Facts Tell

FACTS TELL

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
PYONGYANG, 1960

EDITOR'S NOTE

The people of the world still remember vividly that on the 25th of June 1950 the U.S. imperialist war mongers launched a war of aggression against Korea.

With an eye to realizing their aim of aggression the U.S. imperialists, from the outset of their landing in South Korea in 1945, have been pursued their policy of turning it into their colony and military base and reinforced the puppet Syngman Rhee army.

At last, early on the morning of June 25, 1950, they started invasion along the 38th Parallel.

Today, despite the ignominious defeat they suffered in the war of aggression against Korea, the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique are still pursuing their war policy in Korea.

They are turning South Korea into an atomic war base, grossly violating the Korean Armistice Agreement. They reorganized the U.S. occupation army in South Korea into pentomic division and are now attempting to organize a pentomic division of the puppet army, thus further aggravating tension in Korea and the Far East.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of June 25, the day of the outbreak of the Korean war provoked by the U.S. imperialists, we reprint the confidential documents of the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique, which clearly reveal who provoked the Korean war. These were seized by the Korean People's Army in the archives of the enemy's organs during the war.

The "Report on the U.S. Crimes in Korea" made by the Commission of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers is supplemented.

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PART I

No. 1

LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED APRIL 10, 1949*

April 10, 1949

Dear Dr. Chough:

I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military aid was very timely. However, I did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something."** When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted and the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether he referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regarding a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Korea is considered dangerous to the United States.

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government: Copy.

** The words "to have secured something" are underlined in ink in the original.

What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and ammunition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confidential.

Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

We have more justifiable grounds for demanding arms than any other nation in the world. It was the United States that invited the Soviet Union to occupy northern Korea, and it was the United States that prevented us for two and a half years from arming ourselves. Despite these facts, among the nations of Northeast Asia, Korea is the only one that has been fighting the Communists successfully.

While the United States as the Arsenal of Democracy was freely granting Lend Lease aid and military equipments to every Allied nation, we were the only people denied the privilege of securing any aid. During all the past years we have had to fight the common enemy alone and unaided. Now as the Americans are withdrawing their occupation forces from Korea, would it not be a gross crime to leave us alone and unaided, ill equipped for national defense, while the north Korean Communist force is armed and aided by the Soviet Union? It the northern army should invade our country and force us to accept a Communist rule, would not the United States be responsible for it?

Ever since the attack on Pearl Harbor we urged and begged the State Department to give us military and economic assistance, so that after the defeat of Japan we would have an army of our own to defend our own homeland against Communist attack. We told them plainly that if the Communists were allowed to occupy Korea a situation would be created disadvantageous not only to Korea but also to the United States. This statement was made repeatedly, both orally and in writing, as is fully evidenced in the contents of the State Department files. They turned a deaf ear to our

appeals, and you know the result. Both the United States and Korea are paying the price for the mistakes made by the State Department at that time.

Now we are asking for arms both for our own defense and for the security of the United States. If they fail us again, both Korea and the United States will suffer. We might as well go on record to this effect, to show that we see in advance what is coming and to warn against a repetition of the earlier mistake. Whether our American friends realize it or not, it is up to us to make plain the warning and the appeal.

I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unification of north and south. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. A large proportion of the Korean Communist Army is ready to mutiny and help us chase out of the country such Communist hirelings as Kim Il Sung and others. And the civilian population in the north will join with them in cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist elements. They are all ready to do it without our aid. They have asked us to give them the signal by radio or by other secret message, setting the time and date. In fact they are urging us to do it.

However, we are urging them to wait for the simple reason that we do not have sufficient arms and ammunition for the next necessary step. Supposing we do clean up the north and settle everything quietly to our satisfaction? Who is there to keep the Chinese Eighth Route Army, the Yenan group, and the Siberian forces from moving in again? We have to be prepared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltration from without.

For this operation we need two naval vessels of 8,000 tons each, with 18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements along our coasts. We need 200,000 soldiers trained and organized for defense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-aircraft guns. And we need them now.

Some Americans worry about the lack of technicians, but they do not know that we have ten or twelve aviators who were among the best in Japan, three of whom were accounted the best in the Orient. We have sea captains who can direct our merchant marine. For our army, we can or-

ganize a force of 200,000 men in a short time. We have several hundred thousand returned soldiers who were forced to join the conscript army during the war. They are, in fact, veteran soldiers. They were put into the front lines by the Japanese, and many of them were killed in the South Pacific Island and Manchurian operations. Most of the officers were trained in Japanese universities. People do not know much about them for they keep quiet for fear they may be branded as pro-Japanese. They are loyal citizens and are ready to give their lives for their country. If we get sufficient arms, we can prepare them in no time.

This outline will show you why I wish you to keep the request confidential, and also suggests the line of approach you may find effective in your talks with United States and United Nations officials. Our need is great, and it will be disastrous for both Korea and the United States if it is not heeded. The mistake of withholding arms from Koreans must not be made again, as it was made during the war.

I shall expect your confidential reports on the reactions you receive from the high officials, and we shall try to help in all ways we can from here.

Sincerely yours,
*(Syngman Rhee)**

Dr. Pyung Ok Chough**
Washington DC

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* Inserted by the editor. In the original a blank was left for personal signature.

** In some places Pyung Ok Chough is spelled as Cho Byung-ok.

April 10, 1949

Dear Dr. Chough:

I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military aid was very timely. However, I did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something." When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted and the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether he referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regarding a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Koreais is considered dangerous to the United States.

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Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 1

No. 2

MEMORANDUM OF SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, AND CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED JULY 18, 1949*

July 18, 1949

MEMORANDUM

To Ambassadors Chang and Chough
From: President Syngman Rhee

Ambassador Chang's letters of 13th with the enclosures and the Korean letter, and Ambassador Chough's letters of July 7 and 12 have arrived. I will make my answer to you both in the form of a memorandum so that it will answer both of your letters.

Since Ambassador Chough represents this government to the UN with complete authority to take up any matter I wonder whether it is necessary for you to get separate authorization in making membership application to various organizations belonging to the UN. If necessary, we will make separate credentials each time. But you have the authority to apply after being authorized by your government for memberships to UNWHO and UNESCO.

I feel that you should have someone to be in charge of the office during your absence. The young man you suggest cannot be adequate to act

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

in your behalf. He is young and his qualifications are limited altogether. He is not the person for such a position. Roy Kim who was serving in AMG* as one of the officers in the Property Custody is now visiting with the Businessmen's Goodwill Party. We have used him in our office for some time and he proves himself very helpful and careful. He speaks and writes English very well and takes shorthand. If you care to use him, wire me at once and we will arrange to have him remain there to help you.

I am sure your trip to Canada will be highly successful and hope you will find it enjoyable as well.

Ambassador Chang's report on the interviews made together with Dr. Chough came together with Ambassador Chough's report covering the nearly same although your report is more in detail from which I gather more of the true aspects. I thank you for them.

I am so happy that our two Ambassadors in America are working in such complete cooperation. Very few representatives of other countries have shown such good spirit. I have nothing to worry about at that end and that harmony alone is sufficient to increase the prestige and solidity of our people and government.

As you will find my answer covering the general topics in my memorandum a copy of which will be sent to Dr. Chough, I am answering several questions relating only to the matters of personal interest. I am sorry to disappoint you but the chancery building project is far beyond our limit. In the first place we have no money to meet this obligation. If we can pay in Korean Won we can meet it but since we have to pay in dollars we cannot pay $50,000 for the building with the equipments and the architect and all that. If you want to build it half a year or so later when we have some of our gold mines developed and some commodities exported we may be able to consider it, but at the present time it is a matter of physical impossibility. Why don't you make a temporary arrangement for the chancery to be accommodated in the Embassy building and get along as best as you can. The architects do not have to be so high-priced people. We can get some smaller companies 2 or 3 companies be invited to submit their bids and if their plan is satisfactory we agree to pay so much. I do not think we have to pay 10 per cent fee for the plan alone, and that building also need not be so complete. Please do all you can to minimize the obligation on dollar basis as much as you can.

It seems to me that J.J. Williams is taking more time in our service than I thought he could spare. If he keeps up as he is doing now please quietly ask

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* "American Military Government".

him what his railroad fares are and we might grant him expenses on a diem basis if he is in Washington. I am afraid if we ask him to present his bills we might not be able to pay for it.

REGARDING STAGGERS

We are not paying him anything for his service or even the time he spends. Ask him confidentially how much you should give him not as compensation but actually for the time he uses in serving us—if he does any important work you ask him to do. We do not want him to have a hand in everything but what you think is important. Everything should be itemized so that it will go on our files. All these things must be understood so that you are to decide what expense to pay and what not. That is to say, when you deliberately ask them to do certain things you must clearly state that their carefares* and hotel bills you will pay. No one in the Embassy's service Korean or foreign should decide so much for one trip.

Sorry I had to take this paragraph out** We received the papers for the SS Washington bought by the ECA.

About the Washington mail. We are still trying to make the ECA pay for it because the boat was not chartered by the Korean Government. Please do not pay unless you have direct orders from me.

REGARDING NATIONAL DEFENCE

We declare that our defense program consists of the following figures: 100,000 standing army; 200,000 reserve force and 100,000 police force; total of 400,000 are to be trained and equipped for our national defense. We have now 35,000 police and it will take a long time to reach that maximum number, but that is our aim. I do not think anybody can interpret it as militaristic expansion project.

The American officials in Washington are of the information that 50,000 fully armed, 15,000 lightly armed, and 35,000 police reasonably armed. These are the information furnished by General Roberts and we cannot give full credence to his reports. We are going to check these.

Since the beginning of the arms discussion I appointed our government representatives to sign the receipt of every item that we receive from the Americans and ask them to get the signature of the American

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* As in the original, evidently misspelt.

** The preceding paragraph (regarding the steamship Washington) has been crossed out in the original and is omitted here.

officials showing what they are turning over to us and what we are receiving. There will be no disagreement in the reports regarding the quantities of arms and ammunition we receive.

You have already received one list of the materials turned over to us. As soon as we have another list we shall not fail to forward it to you.

MILITARY AID

The ECA bill should be passed before we take up the military aid. I am glad our Ambassadors and our friends have done so well that the ECA bill is progressing very nicely and I hope this will be adopted by the end of this month. However, the military aid is the most important one. If things come out as I hope I am sure we will get a large portion of the military aid appropriation of 1 billion 4 million dollars requested by President Truman for several European nations and Korea. These funds will be handled solely by President Truman, and I hope we can convince the President that Korea needs a lion's share, and I believe we deserve it. America's investment on Korea will pay more dividend to the United States than all the other receiving nations can yield. However, we must pave the way and if there is any obstacle we must leave no stone unturned until such obstacles are removed. General Roberts, head of the military mission was chosen by Gen. Hodge because Roberts' idea regarding Korea are just about the same. Roberts has no sympathy whatever for the Korean people or for the government. The best way to handle this question is to use Dr. Chough's suggestion that we ask for an official of a higher rank to head the mission. I am confidentially sending word to Gen. MacArthur asking him to appoint Gen. Coulter to head the mission. Whether Gen. MacArthur is in a position to do it or not is more or less uncertain. At any rate the presence of Gen. Roberts here at this time is not helpful to say the least, and if we can possibly get him out of Korea our case will be won hundred percent. Of course, we do not make this an open issue just as China did about General Stilwell. If we can succeed in quietly replacing him it would all be the better. If not we may have to make open demand which we are trying to avoid.

It was very wise of you and friends in Washington to advise us against any attempt to purchase weapons of war or planes at this time. I was so mad when they said we had more weapons than necessary and we did not need planes or naval vessels since the United States planes could be here within four or five hours, and I told them that we are going to arm ourselves sufficiently for our protection either with or

without United States aid. We inquired all around and we have offers of all kinds of weapons but we have postponed it. We are appointing competent men to survey the entire field of our defense program and make a complete list of things we need and let you have it as soon as we can.

LOAN PAYMENT

We have mailed you the minutes of my conversations with Ambassador Muccio. Please go over carefully the part covering the loan of $25,000,000 the payment for the U.S. war surplus materials as both of you know the circumstances surrounding the signing of this loan are highly questionable. Although the agreement was signed by the Representative Democratic Council and was also included in the financial settlement agreement, none of us ever thought that we would be asked to pay it and I had to be quite frank with Ambassador Muccio regarding it. They told me that we had to sign and I told them that we would rather pay it out of our aid fund and forget it. They can do as they please with the money which is supposed to be spent for the educational work of Americans. The Fulbright Act regulations are such that we have little voice in the matter. We are to spend money for the educational purpose in Korea and pay the expenses for American professors to come and lecture here and all that. They said that the Committee is composed of four Americans and four Koreans with the American Ambassador here as Chairman. That is not all.

They asked us to sell the Banto Hotel together with a number of some important buildings in Seoul. As a matter of fact we do not want to go on the record that the Korean government sold any of our properties to any foreign government and we would rather offer them as a gift with the understanding that when they are through with the buildings sooner or later they will give the Korean government the first opportunity to purchase it back according to the prevailing market price then. And we made the deeds including the words "free gift" and the paper was beautifully made and presented in a ceremony in presence of American and Korean officials. Now they told me that Washington declined to accept it as a gift. They want to deduct several million dollars as their price out of the $25,000,000 loan. I do not know if I should ask you to take it up with the State Department and find out their definite reply regarding this or let it go as it is. I am requested to sign the Fulbright proposition and as I do not wish to show my ugly face I am inclined to sign it whatever it is.

REGARDING OFFICIAL STATEMENT

I know that the June 8th statement was meant to be the guarantee that we asked them to make but it was not at all sufficient and our newspapers make quite a headline. If such a statement has any value at all the publicity about it in America should make it worth any. Time and again we found out that any such statement regarding international situation does not mean much unless the American people are informed of the fact that their nation is committing itself to certain obligations. Whether the State Department will make it known to America to that extent I do not know.

The treaty of commerce and amity is rather urgent. American businessmen are so anxious to open trade. We cannot afford to make an open door to everybody without any rules or regulations and therefore we are very anxious to get this commerce treaty signed soon.

REGARDING CHINHAE BAY

We had another visit by a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. We had a little conversation with him and he is so impressed of the Bay and of our situation in general that he suggested we address a letter to the commanding officer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to accept our offer of the privilege of using all our open ports as temporary mobile bases. That means they can visit and stop or stay any time at our invitation, and I think it would be helpful for both countries in safeguarding peace and security of the Pacific. Such a letter will be sent soon.

Since no naval or air officer of high rank can be employed by the Korean Government as it being against the law of the United States—we may have to find some other way of securing the services of able, experienced United States officials. Whether we should ask President Truman or the State Department authorities I do not know. If you think it available please quietly call on Admiral Yarnel and give him the best regards from Mrs. Rhee and myself to him and Mrs. Yarnel. They are our good friends. I would like you to tell him that we should like him to come and visit us as our guest sometime in the near future, if he would accept our invitation. When he comes we could ask him to stay and he may suggest some plan. However, it should be done as top secret. Of course, we do not want to create any impression that we are giving any of our naval or air base to the United States or any other

foreign power because that will create bad impression all around. You understand that, I am sure.

Noble's article seems to reflect the idea of the officials in the State Department. These are all the views of the pro-Japanese sentiment. We strongly object to the Japanese possession of Manchuria. If Japan had to have it she may be allowed to take north of Mukden up to Harbin and Vladivostok. But from Mukden to south Korea we will not allow any other nation to occupy it even temporarily. We will fight to the nail, and this idea should be gradually made known, although at present people may misunderstand our motive and the result may be hurtful to us. We might as well let the world know that we are strongly opposed to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria or any other part especially the part adjacent to Korea. We will never allow Japan to occupy that part of Manchuria without our opposition.

From Noble's article in the Saturday Evening Post you will see that he is propagandizing that Japan should be included in the Pacific Periphery Alliance which each state is bound to defend Japan. If you would particularly read Page 82 you will see that arming Japan is the main purpose of this article and is sugar-coated enough to make the American people take it. Particularly on the second column of Page 84 he outlined that the first half of the Pacific Periphery Alliance should be strong precise military alliance. The second pact is the Asiatic Pacific Pact which includes Korea, should be etc. etc.

No. 3

LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO DR. ROBERT T. OLIVER, AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR, DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1949*

September 30, 1949

To: Dr. Robert T. Oliver
From: President Syngman Rhee

I received your letters and thank you for them.

I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K.** and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to employ Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W.** told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K. We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter.

There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

** As in the original.

as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office How often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some of my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il Sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are ready to repeat the successful defense of our nation against foreign invasions. All the Chinese, Japanese and the Korean communist army in Manchuria and Siberia may do all they want to but we will be able to fight them off. We want to do regardless of what outside nations may do against us. I believe the Soviet Union will not be foolhardy enough to start invasions at the present time. Our people are clamoring for it. Our people in the north want us to let them do it now but we are doing everything we can to quiet them down and it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express this situation very clearly and convincingly and show a copy to Ambassador Chang and Ambassador Chough. We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to our cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, "Give us the tools and we will do the job." Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be. Soviet's cold war is always a winning war. First they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves. Then later they get the communist converts into a gang of terrorists, assassins and robbers by killing, and burning and making the whole human society hell. So long as they continue robbing they have enough to support themselves. They do everything to make trouble for others. By so doing the communists are

strengthening themselves and spreading wider and digging deeper all the time. The more robbery they commit the more money they get. With the money they carry on their killing and burning activities. But the nationalists everywhere have no one to count on for help. They have to use every means of their own to defend themselves and these sort of things continue herein hereout. They cannot keep fighting. They are forced sooner or later to give in and that is what happened in China and everywhere else. What the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing battle and if we continue in this losing battle by sitting still and warding off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long. When the Koreans are willing to get up and clean them up once and for all it is the most psychological moment to do it now. I am sure we can settle this question within a reasonable short time if we are only allowed to do it.

Please put this whole story in a very convincing statement and quietly approach some influential people here and there and let us get their support. If you could get this story into President Truman's ear I think it will have some desired effect.

September 30, 1949

To Dr. Robert T. Oliver

From : President Syngman Rhee

I received your letters and thank you for them.

I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K. and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to employ Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W. told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K. We simply cannot engage anycne who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter.

There is some criticizm about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office. How often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 3

No. 4

REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED OCTOBER 12, 1949*

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 3-4420**

CABLE ADDRESS
KORUNMISON**

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Rd*** EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK 1, N. Y.**

October 12, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rights and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control.

As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

*** Marked in pencil by Syngman Rhee personally, presumably an abbreviation of "read."

which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

AS REGARDS JOHNSTON

In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston with General Adler of The New York Times and he had assured me that he would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me.

I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzberger for today to deliver personally your letter to him.

YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER

It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps against Albania.

I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such a proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune.

Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you.

PACIFIC PACT

Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 5-420

CABLE ADDRESS
ROKUNISON

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 4

mind. He has lined up already such important countries as India, Australia, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, etc. This Romulo plan is being backed by the United States. So long as the Chinese Nationalist Government cannot recover its prestige there is really no hope of carrying out the original plans of a Pacific Pact.

THE CHINESE SITUATION

We have been hoping that the Chinese Government will defend Canton but, alas, that refugee city is given up and the Central Government of China is being moved to Chungking.

The deteriorating of the Chinese situation creates indeed a world tragedy, especially affecting us. There is a great deal of talk reported in the press here about the possibility of recognizing the communist regime by such countries as the United Kingdom, India and other commonwealth countries. Should the world situation develop in such a manner there will be confusion and discouragement within the entire plank of democracies fighting communism. If such nonsensical international policies should play a full sway the United Nations Commission on Korea itself will prove to be an embarrassing agency to our Government. I pray such things will not come true. I hope the American people will wake up to the real situation they are facing now.

With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Chough, Pyung Ok*
Ambassador Plenipotentiary, Personal Representative
of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent
Observer to the United Nations.

POC:fp

H.E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

---

* Signed by Cho Byung-ck personally.

No. 5

REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1949*

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK 1, N.Y.**

November 3, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to make a brief report covering the following subjects:

THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In view of the fact that I have made telegraphic reports at the various stages of the deliberations, that you must have heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and that various official documents of the United Nations covering proceedings on the Korean discussion are to be sent to the Foreign Minister, I shall not dwell much upon details of the deliberations. I want only to point out that the Four Powers draft resolution was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority; that is to say, 48 to 6, in spite of the opposition from the Soviet Bloc. It is gratifying to note those

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

friendly nations which had supported Korea's case in Paris last year are still steady and strong in sympathy toward Korea, in spite of the continuous and tragic development in China since then.

THE NEW FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION

The characteristic difference between the December 12th, 1948 resolution and the present Four Powers draft resolution lies in the fact that the present resolution emphasizes the urgency of observation on the security situation existing in Korea now, and in the future. That is the reason why military experts are to be attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea. With the unification of Korea as the ultimate objective, the Commission's chief function this year is to make observations on the security situation. The second difference is found in that existence of the Commission is indefinite; it will continue its work until the problem of unification has been achieved.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMISSION

I am happy to report that as the result of strong presentation made by our Delegation, the United States Delegation and the State Department, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Secretariat seemed to have given due attention to the need of strengthening the Commission. Syria is dropped and Turkey is nominated in lieu of that former troublesome member country. Secretary-General Lie has further assured me he had requested various member governments on the United Nations Commission on Korea to nominate their representatives from among persons of strong conviction and high experience and rank, with a view of having a system of permanent chairmanship that will insure steady and stabilized functioning of the Commission.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT

As I reported to you by radiogram, Mr. Bertil Renborg was appointed as the new principal secretary in lieu of Dr. Wertheimer. The Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier (American), Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, have assured me that Mr. Renborg is a man of strong conviction and leadership. He is a Swedish citizen and has been in charge of the Division of Communications and Records. He had ten years' experience in the foreign service of the Swedish Government. They further have assured me that those five objectionable persons; namely Shahbaz, Katz, and three others will be changed and that an entirely new and sound secretariat will be constituted.

FACILITIES FOR THE COMMISSION

Both the Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier requested me to convey to our Government their wishes that our Government improve material facilities, especially hotel accommodations, which I did reply to you already by radiogram. As regards this point my attention was drawn even before this conference with the United Nations authorities by Dr. Liu and Noble. They all suggested that our Government should open Chosun Hotel to the members of the Commission and the principal secretary with reduced rate so as to enable them to live comfortably with their per diem allowances they receive from the United Nations. I personally agree with this suggestion. I now make a strong recommendation to the Foreign Ministry that such new arrangements be made as regards hotel accommodations.

REMAINDER OF AGENDA THAT IS OF CHIEF CONCERN TO US

The General Assembly is busy with the deliberations on various important problems but our delegation is principally interested in the question of membership impasse and the Chinese question. As I already reported to you, the Australian delegation submitted to the Special Political Committee the 9 separate draft resolutions requesting the Security Council to reconsider the membership applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea and Nepal and a heated debate is going on at the present time on these Australian resolutions. In spite of Soviet opposition these resolutions will pass in the Special Political Committee and also will be passed by the General Assembly.

Our delegation is particularly interested in the Chinese problem because the opinion of the General Assembly expressed on the Chinese question will be of important consequences on the future status of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and will have great influence on some countries such as the United Kingdom, India, Australia, etc., who are said to be in favor of according some form of recognition to the Red Regime in China. I hope the Chinese delegation will be able to obtain a favorable decision of the United Nations General Assembly on their proposal. We have to do everything possible to check the growing tendency on the part of some important countries to grant recognition to the Chinese Communist Government, because if that should happen that will bring about confusion and disruption within the rank of the democratic countries fighting communism, and also our country will be directly effected since the Red China together with those countries that will recognize it will sit on the Korean Commission.

STATUS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES JOHNSTON

With regard to Johnston's case, I previously reported that I had a per-

sonal discussion with General Adler who then promised due consideration about Johnston's stay in Korea. And in compliance with further instructions from you, I conveyed your message and had discussions with Mr. Sultzberger of The New York Times. Differing from Adler's attitude, he definitely told me Johnston had to be allowed to come back to the United States in view of the fact that he had been abroad for more than 3 years and he desired to join his family here in New York. However, he assured me that he would assign the best possible man to Korea. He told me that one Mr. Sullivan, who was stationed in Shanghai, might be assigned to Korea. Mr. Sultzberger's letter to you is enclosed herewith.

DEFENCE MINISTER'S STATEMENT AND ITS EFFECT

Defense Minister Shin's statement, which was published in Tokyo and appeared in the dailies here, is a source of grave misconstruction both at Washington and Lake Success. I am myself of the opinion that statement which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune under the date of November 1st is not timely and discreet in substance. For your reference a copy of that release is enclosed herewith. In connection with your letter to Dr. Oliver dealing with the same problem, I expressed my own frank view with a sense of loyalty to you. I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question, which truth has been demonstrated in our past bitter experiences by the habitual tactics that are used everywhere by the Soviet Union to obtain world hegemony. The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in march with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government. Such are the views I dare to express with utmost frankness which I beg you to give full consideration. I am sure Dr. Chang will make a report on his part. I am doing the same based on my discussions with some important delegates at Lake Success.

MR. KIM AND MISS MOH

Mr. Kim has been very helpful to me after his assignment to my headquarters. His charming personality, his command of good English and his wide acquaintances with the Press all have contributed to this. I am really grateful to you for assigning him for a further period. As for Miss Moh, I have changed my original recommendation for her return. This change has been influenced by the fact that Mr. Kim will be absent for at least 2 or 3

weeks on his mission to the South American countries and also that Miss Moh herself desires to stay here until after the adjournment of the Chinese question at the United Nations. I hope you will approve her stay through the month of November at least.

SOME OF MY FINANCIAL REQUESTS

Ever since my appointment to this country I have tried to manage my personal and official affairs within the boundaries of the budget. In spite of this my financial condition is not in good shape. I need a further allowance of at least $1,000 to adjust the financial situation I am faced with. I made three special trips to Canada, Indiana (Yarnel), and to Virginia and South Carolina (Halsey). In connection with these trips I spent $650; Canada ($300), Indiana ($250), Virginia and South Carolina ($100). And Miss McIntyre began to send our rent here beginning the period July 1st. But, as you know, the Empire State Building office was contracted from the month of June. Therefore I need another remittance for $280 covering that period. So I should like to have another remittance of $1,000 in connection with these items.

Further I request you to permit my wife to buy $1,000 exchange. I need that amount for my personal use, for purchasing some books, personal effects and for additional dental treatment. Especially I have to buy books, old and new, in foreign languages. My library was gone during the days of my prison life and its aftermath under the Japanese regime. Some winter clothing is also needed. I hope you will give favorable consideration to these requests.

With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Chough Byung Ok*

Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC: lp
Enclosures

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* Signed by Cho Byung-ok personally

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 2-4430

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE · NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

November 3, 1949

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H.E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 5

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 3-4420

CABLE ADDRESS
KOALINSHOP

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 8010
350 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 1, N Y

For your reference a copy of that release is enclosed herewith. In connection with your letter to Dr. Oliver dealing with the same problem, I expressed my own frank view with a sense of loyalty to you. I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question, which truth has been demonstrated in our past bitter experiences by the habitual tactics that are used everywhere by the Soviet Union to obtain world hegemony. The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in march with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government. Such are the views I dare to express with utmost frankness which I beg you to give full consideration. I am sure Dr. Chang will make a report on his part. I am doing the same based on my discussions with some important delegates at Lake Success.

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With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

John M. Chang

Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC:fp
Enclosures

Photostatic copy of the last page of Document No. 5

No. 6

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JANUARY 11, 1950*

*Confidential***

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington D.C.***

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency:

This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result.

I have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle.

The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found

---

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.
** This is hand-written and underlined in ink in the original.
*** Letterhead.

him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,

John M. Chang*

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

Signed by Chang Myun personally.

Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 11, 1950

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Respectfully yours,

John M. Chang

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

Photostatic copy of Document No. 6

No. 7

LETTER FROM YOON PEONG-KOO, ADVISER TO SYNGMAN RHEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED DECEMBER 3, 1948*

3568½ S. VAN NESS AVENUE
LOS ANGELES 7, CALIF.**

Dec. 3rd, 1948

President Syngman Rhee
Republic of Korea
Office of the President
Kyung Mu Dai, Seoul, Korea.

Dear President:

I received your radiogram this morning and I, hereby, thank you for your granting of the time to nurse my wound and to postpone my coming till early spring, to serve you and my country.

Touching on the international affairs and of combatting the threat of Communism against Korea and China, I take the liberty of repeating what I had written you about before and that is: the die is cast that East Asia, like any other immediately threatened spots in the world, has either to submit to Communist conquest without resistence***, or prepare to fight for survival, and that every true-hearted patriot in America, Korea, Japan, and China shall offer self, service and substance for the latter alternative.

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

But to carry on the coming struggle to a victorious conclusion, the forces of defence such as the armies of America, Japan, China and Korea must be coordinated and led by a supreme Commander with triple objectives, namely: The Japanese push through North-eastward and pass Vladivostock; Korean and American armies, after liberating our Northern territory, march through Liatong peninsula and up to Harbin; and a re-viatlized* Chinese Nationalist army to recover China's lost territory including Shantong Province; and after such a victorious conclusion, the Korean and American armies hold Manchuria unitl* the cost of liberation by* fully repaid by means of the developments of the natural resouceses* of that of East Asia by the combined capital and labor of Manchuria, Korea, and America and that until democracy and peace be furmly* established there.

In the next reshaping of Far East, Japan should be made to be content with the preponderant influence to be acquired over Vladivostock and a part of Siberia but never again over Korea and Manchuria for the simple reason that were Japan allowed to become an imperialistic nation again, her vengeful spirit shall kindle again and burn the heart and soul of every Japanese however much she may be witewashed* with American benevolence and democracy, and Japan shall prepare to redeem herself from the humiliating surrender that she had to offer on a U.S.S. battleship; and secondly, perhaps embarce* Russia as an ally and try to embark upon a venture to conquer the world, again. The only way to nip such a potential danger to become a reality, lies in making Korea and China as strong as Japan so as to have one and all serve as mutual check and balance, and in the event of Russia's attack, that the three, with America's cooperation, may serve as a united defender.

No doubt you have a better plan than what I have said herein above concerning the future destiny of Asia, but I repeat these viewpoints to the end that I, not you who are the supreme leader of thirty Million Koreans, may become the target of enemy's attack and ridicule in case our plans happen to be leaked out or intercepted by the enemy.

Faithfully yours

Peong Koo Yoon**

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* As in the original, evidently misspelt.

** Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personally.

No. 8

LETTER FROM YOON PEONG-KOO, ADVISER TO SYNGMAN RHEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED APRIL 18, 1949 AND ATTACHED DRAFT OF THE "U.S.-KOREAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE"*

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

18 April 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Office of the President
Capital Bldg., Seoul.

Dear President:

This enclosure is the concluding portion of a rough draft of Korean-American treaty of alliance. In order to keep the content of this draft strrictly*** secret, I, after drafting it, typed with my own hands. I request you to destroy it if you do not find it to be of any use. On the other hand, if you desire such a treaty, the first step tp*** open a negotiation will be to discuss the feasibility with Mr. Muccio at a private dinner, quoting me as the one who had written about it to Mr. Dean Acheson while I was in Los

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

Angels; you may add that the substance of the draft was brought to the attention of President Truman through a letter last December. To open the discussion in this way will free you from an embarrassing situation in case Mr. Muccio does not see the Korea-America-Russia problem as you or I do.

As your adviser on foreign affairs, I feel that I ought to express my opinion about Dr. Cho, your roving ambassador who is now in America. He seems to be talking too much, thus putting not only you but also the leaders in the U.S. Government in embarrassing situation by* broadcasting such matters as of his requesting for arms aid. His asking for aid is one thing and getting what he asks is quite another but even before he knew anything about the fate of his request, Cho broadcasted about it. No diplomat of any grain of salt would do such silly thing.

As to the under-current of public opinion on internal politics, I will report later in a separate letter.

I add my grateful sentiment to you and to Mrs. Rhee for her visitation during the few days of my confinement in a sick bed.

Respectfully yours,
*Peong Koo Yoon**

ROUGH DRAFT OF TREATY OF ALLIANCE

His Excellency, the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea,

Whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and to perpatuate*** the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

Whereas His Excellency, the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea consider that the relations which will exist between them as independent Sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and amity;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose on terms of complete

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* The words "in embarrassing situation by" are inserted in ink.
** Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personally.
*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

freedom, equality and independence which will become operative following the ratifications, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

John Doe of U.S.A. and

John Doe of Republic of Korea

Who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the United States of America and Republic of Korea; and there shall be established between the high contracting parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations and for the purpose of common defence, and there shall be full and frank consultation between the two Chief Executives in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to adopt including foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or might create difficulties for the other party thereat.

Article 2. Each of the high contracting party will be represented at the Court of the other high contracting party by a deplomatic* representative duly accredited.

Article 3. Should any dispute between the Republic of Korea and a third State produce a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the high Contracting parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peacceful means in accordance with the provisions of United Nations Charter and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Article 4. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of article 3 above, either of the high contracting parties become engaged in war, the other high contracting party will, subject always to the provisions of article below, immediately come to this aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent manace* of war the high contracting parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence.

The aid of His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea in the event of war or the imminent threat of war will consist in furnishing to His Excellency, the President of the United States of America on Korean

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* As in the original, evidently misspelt.

territory all facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of railway, rivers, forts, aerodromes and means of communications.

Article 5. The aid of His Excellency, the President of the United States of America in the event of war or the imminence of war will consist of furnishing to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea on Korean territory all the facilities in his power, including the armed forces of the United States of America, and arms and supplies, ships and airplanes on Lend-Lease basis and technicians and tacticians, as stipulated in annexure to equip and train and to activate the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea.

Article 6. It is understood between the high contracting parties that responsibility maintaining internal order in Korea and, subject to the provisions of Article 5 above for the defense of Korea from external aggression rests with His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea. Neverthless,* His Excellency, the President of the United States of America recognozes* that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communication of American Armed Forces is in the common interests of the high contracting parties. For this purpose and in order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Excellency, the President of the United States of America under Article 4 above, His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea undertakes to grant to His Excellency, the President of the United States of America for the duration of the war, air bases to be selected by His Excellency, the President of the United States of America at or in the vicinities of... and... The President of the Republic of Korea further will authorize His Excellency, the President of the United States of America to maintain forces on Korean territory as well as on Korean waters for the duration of the war and in accordance of the provisions of this treaty on the understanding that the presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereignty of Korea.

Article 7. It is further recognized and understood that should a war of liberation have to be carried on to Manchuria in retaliation to Chinese Communist Army's attack upon Korea, His Excellency, the President of the United States of America will assist His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea to bring the war of liberation to a victorious conclusion, and in return, the President of the Republic of Korea, except the reconstruc-

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* As in the original, evidently misspelt.

tion of North Korea which shall be the sole concern of the Republic of Korea, pledges to put the development of the natural resources of Manchuria and other parts of East China under a joint adminsitration* of the United States of America and Korea.

Article 8. Point-1. This treaty shall be executed in duplicate, in English and Korean languages, of which the former shall be recognized as the authoritative version. Point-2. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this treaty, and should the high contracting parties fail to settle the difference by direct negotiation, then it shall be dealt with in accordance with the decision of a court of arbitration to be composed with** three neutral and disinterested powers who shall be considered fair and impartial to both of the high contracting parties.

Article 9. The Annexure, stipulated in Article 5 is an integral part of this treaty of alliance.

Article 10. Point-1. This treaty shall be coming into force, subect*** to the ratifications of the Congress of the United States of America and of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and shall be in full force from the date of ratification for twenty years. Point-2. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this treaty, the high contracting parties will at the request of either of them conclude a new treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance of the principles of friendship and of mutual security and defense of interests in East Asia as embodied in the present treaty.

Annexure:

(In the annexure, the type and quantity of guns, tanks, caliber, model, and the numbers of ships and types of ships and tonnages, the number, the type and model of airplanes and the quantity and types of supplies that our armed forces need, should be stipulated; and these can best be described by an expert ordnance officer.)

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* As in the original, evidently misspelt.
** As in the original, presumably "of."
*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at . . . . . in duplicate this . . . . Day of . . . . 1949.

L.S. . . . . .
L.S. . . . . .

Notes to be followed on any subject concerning the said 10 articles.

of the war, air bases to be selected by His Excellency, the President of the United States of America at or in the vicinities of------ and -----. The President of the Republic of Korea further will authorize His Excellency, the President of the United States of America to maintain forces on Korean territory as well as on Korean waters for the duration of the war and in accordance of the provisions of this treaty on the under standing that the presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereignty of Korea. Article 7. It is further recognized and understood that should a war of liberation have to be carried on to Manchuria in retaliation to Chinese Communist Army's attack upon Korea, His Excellency, the President of the United States of America will assist His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea to bring the war of liberation to a victorious conclusion; and in return, the President of the Republic of Korea, except the reconstruction of North Korea which shall be the sole concern of the Republic of Korea, pledges to put the development of the natural resources of Manchuria and other parts of East China under a joint adminsitration of the United States of America and Korea. Article 8, Point-I. This treaty shall be executed in duplicate, in English and Korean languages, of which the former shall be recognized as the authoritative version. Point-2. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this treaty, and should the high contracting parties fail to

Photostatic copy of the 4th page of the Draft of the "U.S.-Korean Treaty of Alliance"

No. 9

LETTER FROM YOON PEONG-KOO, ADVISER TO SYNGMAN RHEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JUNE 18, 1949*

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA**
18 June 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Kyung Mu Dai
Seoul.

Dear President:

I just returned from the American Embassy where I had a very cordial conversation with Mr. John Muccio on two subjects, namely—concerning my mission to South American States, and about U.S. aid with air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight.

On the matter of my visiting the central and South American States, Mr. Muccio said he would wire to State Department, requesting that Department to send word to the U.S. diplomatic representatives in Latin America about my contemplated visit so that they may help me in dealing with the Latin American States when I am there, besides Mr. Muccio himself will write to his coleagues*** in Latin America of my coming.

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

On the matter of aid to be given us with U.S. Air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight the North Bear, Mr. Muccio said he would do the cultivation work for the matter with his Government so that things shall be ready in case we need. Mr. Muccio's words are too good to believe but those are what he said to me this morning. Mr. Muccio said he regrets that I have to leave the important job of teaching the youths in the Army and the youths in general about loyalty and devotion to our Fatherland and to the sacred cause of democracy and of Christian civilization. I replied I will return and keep up the work which I have started.

We have to let Mr. Muccio know the countries that you want me to visit so that he may contact with the U.S. diplomats in those countries. Will report more fully when I see you next time. I enclose an extra copy so that you may give it to Mr. Cynn Sung Mo.

Faithfully yours

Peong Koo Yoon*

N.B. Either due to their jealousy or something, both Lee Chul Won and Ben, in certain respects, non-cooperative and discourteous. Lee Chul Won made an announcement that he appointed Kim Kil Jun an adviser to OPI.

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* Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personally.

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

18 June 1949

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Photostatic copy of Document No. 9

PART II

Photostatic copy of Strategic Map for Attack on North Korea

No. 10

STRATEGIC MAP FOR ATTACK ON NORTH KOREA

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

This is a U.S. military map found in the South Korean Army Headquarters, published by Army Map Service, U.S. Army in 1945. (Scale 1:1,000,000)

Lines, arrows and other conventional signs indicated in this map show the plan drawn up by the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee clique for an attack on north Korea.

This map shows that there were to be two South Korean armies stationed along the 38th parallel for the attack on the north. The first army was to begin military operations against north Korea between the Yellow Sea coast and Kolangpo, north-east of Kaesung; whilst the second army was to begin operations between Kolangpo and the east coast.

The first army was to deal the main blow from its right flank in Kaesung area, directly opposite Pyongyang; whilst its left flank was to attack from Ongchin area on Sinchon and afterwards on Sariwon. In addition, a landing under air cover in Hanchon area was to be carried out from Inchon, and to advance towards Pyongyang.

The first army was to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions and one regiment, and the second echelon was to be composed of the 5th division, three independent regiments and several A.A. gun companies.

The second army was to start an attack on the north from Tongduchon, Chunchon and Hanchi areas, and a landing under air cover in Dyengpyeng area was to be carried out from Chumunjin, to cut off communications between Pyongyang and South and North Hamgyeng.

The second army was also to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 7th and 8th divisions, and the second echelon

was to be composed of the 6th division, independent regiments and A.A. gun companies.

In addition to the 1st and 2nd armies there were to be reserve units consisting of the 3rd division (5 regiments) and mechanized divisions.

In the area along the 38th parallel, about ten divisions were to be concentrated for starting the offensive against North Korea.

No. 11

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JUNE 27, 1949*

KOREAN EMBASSY

Washington D.C.**

June 27, 1949.

H.E. President.

WEEKLY REPORTS.

On June 27th, at noon time, I called on President Truman at the White House, and in accordance with Your Excellency's instructions I expressed my deep gratitude for the kindness and efforts he had revealed in assisting our country this time. At the same time I emphasized the necessity of taking immediate measures for military assistance, laid stress on the fact that it would be yet too early for the U.S. Forces to withdraw, that sufficient arms should be left in case of withdrawal and that assistance in the event of any emergency should be absolutely guaranteed. Further, I earnestly appealed to him that treaties for mutual amity and trade should be immediately concluded, and that the Pacific Pact was urgently needed. Mr. Truman listened to me with much concern, and he promised me that he would do his best for security and prosperity of our country, that regardless of the situation in China he would spare no effort in having the bill for the assistance of Korea passed by Congress during the current session.

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. The original is in Korean, written in ink by Chang Myun personally.

** Letterhead in English.

I handed to him the resolution of the Grand Meeting of the Nation concerning national defence, and conveyed to him what our people cried for. He read it carefully, and said that he could see the real intention of it. He had a great sympathy for us, and in an energetic tone he spoke to the point of doing his utmost.

Dr. Chough, Mr. Staggers, Mr. Williams and I came together and had a thorough-going talk about the purchase of arms. We are unanimously of the opinion that at this moment when the bills of economic aid, military aid, etc. are being discussed at Congress from every point of view it will unfavourably influence the adoption by Congress of the same bills, should our Government purchase aeroplanes and other arms from the American market, not to speak of its being unrealizable under the given circumstances. We all are also of the opinion that we should survey the possibility in secret and pull it through in due time.

Re: Emigration to Argentine.
Omitted.*—Ed.

Re: ECA Bill at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Arrival of Servants.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Arrival of Economic Mission.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Visa for Mr. Chei Jinha's trip to Mexico.
Omitted.—Ed.

Chang Myun
Seal**

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* Three pages in the original are omitted here in view of its unimportance.

** A square seal, "the seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.

No. 12

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JULY 13, 1949*

*Confidential***

H.E. the President.

WEEKLY REPORTS.

!. Regarding interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig-Gen. Timberman.

On July 8th, in the afternoon, I and Dr. Chough visited the War Department and had an interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-Gen. Timberman, a member of his staff. We explained to them that at present our country is in urgent need of reinforcement of the armed forces on account of the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces, and asked them what measures the U.S. Military authorities would take. Brig.-Gen. Timberman*** answered.

"As far as we American authorities can see, Korea has nothing to worry about. Because:

1. Taking into account the international situation, the Soviet Union will certainly not attack Korea with her own troops.
2. The Chinese Communist Army, too, will not possibly invade Korea.
3. As the North Korean Communist Army is inferior to that of South

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. The original is in Korean, written in ink by Chang Myun personally.

** "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs.

*** In the original the name of "Gen. Wedemeyer" was written first, then crossed out and "Brig. Gen. Timberman" was inserted in its place.

Korea in its numerical strength as well as in its equipments, it will certainly not itself start the expedition against the South.

4. The South Korean National Army is splendid in its numerical strength and in its equipments.

5. When the U.S. Forces pulled out, they left a large quantity of weapons; and munitions, too, must be sufficiently reserved.

6. As for further military aid to Korea, as soon as the sum of aid is fixed by Congress, we will decide on kinds and quantities of weapons to be delivered, taking account of the opinion of the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in Korea."

(Lieut.-Gen. Wedemeyer could not abide the interview very long as he did not have much time).

We said, we were told that we were very short of ammunition, and in the event of an actual warfare it would last only for a couple of days; and we asked him, if that was true. He answered: "We haven't received any such report from Brig-Gen. Roberts, and we don't think you are short of ammunition." He said further: "It was a matter of course that the U.S. troops pulled out this time." He said, anyhow it was an established fact that the United States would militarily assist Korea; and after the decision by Congress, further aid would be itemized in accordance with the recommendations by the Military Advisory Group, etc.

It is certain that American military aid in the future will depend a great deal on the will and attitude of Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Chief of the Military Advisory Group—a fact which Your Excellency will have to consider. It seems to be adequate to make a confidential proposal for the change of his post through Ambassador Muccio.

As for the ammunition, I also had a talk with Mr. Bond of the State Department. They say here that there are about fifteen million rounds in all, of which not the whole quantity will be handed over to the Korean National Army, but will be kept by the U.S. Military Advisory Group and delivered occasionally. We insisted that the whole quantity should be handed over to the Korean National Army so that we could use them as occasion demanded. Any way, for the sake of further negotiations, too, we need an itemized table of weapons and munitions we received when the last troops of the U.S. Forces withdrew. I hope Your Excellency will send me the table.

We asked both Generals to do their utmost for the military aid of our country. Mr. Staggers will have an interview with Mr. Wedemeyer this afternoon, and appeal to him again.

2. Regarding interview with Acheson, Secretary of State.

On July 11th, at 3.00 p.m., I and Dr. Chough made a call on Mr. Acheson. Dr. Chough conveyed to him the following three points as Your Excellency's message:

1. For the Korean National Army and the security forces, at least 100,000 standing army, 50,000 reserve force, 50,000 police force and 200,000 militia must be equipped and be ready for any emergency. The United States shall supply us with arms sufficient to meet this.

2. It must be clearly mentioned that in the event of invasion of foreign forces or of the North Korean Communist Army under command of a certain foreign power, the United States shall positively come to our military assistance or back us.

3. The United States shall take an active part in supporting a Pacific Pact or a similar union of Asiatic countries for their common security.

Thereupon, Mr. Acheson answered as follows:

1. As for the first item, it will be carried out by decision of Congress;

2. As for the second item, though no specific statement can be made concerning any individual state, we think measures for Korea, as was declared by the State Department on June 8th, can fully comply with the demands (Original enclosed);

3. As for the third item, for the time being, the United States cannot officially take part in it.

Though the United States hesitates in officially taking part in the matter of the 3rd item, we can gather from yesterday's statement of Mr. McDermott, official reporter of the State Department, that for the first time the United States is deeply interested in a union of Asiatic countries against the communist influence; and we can expect that in due time she will take an active part in it.

The press here published a good account of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's interview with the President of the Philippines concerning the Pacific Pact as well as Your Excellency's statement. Herewith I enclose selections of them for Your Excellency's reference.

I made a statement concerning the so-called September Elections in North Korea, which I am also enclosing.

Mr. Staggers has just come back, having had a confidential talk with

Gen. Wedemeyer for two hours concerning the situation in our country. Gen. Wedemeyer's attitude is through and through sympathetic and co-operative, by which we are very much enlightened. The talk includes Brig-Gen. Roberts' case, question of establishing a Korean-American Joint Commission concerning the arms etc. I cannot make reports on it this time; but Mr. Staggers will make a detailed report by the next mail.

Ambassador of the Republic of
Korea to the United States of
America.

Seal*

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* A square seal, "the seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.

極秘

駐美大第 號
檀紀四二八二年 六 月十七日

大韓民國駐美國大使

大統領 閣下

件名 電信報告에 關한 件

一. 別紙마이어 將軍及 팀버맨氏(Brig. Gen. Timberman)과의 會談報告

去七月八日午后 陸軍省으로 招待士에게 마이어 別紙마이어 將軍及 팀버맨氏와 會見한 바 會見에 있어서 美軍撤退에 伴한 我軍備의 充實에 關한 美軍部 當局의 如上한 對策이 있었음을 報告함에 對하여

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 12



Photostatic copy of the 2nd page of Document No. 12

No. 13

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED APRIL 6, 1949*

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON**

April 6, 1949

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to report to you on the recent developments and my activities at our Embassy in Washington.

On April second Dr. Chough and I had a long conference with General Wedemeyer of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. We presented to him a strong appeal for military aid to Korea, illustrating it by a detailed analysis of the Korean military situation and needs of the Korean defense forces. General Wedemeyer now has the report under consideration. His immediate and specific advice in regard to the Air Force is that it is expensive in up-keep and not more than a minimum force should be maintained. Bombers are likely to kill our fellow countrymen. Light planes with arms for reconnaisance and intelligence are the most valuable. In case of full-scale invasion we can apply for United States aid. The Navy's greatest need is for small fast ships as an efficient coast guard. The General's intelligence reports show that early estimates of the strength of the military force of north Korea were exaggerated both as to number and equipment and the prospects of an invasion from the north are slim at this time. General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Gov-

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

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Dr. Chough and I also visited Senator Knowland of California and made a similar appeal to him. He assured us of his sympathy and support.

Yesterday I enjoyed a lengthy conversation with Congressman Kee, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, stressing an appeal for ECA funds and military aid. He will do his best to help us. I have it on good authority that the ECA allocation for Korean aid, about $190 million, will pull through the Congress. I suggested to Congressman Kee that a Pacific Pact is the next step, and he agreed.

Since my presentation of credentials to President Truman on March twenty-fifth, I have been very busy making courtesy calls on the members of the diplomatic corps in the city. All the Ambassadors have offered their strong support. The Ambassadors of El Salvador, Egypt, Iran and Brazil are seriously considering the request for formal recognition of our government. Sr. Nabuco of Brazil suggests that Your Excellency write a letter to the President of his country informing him of the establishment of the Republic of Korea and your election as President and assuring him of the good will of our Government. A reply from the President of Brazil will constitute a recognition of our government. I told the Ambassador of our population problems and he has assured me that he will take up the question of immigration of Koreans to Brazil with his Government for early action.

The signing of the Atlantic Pact was an impressive ceremony. As a member of the Diplomatic Corps I was formally invited to attend by the Secretary of State. There is little doubt about quick ratification by the Senate. The Near Eastern Ambassadors expressed personally the necessity for a Mediterranean Pact and the Far Eastern countries for a Pacific Pact. An expression of the urgency of such a Pacific Pact from the President of our Republic might do much good to expedite such an agreement.

Archbishop Yupin cordially invited me to dinner last week and informed me that he will come to Korea by way of Japan, to arrive in the latter part of May.

I am continuing my through search for an Embassy building. The house of the late Chief Justice Stone, located on Wyoming Avenue and 23rd Street near Massachusetts Avenue has been highly recommended by Mr. Staggers and Mr. Williams and appears to be suitable as to location, dignity and serviceability. However, I shall continue my negotiations with the realtors.

Thank you for the appointment of Mr. Choi Woonsang as Third Secretary at the Embassy. He will be of great assistance here. Mr. Namkoong is still awaiting his formal commission and allocation of funds as Consul

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1949

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to report to you on the recent developments and my activities at our Embassy in Washington.

On April second Dr. Chough and I had a long conference with General Wedemeyer of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. We presented to him a strong appeal for military aid to Korea, illustrating it by a detailed analysis of the Korean military situation and needs of the Korean defense forces. General Wedemeyer now has the report under consideration. His immediate and specific advice in regard to the Air Force is that it is expensive in up-keep and not more than a minimum force should be maintained. Bombers are likely to kill our fellow countrymen. Light planes with arms for reconnaisance and intelligence are the most valuable. In case of full-scale invasion we can apply for United States aid. The Navy's greatest need is for small fast ships as an efficient coast guard. The General's intelligence reports show that early estimates of the strength of the military force of north Korea were exaggerated both as to number and equipment and the prospects of an invasion from the north are slim at this time. General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic. Meanwhile, the General will do his utmost for us and will consult with Secretary Acheson in our behalf.

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 13

General in New York. Mr. Kim Sae Sun is doing good work in establishing the Purchasing Commission in Washington. However, he is without funds and very much needs further resources, retroactive to the date of his appointment, to carry on his work.

Following the instructions I have received, all passports presented at this office for Korean visas are held pending clearance from Seoul. The ECA has strongly protested the delay in the issuance of the visas for they interpret it as a violation of the ECA Aid Pact signed by the two Governments which assures unobstructed passage of ECA personnel to Korea and in Korea. Mr. Hoffman is very disturbed and indignant about the situation, as are Dr. Johnson and Dr. Harriman. The State Department informs me that Mr. Muccio has taken the matter up at the Capitol in Seoul. ECA plans to send about two hundred fifty persons to Korea; about half are already there. Please advise further on this question.

The reaction here in America to the arrest of Dr. Ryang, the Methodist Bishop, and others, was very strong. Many protests have been received by Americans who have been staunch friends of Korea. I am enclosing a copy of one of these letters which illustrates the feeling here.

Accept Sir, the continued expression of my high esteem.

John M. Chang*

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, KOREA

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* Signed by Chang Myun personally.

No. 14

REPORT OF 971st C.I.C. DETACHMENT TAEJON DISTRICT OF THE U.S. ARMY, DATED JANUARY 27, 1949*

*Confidential***

971ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
TAEJON DISTRICT OFFICE
APO 235***

File No. . . . . .
27 January 1949

SUBJECT: Execution of Military Prisoners, Taejon (1040-1490).
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 271000 January 1949, execution of Military prisoners was to be held just outside Camp Taejon. Upon arrival at the scene a lack of preparation was noticed. At approximately 1030 20 prisoners were blindfolded and led to the post and tied. No Medical Officer was on the scene and only ten riflemen to fire on the twenty prisoners. The Advisor to the 2nd Korean Army Brigade immediately stopped the executions and advised to have a Medical Officer present and to either get ten more riflemen or execute ten prisoners at a time. Ten of the prisoners were untied and led to the rear of the firing point. A Medical Officer and ten riflemen were summoned. At approximately 1130 final preparation was completed and the executions were started. B-2

The ten prisoners were then retied to the post and the riflemen were assigned a post to fire upon. Each fired the allotted rounds into the prisoners assigned. One clip of M-1 was used in each volley. Then the Kun Ki Dai

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* This document was found in the headquarters of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Korea.

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*** Letterhead.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The ten prisoners were then retied to the post and the riflemen were assigned a post to fire upon. Each fired the alotted rounds into the prisoners assigned. One clip of M-1 was used in each volley. Then the Kun Ki Dai officer, in charge of the executions, went down the line and fire from one to three rounds in the bodies that showed signs of life. In some instances he had to fire on them the second time, making three time in all. After each group was pronounced dead by the Medical Officer, who merely went part of the way down the line and pointed to the dead and the live, the bodies were carried from the posts to the pit to the side of the execution scene. Firing was heard in the pit, evidently on those that still showed signs of life. B-2

Fourgroups were executed, the first group totaled 20, the second 18, the third 18 and the fourth 13. Totaling 69 in all. After the first group was executed at approximately 1130 the rest of the executions followed in order and at 1215 all were executed. B-2

All prisoners executed were from the 14th (YOSU) Regiment, from the Yosu-Sunchon area. They all appeared to be young and estimated ovorall average of eithteen years of age.Prisoners were shoeless and were clad in underwear and some in fatigues. B-2

After the first group which was led to the bost from back

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 14

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Foursgroups* were executed, the first group totaled 20, the second 18, the third 18 and the fourth 13. Totaling 69 in all. After the first group was executed at approximately 1130 the rest of the executions followed in order and at 1215 all were executed. B-2

All prisoners executed were from the 14th (YOSU) Regiment, from the Yosu-Sunchon area. They all appeared to be young and estimated overall average of eighteen years of age. Prisoners were shoeless and were clad in underwear and some in fatigues. B-2

After the first group which was led to the bost* from back of the firing point, the rest were trucked to the posts, then tied by a detail prearranged. B-2

One very young prisoner tied to the post was singing the Communist Battle song, and the last group sang as they were trucked to the posts, they sang a Loyal Korean Army Song. Most all* prisoners were pleading that they were innocent. B-2

DISTRIBUTION
G-2, USAFIK**. 2
File 2

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* As in the original.

** "United States Army Force in Korea."

No. 15

SCHEME (A) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

*(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)***

SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950.

Section III, Intelligence Bureau,
Army Headquarters.

Policy:

In consideration of the tense international situation at home and abroad fundamental policy of the intelligence work shall hinge upon execution of matters of importance. Extermination of puppet organizations of North Korea shall be aimed at by means of secret warfares, and with might and main successful intelligence works shall be carried out for a rapid frustration of the said organizations for the restoration of lost territories.

INTELLIGENCE:

TARGETS:

I. Military intelligence:

1) Formations and equipments of the stationed units;
2) Movements and defence of the 38th parallel line;
3) Ideological tendencies of the People's Army officers;
4) Attitude of the Army towards the government and the people;

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* This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The original is in Korean.
This document is divided into A and B Sections by the editor in view of the difference in their contents.

** Stamp.

5) How far the Army participates in politics;
6) How much the population has confidence in the Army;
7) Relations between the Army and political parties and social organizations;
8) Morale and discipline;
9) How far the Soviet military advisers have a hand in the North Korean affairs;
10) Relations with the Eighth Route Army in Manchuria;
11) Operation plans;
12) Anti-army and anti-war sentiments of the Army personnel;
13) Military finance and funds;
14) How the Army is supplied;
15) Military intelligence work versus the South.

II. Political, economic and ideological intelligence:

1) Popular rumours about the lower administration officials
2) Collections, labour service, requisitions, taxes;
3) Complaints of the civilians against the officials;
4) Political co-operation of the people;
5) Industrial conditions;
6) Rehabilitation of business and industry;
7) How far the communist regime is understood;
8) How transportation facilities are being operated;
9) Foreign trades;
10) How far the international situation is understood;
11) Propagandas at home and abroad;
12) Education and culture;
13) Ideological tendencies of the students;
14) Materials delivered to the Soviet Union.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

Main points of the intelligence work:

I. The main point of the intelligence work lies in getting the mainstay of secret agents as follows, and equipping them with the qualifications of best workers through a thorough-going training:
1) One who has knowledge of military affairs, is interested in getting wind of secrets, and predisposed to adventure;
2) One who is clever, has sound judgement and knows the art of social intercourse;
3) A quick witted, bold and self-possessed person;

4) A shrewd person with a wealth of common sense and who is skilled in techniques;
5) One who has a strong lust for fame and money;

II. Together with the permanent secret agents, liaison agents shall also be used, and through their intimate connections informations shall be transmitted; liaison agents shall be selected as follows:

1) One who is skilled in feigning a pedlar, also skilled in arts and techniques;
2) Beggars who hang about the taverns, and give performances of dancing, singing and musical instruments;
3) Barbers, photographers, train conductors and engineers;
4) Pedlars of miscellaneous goods, motorcar drivers, fishermen, etc.;
5) Cooks, bar-maids, waitresses and day-labourers.

Powerful nets of intelligence service shall be laid with the above-mentioned permanent and liaison secret agents; they must assume an ever-growing dimension, and at the same time they shall have cells as follows:

III. Cell organizations:

1) Cells, up to 5 in number, shall be organized around a leading agent; each cell shall consist of 3 to 5 persons, and they shall incessantly bring in informations;
2) In each cell, the person who is in charge shall have direct contacts with the permanent agent, and other cell members shall work by themselves;
3) One who is in charge of the cell shall give only partial orders to the agents under him, and the full account of an affair shall not be revealed;

IV. To bribe persons in important positions in various organs:

1) To make use of officers and men of the Army, who are prone to conversion, and pilfer confidential documents;
2) To infiltrate into important organs such as police stations, Counter-Intelligence Bureaus, etc., and steal confidential documents or obtain secrets;
3) To buy off workers and purveyors of prohibited military areas for sketches of important buildings.

INTRIGUES:

TARGETS:

I. Intrigues for Destructions:

1) Concerning railroads:
   a) To destroy bridges and tunnels;
   b) To derail and overturn military trains;
   c) To destroy freight cars and station buildings;
   d) Collision;
   e) To destroy main railway factories.
2) Heavy industry, firms and factories:
   a) Munitions factories of the People's Army;
   b) Various important factories of the Army;
   c) Public buildings;
   d) Aerodromes;
   e) Power plants and transformer stations;
   f) Broadcasting stations;
   g) Cylinder-press of newspapers.

II. Incendiarism: To set afire

1) Public buildings,
2) Dwelling houses,
3) Public halls,
4) Military barracks and school buildings,
5) Buildings of political parties and other organs,
6) Aerodromes,
7) Power plants and transformer stations,
8) Broadcasting stations,
9) Various factories of the Army,

III. To infect with bacteria:

1) Army kitchens,
2) Dining rooms of the police,
3) Banquet halls of the Army, government, party, etc.,
4) City reservoirs, rivers,
5) Houses of the leaders of the Army, government and the party.

IV. Propaganda:

1) To distribute leaflets;
2) To post wall newspapers;
3) To scribble on walls;
4) To circulate sensational rumours;
5) To inspire liberalistic ideas;
6) To stir up people against the war, against military service;
7) To instigate anti-communist ideas;
8) To provoke revolts and nationalistic uprising;

9) To instigate strikes;
10) To instigate sabotages;
11) To propagandize the might of the National Army of the Republic of Korea;
12) To instigate migration to South Korea;
13) To propagandize freedom in South Korea.

V. Economic intrigues:
1) To corner and hold back main goods;
2) To waste daily necessities;
3) To counterfeit North Korean bank notes;
4) To hinder collections of provisions.

VI. Assassination:
1) The biggest ringleaders of North Korea;
2) Higher officers of the People's Army;
3) Higher officers of the Home Ministry;
4) Leaders of the political parties and social organizations;
5) Persons in charge of cultural organizations;
6) Highest cadres of the ministries;
7) Highest cadres and those of middle rank in charge of intelligence work on South Korea;
8) Bad elements in the intelligence service, policemen and officials;
9) Previous officers of the National Army who have deserted to the north, and the ringleader in the desertion of s/s Smith to the north.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) Bold and valiant persons shall be selected from the agents in service, and they shall receive sufficient remunerations; at the same time orders shall be given in accordance with their specific characters;
2) Agents shall personally and secretly take up the execution of destroying main buildings; at the same time they shall pick up adequate collaborators on the spot of their actions;
3) Prior to destroying the objects, thorough-going study of the situation shall be done;
4) In setting buildings afire, employees in the buildings shall be bribed, but the agents shall personally make a careful survey of the matter beforehand;
5) In assassinations, cell members shall bribe waitresses or kitchen workers, and have them poison the persons in question;

6) Skilled agents shall manage to be near the leaders, and poison them during meals or at drinking parties;
7) Employees at the city reservoirs shall be bribed into poisoning the water;
8) Kitchens of the Army and public organizations shall be poisoned;
9) Purveyors and pedlars who regularly visit the Army or main organs shall be utilized for mixing poisons in food supplies;
10) In propaganda intrigues, circulations of leaflets and northbound broadcasts, which have already been in use, shall be intensified;
11) Students who harbour patriotic ideas shall be utilized for posting wall newspapers or scribbling on walls;
12) Propaganda leaflets shall be dispatched to youth organizations through mails;
13) In the main cities secret senders shall be set, and counter-propaganda shall be broadcasted as occasion allows;
14) Songs in praise of the Republic of Korea shall be propagated among the primary school children;
15) Dynamite, etc. shall be buried at aerodromes or main bridges.

MAIN POINTS OF COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE:

1) Secret ink-cloth shall be used if there is no wireless set;
2) Colourless letters shall be used in newspapers or magazines;
3) Ciphers shall be used in disguised mails;
4) Bacteria shall be disguised as ordinary drugs;
5) Other tools and materials, mentioned in the instructions, shall be obtained from the spot if possible, and shall be sent over only when they are not obtainable there.

UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES:

TARGETS:

1) North Korean secret agents who have reliable guarantors in South Korea;
2) Members of the South Korean Workers' Party, who are disposed to conversion;
3) To select adequate persons from converted captives;
4) To select adequate persons from businessmen who trade between the north and south;
5) To utilize spies who live permanently in south Korea;
6) To utilize north Korean ships now in south Korea for smuggling;
7) R.H. special service; R.C.K. special service; N.N. special service;

R.I.W. special service; K.P. special service.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To take advantage of criminal acts, i.e. weaknesses of the person in question, pretend to pardon him leniently, fully protect him and utilize him;
2) To double the pay, when employing spies of north Korean intelligence organs, and try to get accurate informations;
3) To train North Korean spies for not less than a week how to give false informations, when sending them back;
4) The person who manipulates an enemy spy must be very careful that the latter does not know that the southern authorities are aware of his double-dealings. He shall keep his eye on the enemy spy in strict secret.

WORK FOR CONVERSION:

TARGETS:

1) On officers and men of the People's Army;
2) On officers and men of the Police;
3) On leading cadres of various political parties and social organizations;
4) On technicians in heavy industry;
5) On leading railway cadres as well as engineers and assistants;
6) On officers and men of the Air Force;
7) On officers and men of the Marines;
8) On cadres in freight vessel service;
9) On leading intelligentsia in the organs and magazines of communist hordes;
10) On higher officials in administrative bodies.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To send back patriotic young men from the North, and send them to the People's Army, to influence those who are prone to ideological conversion or those who have joined the army by force, and to persuade them to desert or revolt;
2) To praise incessantly the might of the South Korean National Army by means of leaflets;
3) To allure the person in question into conversion through his relatives, schoolmates and other friends.

REMARKS

I. Agents on Special Service to and from the north;

1) Preliminary investigations for the acquisition of persons for Special Service;
   a) Preliminary investigation is the first step to acquiring such persons—they must be persons with sound patriotic ideas.
   b) The work shall hinge upon county people's organizations or youth organizations of the people who have left the north;
   c) By preliminary investigations the person in question shall be imbibed with aspirations and curiosities for our aims and schemes, and his patriotic morale shall be inflamed;

2) Selection of persons for Special Service:
   a) The person shall be selected upon his application or through suggestions in accordance with the preliminary investigations;
   b) At least for two months his behaviour, above all his ideological background, shall be strictly observed, and when he is proved to be a staunch patriot, he shall be selected;
   c) One who is fit for the service is:—a person who has left the north, concretely and thoroughly knows the military, political and economic situation in the north, and is interested in adventure;
   d) One who has intimate friends and relatives in north Korean puppet organizations;

3) Examination of persons for Special Service:
   a) If possible he shall be examined for several times, and his mentality and circumstance shall be of primary consideration; trifling weak points should also be of little consideration lor the service;
   b) As a rule, person in charge of the manipulation of the candidate shall examine; but officers concerned, who fully knows his mentality, shall also examine him;
   c) It is required of the examiner to assume dignity and be erudite so that the person in question can have respect for and confidence in him;

4) Training of persons for Special Service:
   a) Persons for Special Service shall be trained per month, per week or occasionally, but always in a secret place;

b) In training, applied psychology should be understood and specific character of the person in question should be adequately estimated for the service; in consideration of human nature, no personal connections among themselves shall be tolerated;

5) Orders to person on Special Service:
   a) Orders shall be given within the limit of possibility: Prior to the issue of orders, their contents as well as its limit in time shall be thoroughly and philosophically studied, i. e. those orders which can be carried out.
   b) Not to issue too much orders to a single person; the order must be simple and clear, and the target must be definite, so that the ordered can have full self-confidence;
6) Dispatch of persons on Special Service:
   a) Agents shall be dispatched by ones or twos; they must be persons who are well acquainted with customs and landscape of their destination; they shall make use of their relatives, friends and schoolmates;
   b) When dispatched, he shall be escorted to the border by officers or non-commissioned officers, thus guaranteeing his crossing;
7) Activities at the destination:
   a) The service shall be carried out in accordance with the order and circumstances, best methods with regard to time and space shall be applied, and confusions shall be avoided;
   b) He must always be ready for the worst, and actions shall be taken after careful preparations;
8) Way home:
   a) The route home shall be the same as the route out;
   b) The person on Special Service shall speak with nobody on his way home, and shall not be in touch with the organ concerned near the border;
9) Reports of the person on Special Service:
   a) Besides written or oral reports, reports through secret ciphers, colourless letters or secret ink;
10) Estimation of reports:
   a) Grades A, B and C shall be used as regards origin and accuracy of the reports;
   b) When intelligence has come from person A on Special Service, it shall be compared with that of another person, who is not on Special Service, from the same place, and thus accuracy can be ensured.

11) Education of persons on Special Service:
   a) When a person on Special Service has returned, his service shall be highly praised, regardless of his success or failure; his errors shall be immediately corrected through education, and thus success shall be guaranteed for the days to come;
   b) A person, who hands in informations of 90 % accuracy, shall be remunerated with a sum beyond his expectation, and due respects shall be paid him.

MEASURES FOR BEREAVED FAMILIES OF VICTIMIZED AGENTS, AND COUNTER-MEASURES FOR DESERTED AGENTS.

I. Livelihood of bereaved families of agents arrested in the field of their activities shall be guaranteed, and they shall be safeguarded morally and materially.

II. Families of those who were not killed, but imprisoned, shall be supported till they return.

III. A satisfactory solatium shall be paid to the family of the agent who has been executed or exiled, and cannot return forever; at the same time some adequate occupation shall be arranged for its members.

IV. A person of this Section, who arrives at his destination at the expense of the Section's fund, but tries not to come back, or has fawned on the enemy and becomes a convert, shall be allured by another person in the same service to come back and shall be executed, or he shall be assassinated by somebody else.

PERSONNEL AND EXPENSE FOR OUTSIDE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN VARIOUS PLACES

Permanent Secret Agents:				
Place	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
Pyongyang	15 per.	50,000—	750,000—	9,000,000—
Sinijoo	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Haejoo	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Nampo	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Namchun	3 ,,	50,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—
Sunchun	3 ,,	50,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—
Sariwon	4 ,,	50,000—	200,000—	2,400,000—
Hamheung	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Chungjin	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Wonsan	8 ,,	50,000—	400,000—	4,800,000—
Heungnam	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Chulwon	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Sungjin	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Najin	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Hoeryeng	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Total	103 per.	750,000—wons	5,150,000—wons	61,800,000—wons

LIAISON SECRET AGENTS:

Place	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
Pyongyang	5 per.	30,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—wons
Sinijoo	4 ,,	30,000—	120,000—	1,440,000—
Haejoo	5 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Sariwon	4 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Namchun	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Nampo	4 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Sunchun	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Hamheung	5 ,,	30,000—	150,000—	1,080,000—
Chungjin	5 ,,	30,000—	150,000—	1,080,000—
Wonsan	4 ,,	30,000—	120,000—	1,440,000—
Sungjin	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Chulwon	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Najin	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Heungnam	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Hoeryeng	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Total	57 per.	450,000—wons	1,590,000—wons	16,920,000—wons

* This is precisely the figure given in the original.—Ed.

FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AT HOME

IN SEOUL:

District	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
Mapo	3 per.	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Yungdeungpo	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Yongsan	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
West Gate	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
East Gate	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Choonggoo	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Sungdong	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Sungbook	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Chongno	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
In the Province:				
Inchun	5 per.	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Poosan	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Pohang	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Yusoo	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Koonsan	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Choonchun	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Total	55 per.	185,500—wons*	825,500—wons	10,300,000—wons

* As in original.—Ed.



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FOR UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES

Classification	Target	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
R.H.	Special Serv.	500,000—	6,000,000—
R.C.K.	South Korean Workers' Party	200,000—	2,400,000—
N.N.	Supreme People's Assembly	200,000—	2,400,000—
R.U.N.	Counter Intelligence Bureau	100,000—	1,200,000—
K.I.P.	Special Service	300,000—	3,600,000—
Total		1,300,000—wons	15,600,000—wons

GRAND TOTAL: ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLION AND ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND WONS.

No. 16

SCHEME (B) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

*(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)***

SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR OF 1950

Section III, Intelligence Bureau,
Army Headquarters.

POLICY:

This Section is going to inflict, by March this year, epochmaking destructions, intrigues and provocations upon the North Korean hordes, and lay a complete net of intelligence service around the puppet army as well as political, economic and cultural spheres and also in adjacent countries, and frustrate the March move of the puppet hordes. At the same time, the Section is going to accurately grasp the movement of the puppet hordes, especially of the puppet army, nip it in the bud, and from being defensive we change into the offensive, and by safeguarding our leading position stir up revolts within the Northern territory for the annihilation of the puppet hordes.

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* This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The orginal is in Korean.
In this document, the general plan of intelligence work against North Korea which had already been planned out in the previous document No. 15 is more concretely elaborated here and specifically divided up for each quarter of the year of 1950.

** Stamp.

THE FIRST QUARTER: JANUARY—MARCH.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT:

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
   1) On the People's Army;
   2) On the Police Force;
   3) On the Volunteers;
   4) On the Special Units;
   5) On the Coast Guard;
   6) On relations with the Soviet Army;
   7) On relations with the Chinese Communist Army;

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:
   1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a division;
   2) To station at least 2 permanent secret agents each in Pyongyang, Nanam, Hamheung, Sinijoo, Wonsan and Heungnam;
   3) To station permanent secret agents in Hongkong and Shimonoseki.

III. Utilization of enemy spies:
   1) R.H. special service;
   2) R.C.K. special service;
   3) N.N. special service;
   4) R.I.M. special service;
   5) K.P. special service;
   6) R.T.K. special service;

IV. To organize cells.

Intrigue;

I. Destructions:
   1) Railway (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
   2) Bridge (Hamgyeng Line);
   3) Tunnel (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line);
   4) The Soopoong Dam,
   5) Pyongyang Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria.
   1) In Nampo;
   2) In Najin;

3) In Wonsan;
4) Kitchens of various Division-Headquarters.

III. Incendiarism;

1) Arsenal at Kanni;
2) Arsenal at Supo

Assassination:

I. In politice circles

II. In military circles

Conversion:

I. 5 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 5 officers of the People's Army.
III. 5 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Pyongyang;
II. In Sinijoo;
III. In Chungjin;
IV. In Hoeryeng;
V. In Yunchun;
VI. In Kangge.

SCOUT UNIT:

Transportation:

I. Railroads:
1) Double gauge;
2) Rails;
3) Number of wagons;
4) Coal supply;
5) Maintenance of railway tracks;
6) Ware-houses;
7) Electric railroads;
8) Stations;
9) Water supply;

10) Depots;
11) Machineries.

II. Roads:

1) Length, width, height, soil, conditions of the vicinity, pass, tree-lined streets, hills, plains, etc.

III. Bridges:

1) Length, width, height, material, solidity, age, soil, river conditions.

Topography:

I. Mountainous regions:

1) Height, (width), kinds of forests, distance, steepness of the roads, mountain ranges, rocks, soil.

II. Rivers:

1) Length, width, depth, swiftness, light vessels, transportation facilities, tides, etc.

III. Coasts:

1) Conditions of sea water, coast line, coming-and-going of ships and fishing boats, depth, etc.

IV. Harbours:

1) Situation, depth, tides, scale, water-breakers, protection of the beach, light-house, pier.

Military Establishments:

I. Fortifications:

1) Enemy trenches, batteries, tochkas, tank trenches, watch-towers, etc.

II. Naval ports:

1) North Korean naval bases, harbour equipments, bridge-heads, dock-yards, etc.

III. Fortress:

1) Fortresses, military establishments and buildings, mobilization equipments, etc. of the North Korean enemy.

IV. Munitions Factories:

1) Output of the munitions industry, raw materials, mobilization, reserves, buildings, etc. of the enemy.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

I. Inspection of informations received on various North Korean military affairs.
II. Inspection of operation of intelligence nets laid in North Korea.
III. To make a statistical table of secret assaults.
IV. To make a statistical table of informations on military affairs etc.
V. Inspection of operation of the cells.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To intensify strategical propaganda against North Korean politics, economy, culture and industry.
II. To smuggle our agents into North Korean political circles.
III. To propel anti-communist measures to the utmost.
IV. To intensify the publicity work of permeating South Korean administrative policy to the North Koreans.

Adjustment:

I. To inspect and adjust informations received.
II. To examine the preservation of secret documents.
III. To get hold of secret ink and other chemical stuff.
IV. To study how to get hold of machines for destructive works.
V. To purchase special materials for the destruction of North Korea.

THE SECOND QUARTER: APRIL—JUNE

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:

1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a brigade;
2) To station permanent secret agents in Chungjin, Nanam, Hoeryeng, Chulwon, Haejoo and Sariwon;
3) To station permanent secret agents in Shanghai and Tsuruga.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.

IV. To intensify the cells.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:

1) Railway (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line);
2) Bridge (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
3) Tunnel (Hamgyeng Line);
4) Power Plant of Changjin;
5) Wonsan Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria:

1) In Sinijoo;
2) In Oonggi;
3) In Pyongyang;
4) Kitchens of various brigade-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:

1) Ministry of National Defence;
2) National Theatre of Pyongyang;
3) People's Assembly hall of the puppet hordes.

Assassination:

I. In political circles:

II. In military circles:

Conversion:

I. 6 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 8 officers of the People's Army.
III. 4 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Wonsan:
II. In Hamheung.
III. In Heungnam.
IV. In Najin.
V. In Kimchun.
VI. In Manpo.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

I. Railway station establishments:
   1) Buildings;
   2) Accommodation capacity;
   3) Compound equipments;
   4) Warehouses;
   5) Area;
   6) Awaiting wagon. The number of wagons ready for operation;
   7) Traffic frequency, etc.

II. Projected railway lines and roads:
   1) Aim of establishment;
   2) Kinds;
   3) Mobilization;
   4) Topography;
   5) When?
   6) And other items.

III. Tunnels:
   1) Length, width, height, construction material, age, topography, traffics, guards etc.

Topography:

I. Plains:
   1) Size, length and width, soil, products, rivers, cultivated areas, forests, ox and horse carts numbers, etc.

II. Weather:
   1) Difference in temperature, temperature, wind velocity, rain and snow, (fog), tide, intensity of sun and moon shine etc.

III. Cities and towns:
   1) Area, population, house numbers, buildings, transportation facilities, schools, parks, sanitation facilities, barracks.

IV. Lakes:
   1) Size, depth, width, length, perimeter, boat production, how utilized, irrigation etc.

Military Establishments:

I. Barracks:

1) Barracks and buildings, their kind and number, floor space, equipments etc., of the North Korean puppet army.

II. Power Plants:

1) Power houses, transformer stations, amount of electricity, electric supply etc. in North.

III. Broadcasting Stations:

1) Establishments of broadcasting stations, wireless stations etc. in North Korea.

IV. Telephone:

1) Everything about the telephone equipments of the guards.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To find out how far the masses participate in politics and their relations with the political parties, and to expose their war aims.
II. To find out and propagandize organizations of the North Korean puppet hordes, and characteristics of leading political parties.
III. To dispatch patriotic envelopes.
IV. To find out things about the issue of bonds and bank notes. Their amount and credit.

Adjustment:

I. To put the material in order and hand in for the strategy of our army.
II. Task during this period, as mentioned above.

THE THIRD QUARTER: JULY—SEPTEMBER.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:

1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a regiment;
2) To station permanent secret agents in Namchun, Sinmak, Sungjin, Najin and Oonggi;
3) To station permanent secret agents in Amoy and Maizuru.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.
IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party):
To stir up against the Party policy.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:
1) Railway (Hamyeng Line);
2) Bridge (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line),
3) Tunnel (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
4) Whachun Power Plant;
5) Hamheung Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria:
1) In Hamheung;
2) In Chungjin;
3) In Chulwon,
4) Kitchens of various regiment-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:
1) Engineering Plant at Pyongchulli;
2) Headquarters of the North Korean Workers' Party

Assassination:

I. In political circles:

II. In military circles:

Conversion:

I. 5 officers of the Home Ministry;
II. 7 officers of the People's Army.
III. 6 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Sunchun,
II. In Nampo.
III. In Chungjoo.
IV. In Sungjin.

V. In Aoji.

VI. In Kaechun.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

I. Air Lines—Military and Passenger Planes:
   1) and 2) are too blurred to be legible—Ed.
   3) Regular service;
   4) Meteorology, topography, atmospheric current etc.;
   4) * Routes of war vessels and merchant ships;
   5) Destinations; 6) Number of ships; 7) Kinds of ships;
   8) Number of crew and passengers; 9) Depth of the route;
   10) Tide; 11) Light house, weather.
   (* It should be II. instead of 4; figures following it are all erroneous, but here they are given as in the original—Ed.)

III. Warehouses on the railroads:
   1) Situation, building, floor space, number, usage, material, how guarded.

Topography:

As before.

Military Establishments:

As before.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To intensify anti-communist broadcast.
II. To distribute leaflets against communism and war.
III. To reveal economic relations with foreign countries.
IV. To reveal and exaggerate the slavish character of the North Korean administration.
V. To propagandize artfully the reason why the Soviet Union will collapse after World War II.

Adjustment:

As before.

THE FOURTH QUARTER: OCTOBER—DECEMBER.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:
1) To obtain at least one permanent secret agent for a battalion;
2) To station permanent secret agents in Sunchun, Chungjoo, Anjoo, Kaechun, Sinpo, Changyun, Tongchun;
3) To station permanent secret agents in Dairen and Nagasaki.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.

IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party):
To start a revolt.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:
1) Railway (Manpo Line);
2) Bridge (Seoul-Wonsan Line);
3) Tunnel (Seoul-Wonsan Line);
4) Power Plant at Yungwol;
5) Broadcasting Station of Chungjin.

II. Infection with Bacteria:
1) In Haejoo;
2) In Heungnam;
3) In Sungjin;
4) Kitchens of various battalion-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:
1) Heungnam Fertilizer Factory;
2) Headquarters of the Minjoo-Dang (Democratic Party).

Assassination:

I. In political circles:

II. In military circles.

Conversion:

I. 7 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 8 officers of the People's Army.
III. 8 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Sariwon.
II. In Haejoo.
III. In Chulwon.
IV. In Namchun.
V. In Anjoo.
VI. In Myengchun.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

As before.

Topography:

As before.

Military Establishments:

As before.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To reveal real abilities and activities of North Korean political parties.
II. To propagandize artfully the weak foundation of the Government.
III. To carry out special plans regarding leading figures of the North Korean hordes.

Adjustment:

I. To put in order, inspect and report on information received of North Korea.
II. To make a table of the situation of the North Korean Army, and inspect.
III. To make various statistical tables concerning the situation of the North Korean Army, and inspect.
IV. To put in order special informations.

REMARKS:

I. Besides this scheme, intelligence campaign concerning the North Korean Forces shall be undertaken according to an extra plan.
II. This scheme may undergo alterations in the sequence as circumstances require.



Photostatic copy of the 1st part of Document No. 16

No. 17

SCOUT UNIT SCHEME FOR MARCH—MAY, 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

*STRICT MILITARY SECRECY***

SCOUT UNIT SCHEME FOR MARCH—MAY, 1950.

SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

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* This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters.

** Stamp.

I FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To set up permanent cells in important places of Manchuria. 2) To set up permanent cells in main cities of Peking-Shanhaikwan area. 3) To prepare for the setting up of permanent cells in Formosa, Hongkong and Japan.	1) In Mukden..... (not clear —Ed.). To set up permanent cells in Dairen. 2) To prepare for the setting up of permanent cells in Peking-Shanhaikwan area, Formosa, Hongkong and Japan.
Work for March:	1) To get in touch with Kuomintang Chinese in Korea, and work for setting up cells in main cities of China. 2) To get in touch with those returned from China. 3) To conduct a strict examination of communist-circle or pro-communist Chinese in Korea.	
Work for April:	To continue the work of March.	
Work for May:	To continue the work of March.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To dispatch agents. 2) To select persons out of those who have returned from Peking-Shanhaikwan area and those who have relations with Formosa, Hongkong and Japan, and prepare for organizing cells; at the same time, to take measures for relations with underground cells of Kuomintang.	(Special Service).	130,000.— wons	
Incessant contact.	(Expenses for special service).	30,000.— wons	
As March.	(Expenses for Special Service).	50,000.— wons	
As March.	(Expenses for Special Service).	50,000.— wons	Preparations finished.

II SECOND SPECIAL SERVICE

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To set up organic permanent cells in various places in North Korea. 2) Intelligence through those coming over the 38 par. line. 3) Scout service by special orders.	1) To set up organic permanent cells in main cities of North Korea. 2) To take measures for spreading out nets of intelligence through those coming over to the South.
Work for March:	1) To prepare for organizing intelligence nets in cities along the 38 par. line. 2) To prepare for setting up permanent cells for intelligence from the North.	
Work for April:	To continue the work of March.	
Work for May:	To continue the work of March.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To dispatch agents. 2) To be in contact with HID, and collect materials. 3) To dispatch agents to the 38 line, and organize intelligence cells in adjacent villages. 4) To set up permanent cells for intelligence from North Korea.	1) Agents for Special Service — (aggregate) 3 persons. 2) To dispatch agents to the North — (aggregate) 3 persons.	1) 30,000.— wons 2) 90,000.— wons	
1) To dispatch agents on Special Service. 2) To dispatch agents to the North.	1) 1. 2) 1.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
As March.	1) 1. 2) 1.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
As March.	1) 1. 2) 1.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	Preparations finished.

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate the status quo of railway establishments. 2) To investigate railway conditions and operations. 3) To investigate transportation capacity. 4) To investigate matters appertaining to railways. 5) To work on setting up cells and on conversion of cadres.	1) To investigate the location of station districts. 2) To investigate the seats of depots, overhaul districts, communication districts, construction districts, works districts and electricity districts. 3) To investigate water supply facilities (to be continued till June). 4) To investigate the cranes. 5) To investigate railway-factory establishments (to be continued till September). 6) To investigate the maximum transportation capacity (to be continued till September). 7) To investigate the status quo of locomotives, freight cars and carriages. 8) To investigate existing materials. 9) To work on setting up cells and on conversion of cadres.

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To lay nets of joint cells (to intensify existing cells—informations shall be collected through contact with the White Dress Youth Association and liaison through dispatched agents). 2) To dispatch secret agents. 3) To utilize traders between North and South. 4) To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun - Minjoo - Dang or Chosun Democratic Party (North Korea Railway Comrades Association). 5) To utilize immigrants from the North, and collect necessary materials. 6) Work on conversion: (To work on conversion of cadres in transportation organs and the Planning Commission).	1) Residing agents — (aggregate) 7 persons. 2) Dispatched agents— (aggregate) 8 persons. 3) Agents for conversion work — 2 persons.	1) 210,000.— wons 2) 240,000.— wons 3) 60,000.— wons	

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate the seats of station districts. 2) To investigate the seats of cranes. 3) To investigate the status quo of locomotives, goods wagons and carriages. B 1) The seats of depots, overhaul districts, communication districts, construction districts, works districts, electricity districts and repair districts. 2) To investigate railway materials. C To investigate water supply establishments. D 1) To investigate establishments for railway works. 2) To investigate maximum transportation capacity. E To work on conversion of leading cadres of the Ministry of Communications.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
A 1) To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. 2) To dispatch agents. B Same as A. C 1) To utilize the Communications Department. 2) To dispatch agents. D 1) To utilize the Communications Department. 2) To utilize Transportations Branch of Chosun - Minjoo - Dang. 3) To dispatch agents. E To dispatch agents.	A 1. Residing agent— 1 person. 2) Dispatched agent — 1 person. B . . . . . . C Residing agent — 1 person. D 1) Residing agents in the Comm. Dept. — 2 persons. 2) Residing agent in the Transportations Party Branch — 1 person. 3) Dispatched agent — 1 person. E Dispatched agents — 2 persons.	A 1) 10,000.-- wons 2) 30,000.— wons B . . . . . C 10,000.— wons D 1) 20,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons E 60,000.-- wons	

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	A To continue previous work. B ,, C ,, D ,, E To survey the work of dispatched agents and take measures.	
Work for May:	A Finished. B To continue previous work. C ,, D ,, E If possible to dispatch agents again.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
A As before. B 1) To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. 2) To utilize Communications Department. C To utilize Communications Department. D 1) To utilize Communications Department. 2) To utilize Transportation Party Branch. E	A 1) Residing agents — 1 person. 2) Agents—2 persons. B Residing agent in Communications Branch of Chosun Minjoo - Dang — 2 persons. C Residing agent — 1 person. D Residing agent in the Communication Department—1 person. E	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 60,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons E	
A ..... B To dispatch agents. C 1) To utilize Communications Department. 2) To dispatch agents. D 1) To utilize Communication Branch of Chosun - Minjoo - Dang. 2) To utilize Communications Department. 3) To dispatch agents. E	A ..... B Agents - 2 persons. C Residing agent - 1 person. D 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) ditto - 1 person. E Agents - 2 persons	A ..... B 60,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons E 60,000.— wons	A ..... B Finished. C Preliminary investigation to be finished by the end of June. D To continue till September. E .....

Roads

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate conditions of highways and byways as well as their changes. 2) To investigate seasonal influence as well as that of the soil upon highways and byways in relation to local operations. 3) To investigate into conditions of the bridges and their changes with relation to operations.	1) To investigate into conditions of highways (Seoul-Hamheung, Seoul-Pyongyang), highways in north Gangwondo and in Hwanghaido, as well as their changes. 2) To investigate how seasonal changes and their soil would influence our operations. 3) To investigate into conditions of bridges in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido with relation to operations.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate conditions of highways (Uijungboo-Kimhwa Hoeyang - Wonsan-Hamheung). 2) To investigate the Kaesung-Pyongyang highway. 3) To investigate the Choonchun-Pyongyang highway. 4) To investigate the Choonchun-Kosung highway. 5) To investigate the Kangneung-Wonsan highway. 6) To investigate the Haejoo-Pyongyang highway. B 1) To investigate Whachun-Yangyang byways.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) a To collect elementary materials in-co-operation with the Home Department. b To utilize the Communications Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. c To collect materials from immigrants from the North. d To dispatch agents. 2) Same as 1). 3) Same as 1).	1) Residing agents-(aggregate) 6 persons. 2) Dispatched agents-(aggregated) 3 persons. 3) (Communication expenses).	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 90,000.— wons 3) 15,000.— wons	
1) To collect materials from the Constructions Bureau of Home Department. 2) To utilize Communication Sp. Branch of Chosun - Minjoo - Dang. 3) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 4) To dispatch agents.	1) 1 residing agent in the Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in the Communications Sp. Branch of Chosun Minjoo Dang. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	

2. Roads

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	2) To investigate Tongdoo-chun - Yunchun - Hoeyang byways. 3) To investigate Yunchun-Ichun-Moonchun byways. 4) To investigate Kaesung-Pyongyang byways. C To investigate bridges on these roads.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
As March	1) 1 residing agent in the Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in the Communications Party Branch. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 reserve agent (dispatched).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	
As March	1) 1 residing agent in Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in Communications Party Branch. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	Preliminary investigations finished.

3. **Overland and Maritime Traffic**

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate by districts capacity of transportation mobilization (trucks). 2) To investigate sources of supply of fuel and the maximum transportation capacity. 3) To investigate into distribution of ox and horse carriages and mobilization capacity by districts. 4) To investigate into status quo of harbours and bays.	1) To investigate into the capacity of truck-mobilization in Chulwon, Wonsan, Hamheung, Haejoo and Pyongyang as well as adjacent cities, and the sources of supply of fuel. 2) To investigate into the distribution of ox or horse carriages in the counties, subcounties and towns in north Kangwondo and Hwanghaido, and the mobilization capacity by districts. 3) To investigate pier establishments. 4) To investigate war vessels, merchant ships and their routes.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate into capacity of truck-mobilization, and into how substitute fuel is being supplied in Chulwon and in the vicinity. 2) To investigate into the same items in Sinmak, Sariwon, Haejoo. B 1) To investigate capacity of mobilization of ox and horse carriages in Chulwon and surroundings. 2) To investigate the same	

How to work:	Personnel required	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1)&2) a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize immigrants from the North and collect materials. 3)&4) a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize the Communications Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. c. To utilize immigrants from the North.	1) Residing agents - (aggregate) 15 persons. 2) Dispatched agents (aggregate) 6 persons. 3) (Communication expenses.)	1) 150,000.— wons 2) 180,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons	
A 1) To collect materials from the Overland Transportations Bureau of the Communications Department. 2) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 3) To dispatch agents. B 1) To collect materials from the Cattle Breeding Bureau of the Department of	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses). 3) Dispatched agent 1 person. B 1) Residing Agent-1 person (Agriculture & Forestry Department). 2) Residing Agent-1 person (Communications Department).	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	

3. Overland and Maritime Traffic

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	items in Kimchun, Sinmak, Sariwon, Haejoo and the vicinity. C To investigate pier establishments of Wonsan. D To investigate routes on the east coast of North Korea.	
Work for April:	A To continue previous work. B ,, C To investigate pier establishments of Chungjin. D To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
Agriculture and Forestry. 2) To collect materials from the Overland Transportations Bureau of the Communications Department. 3) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 4) To dispatch agents. C 1) To collect materials from Overland Tran. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 2) To dispatch agents. D To collect materials from Overl. Trans. Bur. of Comm. Dept.	3) (Communication Expenses.) 4) Dispatched agents. C 1) Residing agent-1 person. 2) Dispatched agent-1 person. D Residing agent -1 person.		
A 1) As March. B 1) ,, C 1) To collect materials from the Maritime Traffic Bureau of the Comm. Dept. 2) To dispatch agents. D 1) As March.	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses.) B 1) Residing agent - 1 person (Agri. & Forestry Dept.). 2) Residing agent - 1 person (Trans. Dept.)	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	

3. Overland and Maritime Traffic

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:		
Work for May:	A 1) To investigate into capacity of truck mobilization, and into how fuel is being supplied in Wonsan, Kowon and surroundings. 2) The same in Pyongyang and in the vicinity. B 1) To investigate into capacity of mobilization of ox and horse carriages in Yangyang, Kosung, Wonsan and vicinity. 2) In Whangjoo, Sin-ge, Ichun and surroundings. C To investigate pier establishments of Oonggi and Najin. D To investigate navigation routes of the west coast of North Korea.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
	3) (Communication Expenses.) C Residing agent - 1 person. D Residing agent - 1 person.		
A 1) To collect materials from Overl. Trans. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 2) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 3) To dispatch agents. B 1) To collect materials from Cattle Breeding Bureau of Agri. & Forestry Dept. 2) To collect materials from Overl. Comm. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 3) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 4) To dispatch agents. C 1) To collect materials from the Comm. Dept 2) To dispatch agents D To collect materials from Overl. Comm. Bureau of Comm. Dept.	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses.) 3) Dispatched agent 1-person. B 1) 1 residing agent (Agri. & Forest. Dept.). 2) 1 residing agent (Comm. Dept.). 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 2 dispatched agents. C 1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 dispatched agent. D 1 residing agent.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	The first two items for May are to be continued till June

IV TOPOGRAPHY 1. Plains, narrow pass and plateau

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate important spots from the standpoint of operation. 2) To collect and investigate strategic materials concerning plains, passes and plateaus. 3) To investigate into areas which can influence operations through seasonal variations or peculiarities of soil.	1) To investigate important spots along high-roads and byways in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido. 2) To collect strategic materials concerning plains, narrow passes and plateaus in Kangwondo and Whanghaido according to 1/50,000 maps. 3) To investigate areas which can influence military operations through seasonal variations or peculiarities of soil.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the plains, on the River Imjingang (up to Ichun), which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 2) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the plains on the River Yesunggang (up to	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize Home Dept. and Communications Special Party Branch. c. To utilize immigrants from the North 2) a. To dispatch agents. b. To collect materials in co-operation with reclamation bodies and irrigation co-operatives. c. To collect materials in co-operation with five provincial governments. d. To utilize immigrants from the North.	1) Residing agents-(aggregate) 6 persons. 2) (Expenses for communications and works.) 3) Dispatched agents-2 persons.	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons 3) 60,000.— wons	
1) To collect materials from the Constructions Bureau of the Home Dept. 2) To collect materials from Farmland Bureau of Agri. & Forestry Dept. 3) To utilize County People's Associations and collect materials.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	Sin-ge), which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 3) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the plain between Haijoo-Sariwon-Whangjoo, which can impede operations during rainy seasons. B 1) To investigate soil along the byways between Yunchun - Chulwon - Pyongyang-Yangyang, and spots which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 2) To investigate soil along the byways between Yanggoo - Malwhiri - Tongchun, and spots which can impede operations during rainy seasons.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
4) To utilize immigrants from the North.			
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

IV TOPOGRAPHY 1. Plains, narrow pass and plateau

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

2. Rivers and lakes

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate rivers and lakes from the view-point of operation. 2) To investigate rivers and lakes from the strategical point of view.	1) To investigate conditions of rivers and lakes in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido (hinging upon river-crossing operations). 2) To investigate how the puppet army is making use of the rivers and lakes in Kangwondo and Whanghaido.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate into ferries, water-volume, depth and swiftness of the River North Han-Gang and its tributaries.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1), 2), 3) and 4)—the same as March. 5) To dispatch agents to the North.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.) 5) 2 dispatched agents.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons 5) 60,000.— wons	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) & 2) a To dispatch agents. b Preliminary investigations in cooperation with Home Dept. Constructions Bureau. c. To utilize immigrants from North. d. To utilize reclamation bodies and irrigation cooperatives.	1) 6 residing agents. 2) (Expenses for communications and works.)	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons	

2. Rivers and lakes

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	2) The same with the River Imjin-Gang & tributaries. 3) The same with the River Yesunggang and tributaries. 4) The same with riverlets in Whangjoo, Sariwon and Haejoo. 5) The same with rivers in Yangyang, Kosung and Tongchun on the east coast. B 1) To investigate into seats and conditions of reservoirs in Whanghaido. 2) To investigate seats and conditions of reservoirs in north Kangwondo.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To collect materials from Home Dept. Constructions Bureau. 2) To collect materials from Farmland Bureau of Agri. & Forest. Dept. 3) To collect materials from Marine Trans. Dept. 4) To utilize irrigation associations and collect materials. 5) To utilize County People's Associations and collect materials. 6) To utilize immigrants from North.	1) I residing agent. 2) I residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March.	1) I residing agent. 2) I residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March.	1) I residing agent. 2) I residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

3. Harbours, coasts and their weather

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To look for and investigate into harbours needed for landing operations. 2) To investigate into seasonal variations of weather of main harbours on the east and west coasts.	1) To investigate into coastlines and harbours on the east coast (up to Hamheung) and west coast (counties Kangsu, Pyengwon and Anjoo) from the standpoint of landing operations. 2) To investigate into seasonal variations of weather of harbours of Wonsan, Hamheung, Nampo and Anjoo.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate east coastline up to Wonsan. 2) To investigate west coastline between 38-39 parallel lines. B 1) To investigate seasonal variations of weather of Wonsan Bay. 2) The same with Nampo Bay. C 1) To investigate accomoda-	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) a. To dispatch agents. b. To do preliminary investigations in co-operation with Home Dept. Constr. Bur. & Communi. Dept. Maritime Traf. Bureau. c. To utilize immigrants from the North. 2) a. To dispatch agents. b. To carry out preliminary investigation in co-operation with the Central Meteorological Observatory. c. To utitize immigrants from the North.	1) 6 residing agents. 2) (Expenses for communications and works.)	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons	
1) To collect materials from Commun. Dept. Maritime Traf. Bur. 2) From the Central Meteor. Obser. 3) Through County People's Associations. 4) Through immigrants from the North.	1) To dispatch 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communications expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

3. Harbours, coasts and their weather

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	tion capacity and harbour conditions of-----(blurred-editor). 2) The same with Changjun, Taedong Bay and Monggeumpo.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	I., II. and III. to be finished by June.

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate fortifications of North Korean Puppet Army. 2) To investigate fortresses within the region of North Korean Puppet Army. 3) To investigate barracks in North Korea. 4) To investigate navigation facilities. 5) To organize and intensify intelligence-nets. 6) To work on conversion.	1) To investigate long beaches and upheaved lands in the region north of 38 par. line. 2) To investigate fortresses in North Korea. 3) To investigate arrangement of barracks and inquire into how matters stand with revolts in North Korea. 4) To investigate air ports and military as well as civilian navigation facilities in North Korea. 5) To intensify intelligence-nets in Whangjoo, Pyongyang and Sinijoo. 6) To work on conversion of 1 captain of the People's Army and 1 sub-lieutenant of the police.
Work for March:	A Work on conversion of 1 People's-Army captain and 1 police sub-lieutenant. B Work on organizing nets of intelligence in Whangjoo Pyongyang and Sinijoo.	

barracks and air force establishments

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) 2)&3) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To collect materials from immigrants from the North. c. To collect materials from the HID Detachment of Section I. 4) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To utilize Communication Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. c. To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 5) To dispatch agents to the North. 6) To dispatch agents to the North for conversion works.	1) 3 dispatched agents. 2) (Special Service expenses).	1) 90,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
1) To dispatch agents to the North.	1) 1 dispatched agent. 2) (Special Service expenses).	1) 30,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons	

V MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

1. Fortifications, fortresses,

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	A Investigations into military establishments: 1. Conditions of aerodromes (Wonsan). 2. Establishments of Navy-headquarters (Wonsan). 3. Establishments of 2nd Division of the People's Army. 4 Establishments of the naval base in Wonsan.	
Work for May:	A Investigations into military establishments: 1. Sariwon area (how units of the People's Army, the police and the Volunteers are stationed, and their establishments). 2. Sinijoo area (ditto). B Work on conversion. (A captain of the People's Army air force)	

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations and

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate establishments of North Korean munitions factories, their output, mobilization of raw materials and stocks.	1) To investigate munitions factories in the districts of Heungnam, Wonsan, Haejoo, Madong and Pyongyang. 2) To investigate the Performance

barracks and air force establishments

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To utilize immigrants from the seats of 5 provincial governments. 2) To dispatch agents to the North.	1) (Special Service expenses.) 2) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
A 1) To investigate documents of the HID detachment of Section I. 2) To dispatch agents. B To dispatch agents.	1) (Special Service expenses.) 2) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	

communications.

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To collect materials in cooperation with the Taehan-Bowi-	1) Residing agent — (aggregate) 1 person. 2) Dispatched agents— (aggregate) 5 persons.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 150,000.— wons 3) 75,000.— wons	

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations and

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	2) To investigate North Korean broadcasting stations and power-houses. 3) To investigate city establishments. 4) To investigate North Korean communication facilities.	Hall of Pyongyang Broadcasting Station and the equipments of broadcasting stations of Wonsan, Hamheung, Chungjin and Chulwon. 3) To investigate military establishments in Haejoo, Sariwon, Pyongyang, Sinijoo and Yangshi. 4) ... (Too blurred to be legible —editor).

communications

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
dae. (Taehan Defence Guard). 2) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To collect materials in connection with general affairs section of Informations Bureau and Broadcasting Station. c. To rely upon preliminary investigations of the Military Affairs Unit. 3) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To examine immigrants from the seats of 5 provincial governments. c. HID Detachment of Section I. 4) a. To dispatch agents to the North. b. To carry out preliminary investigations in cooperation with the telegraph office of Communications Dept. c. ..... (Illegible — editor).	3) (Communication expenses.)		

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations and

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	A Broadcasting station establishments: 1. Performance Hall of the Broadcasting Station of Pyongyang, and the vicinity. 2. Haejoo Broadcasting Station. B City establishments: 1. Haejoo. 2. Sariwon 3. Pyongyang 4. Sinijoo 5. Yangshi } Military Establishments of cities.	
Work for April:	A To investigate broadcasting station establishments: 1) Wonsan Broadcasting Station. 2) Hamheung Broadcasting Station. B To investigate munitions factory establishments: 1) Munitions Factory of Heungnam, Ponkoong Chemical Factory. 2) Wonsan area (Leather Factory, Petroleum and Gasoline Factories, Dockyard). C City Military Establishments:	

communications

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To utilize general affairs section of Information Bureau & Broadcasting Station. 2) To send to the North agents on Special Service.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 dispatched agent. 3) (Special Service expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 60,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons	
A 1) To utilize general affairs sections of broadcasting stations. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. B 1) To utilize Taehan-Bowi Special Units. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. C 1) To utilize Home Dept. Constructions Bureau. 2) To utilize Taèchan-Bowi-Dae. 3) To utilize immig-	A 1) (Special Service expenses). 2) I dispatched agent. B 1) (Special Service expenses). C 1) (Special Service expenses). 2) I dispatched agent.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 1) 20,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	

2. **Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations and**

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	1) Wonsan. 2) Sungjin. 3) Chulwon. 4) Heungnam. 5) Hamheung. 6) Chungjin.	
Work for May:	A To investigate broadcasting station establishments: 1) Chungjin Broadcasting Station. 2) Chulwon Broadcasting Station. B To investigate munitions factory establishments: 1) Haejoo Chemical Factory, machine workshop. 2) Madong Cement Factory. 3) Pyongyang Chemical Factory. C To investigate power plant establishments: Power plants and transformer stations. 1) Distribution 2) Electric supply 3) Generation of electricity	

communications

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
rants from the seats of 5 provincial governments. 4) To dispatch agents to the North.			
A 1) To utilize Information Bureau, Broadcasting Station. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. B 1) To utilize Taehan-Bowi Special Units. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. C 1) To utilize Power Supply Section & Power Section of Commerce & Industry Dept. 2) To utilize Electric Business Section of Seoul Electricity Co. 3) To dispatch agents to the North.	A1) (Special Service expenses). 2) I dispatched agent. B (Special Service expenses). C1) (Special Service expenses). 2) I dispatched agent.	A 1) 5,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	

PART III

No. 18

REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A., DATED JANUARY 28, 1949*

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 35**

FACTORS SIGNIFICANT FOR OR CONDITIONING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM

VI. FAR EAST

OIR REPORT No. 4849
January 28, 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

*Confidential**** VI-72***

c. KOREA

*1. Political and Strategic Importance of Korea*****

Today, as throughout its history, the peninsula of Korea is an area where the competing interests and ideologies of other powers condition and overshadow the country's domestic issues. Because of Korea's geographic

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* The original is a mimeographed pamphlet, consisting of three parts. Part A regards China, Part B regards Japan and Part C regards Korea.

** The original bears stamps of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, U.S.A., dated March 3, 1949, and of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul dated March 25, 1949.

*** Page number in the original. This chapter begins from page VI-72 and ends in page VI-73.

**** At the beginning and end of each page the word "confidential" is inserted.

***** Only chapter 1 of Part C is reproduced here.

position in Northeastern Asia, control over Korea and over the minds of its people is advantageous to any power with Far Eastern interests, whether or not it is considered essential to the United States as military base, the peninsula would be of value to a potential enemy and the effect of its possession under such circumstances on the American position in Japan would be considerable.

Politically, Korea's importance to the United States is open to less dispute. As one of the signatories of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, the United States has pledged freedom and independence to Korea. Through membership in the United Nations and through cooperation with that body in its handling of the Korean question, the United States has accepted the commitments attendant upon UN membership.

These international commitments merely support, however, American national policy toward Korea, a policy springing from the traditional friendship between the two countries, their early treaty relationship, the role of the US in the liberation of Korea, and the announced American policy of seeking a united and sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and established upon a sound economic base. It is also an American desire to reduce as soon as possible the finances and manpower allotted to the achievement of these objectives, to secure through a stable and friendly government in Korea a partial stabilization of the Far East, and to offset, by success in Korea, diplomatic reverses suffered elsewhere in Asia.

It cannot be assumed that Korea would automatically be found in the American camp in a world-wide alignment of states. With the country at present divided into zones under the influence of the US and the USSR, with rival native regimes, the only generalization that can be made is that, assuming continued American support to the government exercising *de jure* control up to the 38° parallel, each zone would on any issue align itself with the views of its sponsor.

VI—73

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 35

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAR 8 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FACTORS SIGNIFICANT FOR OR CONDITIONING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM

VI. FAR EAST

OIR Report No. 4849
January 28, 1949

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
MAR 2 5 1949
SEOUL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

CONFIDENTIAL

Photostatic copy of the cover of Document No. 18

No. 19

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JUNE 7, 1949*

June 7, 1949

H.E. President:

Report on Interview with Director of Far Eastern Affairs Office of the U.S. State Department and other items

Upon request I paid a visit to Mr. Butterworth, Director of the Far Eastern Affairs Office of the U.S. State Department on June 2, and had a talk with him, the gist of which I hereby report to you.

Mr. Butterworth said: "According to to-day's papers, a resolution similar to a non-confidential bill requesting the general resignation of the present cabinet members is reported to have been passed at the National Assembly of Korea. Isn't this a fact which gives impression** that the present cabinet is not backed by the National Assembly, an organ representing the nation? And isn't it also a great scandal that Im Yung-sin, the present Secretary of Commerce and Industry is said to have been prosecuted for various disgraceful cases?

"It is a great pity that all these unfortunate incidents lower the prestige of the present cabinet and influence the situation a great deal just at the time when the United States is furthering assistance to Korea.

Besides, it seems that Mr. Cho Byung-ok is constantly in contact with the U.N. delegates of various countries and other personages, and according

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* This document was found in the achives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. The original is in Korean, hand-written by Chang Myun.

** In the original the words "Isn't this an evidence that..." are crossed out and replaced by this expression.

to what I have heard of the contents of the conversation he had with Mr. Austin the other day, it is evident that the former is making a false propaganda that only 30,000 Koreans are armed and the rest have nothing but their naked fists, in spite of the fact that there are now in Korea over 70,000 soldiers, over 50,000 policemen, and over 5,000 coast guards who are properly armed.

"Such careless talk giving false information with regard to the real quantity of arms transferred to the Korean Army by the American Forces immensely impairs the good will of the United States which has been and is rendering every possible assistance to Korea.

"Morever, your President has more than once declared that the Korean Army is insufficiently equipped with arms at present and that there is a certain apprehension of the communist troops invading south Korea.

"Statements like these will only bring about an unfavourable effect on south Korea, weakening the morale of the general public and increasing their fear by exposing the inferior forces therein, thus facilitating the wicked propaganda of the communist clique. All this is a matter of great regret. I think at the present stage, it is advisable for Korea to inspire the feelings of reliance and security in the public and at the same time intimidate the communist party by exaggerating the strength of the National Defence Army instead of propagandizing its insufficiency in armament, and on the other hand to make secret negotiations with our country (viz. United Staets) through adequate diplomatic channels. It would be erroneous to appeal to the American public at large in the manner of an open request without taking any normal diplomatic measures. Any design to influence the policies of the United States Government by force of public opinion, roused up through newspapermen, would be extremely wrong, and such methods will not only end in a failure, but will also bring about the reverse result by spoiling the friendship between our two countries.

"It is perhaps difficult for you to imagine that we are exerting our best efforts, with the intention of helping Korea in every possible way, and plans are already steadily under way, thus we warn you in a cordial and stern manner not to issue such statements as mentioned above hereafter, but to have confidence in us. Our policy on Korea in future will depend very much on the attitude of the Korean government, and now is the most important turning point. China is another instance of ultimate failure of such a trick. I sincerely hope that Korea will not follow this example, and that she will carry out all matters with the spirit of reliance and cooperation through normal diplomatic channels. I am sure such a path leads to success.

"I hope that you will transmit these points to your Government."

Hearing these warnings as mentioned above, I, on my part, replied

that Your Excellency's statement was by no means a strategy nor was it a design to put pressure upon the State Department, but it was only intended to appeal to the American people, who are our friends with the urgent situation in Korea, and to awaken them to the fact that the United States has to assume a moral responsibility towards our country. And I added that if the United States wanted to help us and was determined to carry it out, it was a necessary step, in my opinion, for the U.S. Government to announce it to the world and to sweep away any doubt and uneasiness which the public have. Then Mr. Butterworth told me that in connection with the question of military assistance it was certain that the present occupation forces in Korea were to leave all the arms behind when they should withdaw, and that further aid would be carried out through the resolution of Congress, adding it to the budget of the coming fiscal year. As the time was up, I ended the talk with Butterworth, and continued to talk to Mr. Bond who promised in a mild and sincere manner to do his very best for Korea.

With regard to the above-mentioned interview, I had a long discussion with Dr. Cho and then it was decided that, for an elucidation of misunderstandings about him he should send a letter, of which a copy is enclosed, to Butterworth, and at the same time he should call on him personally some time next week.

There has been a daily conference on the Korean question during the past few days in the State Department among the high officials, and serious discussions have been made on the question of assistance to Korea. Taking into consideration our urgent request and the public opinion at home and other situations concerned, it is clearly observed that considerable efforts have been made to take necessary measures to solve the said problem. As I already informed you by cable yesterday, President Truman, in a long message requested Congress to approve the budget on the economic assistance to Korea, which was widely reported in the press. Besides, today, the acting Secretary of State Mr. Webb and Mr. Hoffman spoke at Congress (House Foreign Affairs Committee), and urgently requested that the aid bill to Korea be passed; then Mr. Webb declared separately that the United States Government should announce its policy on Korea to the world and render Korea economic, cultural and military assistance in a positive way. Although there are some unsatisfactory expressions in his statement, I believe, it is really fortunate that his statement has cleared up the dark clouds hanging over us these days and has cast a bright sunshine upon us, and that as a result of this, the apprehension and gloom of our people will melt away.

Although the Bureau of Budget has recently decided to curtail the ECA funds to 125 million dollars, revision has been made at the minimum of 150

million dollars as a result of reconsideration, thanks to strong insistence of the ECA officials together with Butterworth, and Webb, while the dollar fund is said to have remained 10 million dollars as before. As the present curtailment has been made in proportion to the fall of prices in the United States, the ECA personnel are optimistic, believing that they will be able to carry it through satisfactorily without much deviation from the original program, if Congress should pass it without any further curtailment.

Mr. Williams returned home safely and I have had several talks with him. We had a joint discussion with Dr. Cho on the question of Chinhai naval port, in connection with which I am going to visit some high officers of the Navy through the kindness of Mr. Williams and I shall have a close consultation with them.

Concerning Chinhai naval port, I would like to know more closely about the details of the installations and other suggestive items, and therefore I am waiting for your instructions.

When I sounded Mr. Bond of the State Department regarding the appointment of Mr. Williams as adviser, he did not seem to agree, saying: "I have not seen him yet; so we are strangers. But according to what I have heard of him, he doesen't seem to be a very good person."

Furthermore, Mr. Williams said that he would certainly do his utmost to help Korea but since his livelihood was an urgent problem he would like to be paid regularly from June on, as it had been agreed upon. He also expressed his desire for matters to be managed in a business-like way, and that he wanted to be paid every month without failure. Therefore, I reverently hope that Your Excellency would either supplement the Embassy estimates or directly send him his pay; in any case, I hope you will send the money, so that I shall be able to pay him by the end of June.

As for the credentials you have sent to be presented to the presidents of various countries, I shall visit all the embassies and convey them personally to their ambassadors from tomorrow, and request them to recognize Korea at the earliest possible date, and I am of the opinion that it is advisable for me to request the non-member nations of the United Nations also such as Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland and others.

I attended the graduating Exercises of George Washington University, and received official commendation of honour, the certificate of which together with the photograph and letters exchanged on that day I am now enclosing for Your Excellency's inspection.

Our good will mission is now on its tour round many places, and is warmly welcomed everywhere. It is achieving immense successes about which I am sure you are happy to hear.

檀紀四二八七年六月十日

大統領 閣下

駐美大使 張

國務省과 接觸한 바 會談內容은 左記와 같음을 報告드립니다

記

一. 六月十日 國務省 極東局長 實에게 韓國 및 韓民族 要請에 依하여 韓國問題를 討議하였음. 그 會談內容의 要約은 左와 같음

(1) 美國은 國連의 決議案을 支持하며 國連의 韓國에 對한 援助를 推進시키고 있는 것은 매우 遺憾스러운 일이며 (2) 韓國은 今般 代表 卞 白物 등과 接觸을 맺어 이러한 態勢에 대하여 우리는 韓國에는 七萬餘名의 軍人과 五萬餘의 警官과 五千餘의 海岸警備

On June 5, at the request of Georgetown University, I delivered a radio address for half an hour introducing the Korean situation through the radio station installed at the same university, after which I have received friendly compliments from many places. With such an experience I intend henceforth to speak through many other radio stations.

It is not necessary to send Whang Si-yon immediately on commercial affairs, as Mr. Kim Se-sun is attending to the business at present; there would be no harm in reserving this matter until necessity arises again. Mr. Choi Un-sang has been doing his business very earnestly since he took up his new post here, so please feel at ease.

As to the bills of the ECA budget and the military aid, I am, in recent days, keeping daily contact with eminent personnel of the Goverment and the newspapermen with a view of having the bills passed as they had been drafted at first; so quite a lot of expenses are needed, no matter how modestly I arrange the entertainments. But, the reception allowances have unexpectedly been reduced to half in the new budget, which puts me in a difficult position. It will be absolutely impossible for me to meet the need with the new budget on the reception allowances, as the scope of society and acquaintance is gradually expanding. Therefore I sincerely hope that you will reconsider it and make it the same as before.

As regards the Los Angeles rebels, I have negotiated with FBI, and the matter is being thoroughly investigated. In connection with this affair, Mr. Han in Mexico has asked Consul Choo for information.

I heard the discussion on the assistance bill to Korea at the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning; however, it is hard for me to foretell the future course as there are many cons as well as pros of the bill.

I nevertheless hope that the bill will be passed, and I will do my utmost to work towards this end.

Chang Myun,
Ambassador to the U.S.A.

Seal*

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* A square seal, "the seal of the South Korean Ambassador to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.

No. 20

MEMORANDUM OF JAY JEROME WILLIAMS, ADVISER TO THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, DATED JUNE 17, 1949*

June 17, 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO: AMBASSADOR JOHN M. CHANG
FROM: JAY JEROME WILLIAMS
SUBJECT: CHIN-HAI NAVAL BASE

As per your direction of today I went to see Admiral L. E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy's member on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The appointment was obtained for me by Secretary Hassett of the White House and I saw Admiral Denfeld in his office in the Pentagon Building.

I told him of the desires of President Rhee regarding the future of the one-time secret Japanese Naval Base in Chin-Hai, Korea, and how he was very anxious to obtain the services of a distinguished Naval Officer. I said President Rhee had sent me to see General MacArthur at Tokyo to get his advise and General MacArthur's recommendation, if possible, of former Vice-Admiral J. L. Kauffman and that I went to Philadelphia and called on Admiral Kauffman, but unfortunately he had just accepted the presidency of the Jefferson Medical College and his commitments were such in this institution that he regretfully was compelled to decline this offer.

I implied that General MacArthur had feared that Admiral Kauffman might not be available and had indicated that Admiral Denfeld would be

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

the proper man to see in our search for an officer to serve as Naval Advisor to the Korean Government.

Admiral Denfeld was most sympathetic and keenly interested. He asked me questions about the Base, whether it possessed a dry dock, etc., and because, as I explained to him, I had only a layman's conception, I suggested his own ONI Reports would give him all the information he needed. He said he would send for these immediately.

He told me confidentially that the Navy would dispatch to Korean waters some Cruisers and other vessels so that this force would be in evidence at the time the American Ground Forces were leaving Korea and, quite to my amazement, he said the Navy was doing this at the request of the State Department. I salute you Mr. Ambassador for your achievement!

He asked me what I had heard about the military forces of northern Korea and I told him that the figure I had most constantly impressed upon me while in Korea was that the Russians had adequately armed and trained, as well as adequately equipped with air support, a force of 200,000 men. I pointed out to him that the northern forces had made more than 200 forays into southern Korea.

He told me that the Korean problem had been up many times before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was still being discussed. I said that I hoped some definite action would be taken soon to insure to Korea receipt of arms and munitions and planes to safeguard its very existence. I said I could not help but recall when I saw Admiral Kauffman in Philadelphia how it was that very day, the fifth anniversary of our landing in Normandy and how the Navy played such a tremendous role in this achievement which had, however, cost thousands upon thousands of American lives and I said "Here is our Asiatic beachhead, Admiral, offered to us by a man who has long shown his admiration and friendship for the American people and if we take advantage of this opportunity it may save thousands and thousands of American lives".

He said I would hear from him within the next three or four days.

No. 21

LETTER FROM JAY J. WILLIAMS, ADVISER TO THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO ADMIRAL LOUIS E. DENFELD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT, DATED JULY 7, 1949*

*Strictly Confidential***

Sandy Hollow Farm
Route 6
Norwich, Connecticut

July 7th, 1949.

Dear Admiral Denfeld:

Since my visit with you in June, through the courtesy of White House Secretary Hassett, I have anxiously awaited some word regarding my request.

The long Fourth of July holiday has, I know, intervened but I am under the spur of a chief of state, who has assigned this mission to me and regards it as urgent.

To recapitulate:

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea wishes the Government of Korea to retain the best qualified American Naval officer available to serve the Republic of Korea for these purposes:

1. To maintain, at the expense of the Republic of Korea, the one-time

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

** "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs

secret Japanese naval base at Chin-Hai, Korea, at maximum efficiency for the sole purpose of its immediate utility to us, a friendly power.

2. To do this so that the Republic of Korea may, within its limitations, make what it believes to be a substantial contribution to peace and security in Asia and evince in some measure its gratitude to the United States of America for our country's military might in freeing the Korean people from their long period of bondage under the Japanese.

3. To make this extraordinary base actually a potential foothold for us on the Asiatic mainland because President Rhee knows that Russia covets it and it is now ours, for future and effective use, if you deem it necessary, in this distraught world, to the security of the United States.

As I told you when I had the privilege of seeing you, an important military man of our nation suggested I see Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman and offer him what I believe to be a vitally important post. For I have seen Chin-Hai and was greatly impressed by its natural and man-made fortifications, its underground reservoirs for millions of gallons of fuel oil, its ship repair installations, deep water advantages and—above all—its location on the land of a people who possess an almost child-like faith in American integrity.

Unfortunately, Admiral Kauffman, upon his retirement, had made commitments from May 1st on of this year which he considered unbreakable. The man who originally suggested Admiral Kauffman had told me this might be the case and I inferred that if it were I should turn to you.

I saw Admiral Kauffman, not by design but accidentally, on the fifth anniversary of our establishment of the Normandy beachhead. The coincidence made an indelible impression upon me. I know the unforgettable part our Navy had in this tremendous achievement and I thought, as I talked with him, how this offer of President Rhee might, under other circumstances, save thousands of American lives whereas in Normandy, because we lacked a beachhead, many thousands of American lives had had to be expended.

Before I left Washington last week, I talked on the telephone with your aide, Commander Miller, and said that if you had any suggestion or recommendation (of an American Naval officer, retired or active) he could call me collect at Norwich, Connecticut, 5647 J-1; also that my address was "Sandy Hollow" Farm, R.F.D. 6, Norwich, Connecticut.

My Washington office is Suite 4,08, 1700 Eye Street, Northwest, and the telephone number is District 2116.

I shall be back in Washington the latter part of this week or the early part of next.

I am most grateful for the appointment you gave me and only because President Rhee—and I, too, after seven weeks in Korea—believe time is of the essence do I risk the impression of being importunate.

May I hear from you, please?

Sincerely yours,
Jay Jerome Williams.

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. Because of the confidential nature of this letter I am sending it by registered mail.

Sandy Hollow Farm
Route 6
Norwich, Connecticut

July 7th, 1949.

極秘

Dear Admiral Denfeld:

Since my visit with you in June, through the courtesy of White House Secretary Hassett, I have anxiously awaited some word regarding my request.

The long Fourth of July holiday has, I know, intervened but I am under the spur of a chief of state, who has assigned this mission to me and regards it as urgent. To recapitulate:

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea wishes the Government of Korea to retain the best qualified American Naval officer available to serve the Republic of Korea for these purposes:

1. To maintain, at the expense of the Republic of Korea, the one-time secret Japanese naval base at Chin-Hai, Korea, at maximum efficiency for the sole purpose of its immediate utility to us, a friendly power.

2. To do this so that the Republic of Korea may, within its limitations, make what it believes to be a substantial contribution to peace and security in Asia and evince in some measure its gratitude to the United States of America for our country's military might in freeing the Korean people from their long period of bondage under the Japanese.

3. To make this extraordinary base actually a potential foothold for us on the Asiatic mainland because President Rhee knows that Russia covets it and it is now ours, for future and effective use, if you deem it necessary, in this distraught world, to the security of the United States.

As I told you when I had the privilege of seeing you, an important military man of our nation suggested I see Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman and offer him what I believe to be a vitally important post. For I have seen Chin-Hai and was greatly impressed by its natural and man-made fortifications, its underground reservoirs for millions of gallons of fuel oil, its ship repair installations, deep water advantages and—above all—its location on the land of a people who possess an almost child-like faith in American integrity.

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Before I left Washington last week, I talked on the telephone with your aide, Commander Miller, and said that if you had any suggestion or recommendation [illegible] American Naval officer, retired or active) he could call me collect [illegible]horwich, Connecticut, 5647 J-4; also that my address was "Sandy Hollow" Farm, Rt. 6, Norwich, Connecticut.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 21

No. 22

LETTER FROM REAR ADMIRAL SOHN WON-IL, SOUTH KOREAN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, TO ADMIRAL RADFORD, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY, DATED JULY 18, 1949*

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE**

Washington Embasy
Muccio
Tokyo
Admiral Sohn***

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

July 18, 1949

My dear Admiral Radford:

The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet consisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral T.H. Binford.

This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling between the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this significant manifestation of your friendship for us, and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

** Letterhead.

*** These four lines were inserted in ink, presumably for distribution.

his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and often. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your Fleet.

Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidify the friendly relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement to all the peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours,
Won Il Sohn
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy

Washington Embassy
Mr. Chi
Tokyo
Admiral Sohn

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

July 14, 1949

My dear Admiral Radford:

The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet consisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral C.H. Binford.

This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling between the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this significant manifestation of your friendship for us, and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and often. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your fleet.

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I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours,

Won Il Sohn
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy

Photostatic copy of Document No. 22

PART IV

No. 23

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JUNE 14, 1950*

*Confidential****

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington. D.C.**

June 14, 1950

Your Excellency,

I arrived in Washington June 10 (Saturday) with my family, and I am happy to report that my wife's condition is good. She stood the strain of the trip better than I expected, and is now under the care of a heart specialist here. We are both most grateful to Your Excellency for the many kindnesses extended to us and for your graciousness in arranging our trip.

On the day of my arrival, I arranged a small dinner party in honor of Mr. Dulles. It was necessary that we have the party that day, because Mr. Dulles is leaving Washington today, and Saturday (June 10) was the only possible opportunity he had to meet with us. We had Mr. and Mrs. Dulles, Mr. Dean Rusk (Mr. Rusk has succeeded Mr. Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Mr. & Mrs. Niles Bond, and Mr. and Mrs. Allison. Mr. Allison is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and will go with Mr. Dulles on his tour of the Far East. I had ample opportunity for a full discussion with Mr. Dulles, and was asked many questions. This visit Mr. Dulles is about to make is most important in view of the fact that he has a strong voice in preparing decisions of the

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government.

** Letterhead.

*** In the original this is hand-written and underlined in ink. There is also a "confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs.

State Department concerning the Far East. I am confident that his visit may bring about a change in the Department's policy with regard to the Far East. I impressed upon him how much our people are looking forward to his visit, in the hope that it will bring about a firmer stand in the State Department on the anti-Communism issue. I summed up the hopes of our people and our Government as to Mr. Dulles' part as follows:

1. He should make a strong statement, assuring Koreans that the United States will stand behind Korea both in peace and in trouble, both economically and militarily. His statement should declare that Korea should be placed within the United States' line of defense in the Pacific. (Mr. Dulles said at this point that the United States had never made an official commitment with respect to military support with any country, except under the Atlantic Pact, and there were qualifications even in that agreement. He said that not even the Philippines had any such agreement with the United States. But, he added, he was certain that the United States would not abandon Korea, and that he is even now preparing a statement to the effect that Korea would be backed by the United States. He said he would assure the Korean people that the United States would assist them).
2. We want more planes and long range guns in order to render our defenses more effective.
3. Korea should participate in peace treaty negotiations with Japan, because we have fought the Japanese longer and more than any other country.
4. Korea should take an active part in the formation of a Pacific Pact, if such a Pact ever comes into being, and we would like to see the United States take an active part in the formation of the pact. (I regret, I told Mr. Dulles, that Korea was left out of the Baguio meeting, despite the specific promise of an invitation from the President of the Philippines himself. Dulles comment was "You didn't miss much.")
5. We want to see that Formosa will be protected by the United States because of its invaluable strategic location.

In conclusion, I told Mr. Dulles that his visit would, we believed, mean a general revision of the Far Eastern policy of the United States, and that we look forward to his precise and accurate powers of observation to effect a drastic change in the American Far Eastern policy. I told him that his coming to Korea would be regarded as the visit of an angel of peace, trying to impress upon him the importance of his presence in the eyes of our people, and also the responsibility that our hopes place upon him. I urged him to visit the 38th parallel and see for himself the situation. He is leaving today at 6 p.m. to go directly to Korea. I will see him off at the airport. He



Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 11, 1950

Your Excellency,

I arrived in Washington June 10 (Saturday) with my family, and I am happy to report that my wife's condition is good. She stood the strain of the trip better than I expected, and is now under the care of a heart specialist here. We are both most grateful to Your Excellency for the many kindnesses extended to us, and for your graciousness in arranging our trip.

On the day of my arrival, I arranged a small dinner party in honor of Mr. Dulles. It was necessary that we have the party that day, because Mr. Dulles is leaving Washington today, and Saturday (June 10) was the only possible opportunity he had to meet with us. We had Mr. and Mrs. Dulles, Mr. Dean Rusk (Mr. Rusk has succeeded Mr. Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Mr. & Mrs. Niles Bond, and Mr. and Mrs. Allison. Mr. Allison is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and will go with Mr. Dulles on his tour of the Far East. I had ample opportunity for a full discussion with Mr. Dulles, and was asked many questions. This visit Mr. Dulles is about to make is most important in view of the fact that he has a strong voice in preparing decisions of the State Department concerning the Far East. I am confident that his visit may bring about a change in the Department's policy with regard to the Far East. I impressed upon him how much our people are looking forward to his visit, in the hope that it will bring about a firmer stand in the State Department on the anti-Communism issue. I summed up the hopes of our people and our Government as to Mr. Dulles' part as follows:

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2. We want more planes and long range guns in order to render our defenses more effective.

3. Korea should participate in peace treaty negotiations with Japan, because we have fought the Japanese longer and more than any other country.

4. Korea should take an active part in the formation of a Pacific Pact, if such a fact ever comes into being, and we would like to see the United States take an active part in the formation of the pact. (I regret, I told Mr. Dulles, that Korea was left out of the Manila meeting, despite the specific promise of an

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 23

is accompanied by Mrs. Dulles. I hope Your Excellency will give him a big reception, and I am confident that you will do all you can to make his short stay pleasant. I would recommend that he be invited to a military review.

In this connection, I might add that yesterday (June 13) I had a long talk with Mr. Carl McCardle, who is going to the Far East with Mr. Dulles. We sent you a factsheet on Mr. McCardle's background last week. Mr. McCardle put many questions to me regarding Your Excellency, and I answered him specifically and with the purpose of clearing up the rumors and reports regarding you which have not been favorable. At the end of our conversation, which lasted more than an hour, he seemed to understand much more clearly. I gave him a copy of "Japan Inside Out" which he said he would read on the plane, together with some material we furnished him. He told me that he was most anxious to see you, and that he wants to go to the 38th parallel. He also would like to attend the opening session of the Assembly. He promised me that he would do his utmost to bring an accurate picture of conditions in Korea to the people of the United States, and told me that he shares most of Mr. Dulles' political views. I hope Your Excellency will show him such courtesies as you deem proper. As for an exclusive interview, there are some disadvantage inherent in granting it, because, as has been pointed out to us, if one newspaperman is permitted to interview Your Excellency exclusively and to quote you directly, the other correspondents in Seoul will have immediate queries from their superiors as to why they have not succeeded in securing such interviews. As a result, some ill feeling might develop. I am confident, however, that Your Excellency's judgement in this matter will be considered and correct. Together with Mr. McCardle, Mr. William Matthews, who is editor-publisher of the Arizona Daily Star, at Tucson, Arizona, will accompany Mr. Dulles' party. We were informed here that Mr. Matthews passport could not be sent to us in time for a visa and returned to the West Coast (he is joining the Dulles party in Seattle tomorrow) and upon this advice from Mr. Dulles office, we cabled His Excellency the Foreign Minister requesting a waiver of visa in Mr. Matthews' case. He is recommended by Mr. Dulles.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,
John M. Chang*

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

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* Signed by Chang Myun personally.

No. 24

LETTER FROM JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SUPREME ADVISER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A., TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JUNE 20, 1950*

June 20, 1950

My dear President Rhee:

I am happy to hand you herewith an inscribed copy of my recent book, *War or Peace***. I think it shows you that you and I have much the same ideas about the nature of the struggle in which we are engaged and you will see that in my book I frequently mention Korea. I attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfolding.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ John Foster Dulles

The following is the inscription written on the book:
To President Syngman Rhee:

An outstanding and victorious leader in the world-wide struggle for peace and justice with whom I am honored to confer on the occasion of my mission to Korea.

John Foster Dulles

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

** Underlined in the original.

No. 25

LETTER FROM JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SUPREME ADVISER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A., TO LIMB BYUNG-CHICK, SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, DATED JUNE 20, 1950*

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON**

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.
June 20, 1950

My dear Colonel Limb:

I have so much for which to thank you that it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to do so adequately.

The dinner which you gave in our honor last night was something I shall always remember. The setting was really glorious, the company distinguished the entertainment most interesting to us, and last, but not least, the food was delicious.

Your address at the Seoul National University on the occasion of my reception of an honorary degree was an eloquent tribute, which I shall long cherish and pass on to my children and grandchildren.

You may be sure that my faith in the future of Korea is strengthened by my visit here, and I hope that our two countries can continue along the way of mutual support.

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* This document was found in the archives of the South Korean Foreign Department. The original bears a stamp of the "South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs," dated June 22, 1950.

** Letterhead.

The antique celadon vase and bowl will grace Mrs. Dulles' living room in New York and always keep fresh the memory of our visit with you.

Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles*

His Excellency Colonel Ben C. Limb,
Seoul,
Korea.

---

* Signed by Dulles personally.

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.

June 20, 1950

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I have so much for which to thank you that it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to do so adequately.

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Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

His Excellency Colonel Ben C. Limb,
Seoul,
Korea.

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Photostatic copy of Document No. 25

No. 26

LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, DATED JUNE 18, 1950*

June 18, 1950

Confidential—no copy on file
To: Ambassador Chang Myun
From: President Syngman Rhee

Thank you for your letters of June 14.

Mrs. Rhee and I are very glad to learn that Mrs. Chang is feeling well and is under the care of a good specialist there.

I am very glad that you had a chance to entertain Mr. Dulles and his party before he left. By now you have no doubt a copy of his speech at the Assembly. He went to the SD** and told them that he wanted to say and they fully approved.

What you wrote in your letter that Mr. Dulles said that the United States has never made any official commitment not even the Philippines etc. I wish to point out to you that all those who are in the perimeter are automatically included in the defense line. Even if there is no pact signed it is the policy of the United States to supply these countries. Besides, the psychological effect of being in the defense line is already a moral commitment.

I had several conversations and an hour's talk today and he fully agreed that the Southeast Asia pact does not mean anything. He also agreed that Communist China should not be admitted to the UN. It would be an act of appeasement toward the Soviet Union. He agreed with all my policy and no doubt will do his best after his return.

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* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy.

** U.S. State Department.

There is one thing I want to tell you. When a party like this comes the next time you have to try to find out why some of the people are attached to it. Mr. McCardle went along to other conferences and he is filing his report in an official way in the White House to give his impression about the things he observes as an unofficial guest. Mrs.* Matthews was sent by the White House in particular to report to the President and it is said that his report will count just as much as the report of Mr. Dulles if not more. These are valuable information I should get through your office. Fortunately we were tipped of the purpose of his presence in the party.

Miss Louise Yim is leaving for the States tomorrow and I asked her to take this letter along. She is trying to get a final settlement of the Pfeiffer Foundation which will amount to $140,000 for the construction of her school buildings. It might be that you get inquiries from different sources and I know you will do all you can to help her in getting this endowment. This endowment granted to her will do a great deal for Korean education. As you know there is no other school in that part of our city and it would be of great advantage if this school could be developed in such a manner as to enable all the students in that area to be taken care of. As you know the school facilities are inefficient and the great need for new buildings is the most essential one particularly since the compulsory school system has been adopted by the Legislature. We are in a great dilemna** as there are not enough schools to accept students. Everything could be done so that the construction work of new buildings can begin. Therefore, do all you can and also ask Mr. Namkoong to help her in every way possible.

In regard to the Los Angeles question. I have received several letters from both parties and it still seems the best to let the resignation of Mr. Min stand with the understanding that he returns to Korea. If there is any possibility for Mr. Min to obtain a position with the U.S. Army in Monterey the Government will consider an extension. By now you will be already in the clear if that can materialize otherwise, tell him the Foreign Office is unable to retract the former request for Mr. Min to return at the end of the month.

I cannot understand what is meant by saying that Chang and his family have no funds for returning. As I explained to you in Seoul our Government has already deposited his and his family's passage to the American Steamship Co. I cannot understand why he has not conted*** them

---

* As in the original, evidently it means "Mr."

** "Dilemma" misspelt.

*** As in the original, evidently misspelt.

as requested before he complains about his inability to pay his passage. We have wired KORIC* several times that his passage was deposited for May and then transferred for the June sailing. I also understood that you were authorized to inform the new clerk to pay his railroad fare from Los Angeles to Seattle.

It is up to you to settle the affairs of the office of the consulate. It is certain that you will have to give the secretary at least a month's notice. Miss Park has to be clearly instructed as to her office hours and her duties. She must keep the books and other things. We should be very sure that she is doing her best in the office.

I intended to give these instructions through the Foreign Office but as Miss Yim is leaving I may not have time to get the orders out on time.

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* Cable address of the South Korean Embassy in Washington.

APPENDIX

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS ON U.S. CRIMES IN KOREA

EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. The Report is published by the Commission with the authority of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. The Head Office of the Association is Avenue Legrand 70, Brussels, Belgium.
2. The Commission has been anxious to publish this Report without delay, and expresses its regret for any incorrect transliteration of Korean names and terms which may appear in the text.
3. Korea is divided into Provinces. Each Province is sub-divided into Goons or Regions; each Goon is divided into Myen or Districts; a Myen is divided into Ris or Villages. The term Ri is however also used for a sub-district of a City.
4. A Korean Mal (weight)
   Li (length)
   Pyung (surface measurement)
   (1 km. 5/8 ths of English Mile)
5. The numbers in brackets in the text refer to the documents and principal witnesses set out in the list at the end of the Report.
6. This Report has been signed by the members in the English language only.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has repeatedly asked the United Nations to protest against violations of interna-

tional law by their enemies on Korean territory, but U.N.O. has ignored these pleas.

The allegations made have been the subject of different enquiries, particularly in a report dated 27th May, 1951, made by the International Federation of Democratic Women who visited Korea.

The extreme gravity of these accusations led the Council of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers following the Berlin Congress of the Association in September 1951 to set up a Commission consisting of lawyers of different countries, to go to Korea and to investigate these allegations on the spot in conformity with legal methods of enquiry.

The Commission consisted of:

Heinrich Brandweiner, Professor of International Law in the University of Graz (Austria), President.

Luigi Cavalieri, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Rome (Italy), Vice-President.

Jack Gaster, Solicitor, London (Great Britain).

Marc Jacquier, Advocate at the Court of Appeal, Paris (France).

Ko Po-nien, Director of the Research Department of People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Peking (China).

Marie-Louise Moerens, Advocate, Brussels (Belgium).

Letelba Rodrigues de Britto, Advocate, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

Zofia Wasilkowska, Judge of the Supreme Court, Warsaw (Poland).

The Commission was in Korea from March 3rd to March 19th, 1952. Members of the Commission visited the provinces of North and South Pyongan, Hwanghai, Kang Won, including the towns of Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaichen, Pek Dong, Anju, Anak, Sinchon, Sariwon, Wonsan, etc.

The limited time which the Commission had at its disposal, and the state of war, made it impossible for the Commission to investigate all the allegations put before it, but the Commission, who received from the Korean authorities all necessary facilities for carrying out its mission, did make careful enquiry into those cases which seemed most significant, either owing to their size and the number of victims, or owing to the special character of the methods employed by their authors.

In all these cases, after examining the reports and statements supplied by competent authorities, the members of the Commission made direct investigations, in the course of which, they questioned more than a hundred witnesses.

The conclusions of the Commission are based on those cases proved before the Commission by direct evidence and duly corroborated together with the examination of all relevant documents.

Important evidence is analysed in this report, especially with reference to the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons, and documents of historical significance have been examined in connection with the origins of the war. The cases of bombardments of cities and protected buildings, assassinations, tortures and the murders of civil population quoted in this report are only those proved by direct evidence, duly corroborated. At the end, the Commission makes its conclusions which, the Commission consider, ought properly to be drawn from the facts proved.

The names of at least one wi'ness in each case quoted, and a list of some of the more important documents referred to is included at the end of this Report. It is hoped to publish extracts from the evidence of the main witnesses and copies of the most important documents in a separate volume as a supplement to this Report.

After classifying the facts proved, according to their nature, the Commission then considered whether they were crimes of war, or crimes against humanity according to the definition of Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, whether they violated International Conventions now still in force, or were contrary to the laws and customs of war.

* * *

It would be foolhardy for a Commission of lawyers to attempt in a page to outline international law on the wide variety of matters that have come under examination during the enquiry. For the benefit of the general reader, however, it thinks it right to indicate very briefly the principal treaties and agreements and customary laws which are relevant. It is not to be taken as comprehensive and cannot begin to deal with the many complex questions of interpretation and application of these and other laws which the Commission has carefully taken into account in arriving at its conclusions.

In the first place, the work of the Commission was to take as its basis the two conventions concerning the laws and customs of war on land dated July 29th, 1899 and October 18th, 1907—the Hague Regulations, for the reason that these conventions contain provisions for regulating the conduct of the fighting forces in an armed conflict, which are accepted as the expression of the customary law which binds all nations. The Hague Regulations contain the basic principles of the law of war which are that the nations engaged in war do not have unlimited freedom in the choice of the means of inflicting injuries upon the enemy; and that, among other things, they are forbidden to make direct attacks on civilian populations. The Hague Regulations distinguish between defended and undefended cities and locali-

ties, and accord privileges to certain buildings, such as churches, hospitals and schools; these conventions further forbid plundering and condemn the use of certain weapons and methods of warfare. These forbidden weapons, particularly, include the use of poison and poisonous weapons, a term which also covers chemical and bacteriological weapons. These two prohibitions were further covered in detail in the Geneva Protocol of June 17th, 1925, concerning the prohibition of the use of suffocating, poisonous and similar gas as well as bacteriological weapons in war. The Commission further takes into consideration, among other things, the Geneva Convention, dated July 17th 1929, providing for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and the sick of armies in the field, the agreement of the same date concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, and the Geneva Convention, dated August 12th 1949, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. With regard to the application of the last mentioned treaty, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a declaration on July 13th 1950, confirming the observation of the condition of that treaty by the Korean People's Army.

The Commission lays special emphasis upon the Nuremberg principles which found their expression in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and the verdicts it rendered. The Nuremberg principles distinguish among other two kinds of crimes against international law.

a. War crimes:

Violation of the laws of customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

b. Crimes against humanity:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.

These principles are further developments of the Hague Regulations as well as customary international law and are generally recognized.

Lastly, the Commission has taken into consideration the Convention concerning the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, which was adopted on December 9th, 1948 by the General Assembly of the United

Nations. By genocide is meant acts done or attempted against national ethnic, racial or religious groups with the intention of annihilating them. This includes also murder of members of these groups, grave attacks against the physical and mental integrity of these members and subjecting them to conditions of life which lead to their total or partial destructions.

* * *

As to the origin of the Korean war, though the Commission did not make a detailed examination of this question, it feels bound to make a few general remarks on this subject.

According to international law, a third party has in general no right to intervene in a civil war. This is reinforced by Article 2, Clause 4 of the Charter of the United Nations which prohibits members from employing force against the territorial integrity of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and by Article 2, Clause 7, which precludes the United Nations from intervening in the domestic affairs of a country except in certain circumstances under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The United Nations decision to intervene was in itself contrary to the Charter, by virtue of the fact that the said decision was not taken with the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council in accordance with Article 27 (3) and was also in breach of Article 32.

The fact that President Truman had immediately ordered the American Navy and Air Force to intervene before the United Nations had taken the unlawful decision mentioned above indicates that the intervention of the United States was unlawful, apparently prepared, premeditated and constitutes an aggressive act.

The intervention of other member states of the United Nations was also contrary to the United Nations Charter.

It is necessary also to point out that the forces contributed to the support of South Korea by member states of the United Nations were, on the recommendation of the United Nations, placed under the High Command of the United States Forces.

Besides making the above general remarks, the Commission hopes to include photostat-copies of some important documents examined by the Commission in Korea pertaining to the origin of the Korean War in the Supplement to this Report.

CHAPTER 2

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

On its arrival in Korea the Commission found itself faced with the unexpected task of investigating a most serious allegation that the American forces in Korea were using bacteriological weapons against the army and the civil population. Members of the Commission went to different regions of the country and took evidence on the spot, interrogated witnesses who found insects in unusual circumstances, examined and obtained evidence concerning the remains of containers found, examined experts, obtained data concerning health conditions during recent years and as to the outbreaks of disease from health service officials and experts and also examined official documents and other material put before them. The Commission was impressed by the clarity and obvious sincerity and veracity of the many simple peasants and others who gave evidence as to the facts.

The results of the Commission's inquiries are as follows:

According to the reports of observation posts of the Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Local Anti-aircraft Detachments, different kinds of insects were found in 169 areas of North Korea (1). The results of 15 typical cases in which expert examinations were carried out and insects found identified between 28th January and 12th March, 1952 are as follows:

1. January 28th, Peng Kang Goon, Kang Won Province, flies, fleas and spiders; (2)
2. February 11th, Chol Won Goon, Kang Won Province flies and fleas (mosquitoes); (3)
3. February 17th, Pengang Goon, Kang Won Province, spiders;
4. February 18th, Anju Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies and fleas;
5. February 23rd, Peng Won Goon, N. Pyongan Province, flies and fish;
6. February 25th, Dok Won Goon, Kang Won Province, fleas and other insects;
7. February 26th, Dia Dong Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies and fleas;
8. February 27th, Kang Dong Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies;
9. February 27th, Hwang Hai Province (military unit), lice;
10. February 27th, Senchen Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies;

11. February 29th, Suan Goon, Hwanghai Province, flies and other insects;
12. March 1st, Chelsan Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies and fleas;
13. March 1st, Yandog Goon, S. Pyongan Province, fleas and other insects;
14. March 2nd, Kowon Goon, Ham Kyeng Province, fleas and other insects;
15. March 4th, Pyongyang City, Middle District, flies.

In many cases special kinds of flies, fleas, spiders, beetles, bugs, crickets, mosquitoes and other insects were found, many of which were hitherto unknown in Korea. Insects were found in different cases far from human habitation, on snow, on the ice of rivers, on grass and among stones.

Considering the very low temperatures prevailing at the time (In January the maximum was 1° and in February 5°, but only for a few hours, the average temperatures being far below zero centigrade) which normally prevent the appearance of insects, and also considering that the insects were often found in great quantities and even in mixed groups or clusters consisting of different varieties of insects which would normally never be found together, like flies and spiders, the appearance of these insects roused suspicion. The results of the expert examination showed that great quantities of insects were infected.

In many cases it was also found that the insects were carrying eggs. In the opinion of experts it may be assumed that these insects were bred artificially. On 23rd February 1952, in Peng Won Goon, S. Pyongan Province, on a mountain not far from Suk Shun Myen Village, in addition to flies, a great quantity of fishes of a species which live in the regions between fresh water and salt water, were found. The fish were found in a half rotten state and infected with cholera. It is assumed that these fishes were dropped by mistake on the mountains.

The kinds of bacteria found were: Vibrio cholerae, pasteurella pestis, Eberthella typhosa, Bacillus paratyphi A and B, Rickettsia prowazeki and shigella dysenteriae. The examinations confirmed the local reports that different kinds of insects were being dispersed, and also established that the insects dropped were infected with plague, cholera and other epidemic diseases. (1)

The Commission particularly investigated the following cases:

1. On the 30th January 1952, southeast of I Chon, Kang Won Province, flies, bugs and spiders were found alive on the snow and among stones. Though the place had been burnt immediately after discovering the insects, 20-30 specimens per square metre could still be found in an area of 600 to 700 m. in diameter.

Expert examination showed that the flies had been infected with the germ of cholera. At a distance of about 300 to 400 m. from the point where the insects had been discovered, remains of containers like leaflet bombs have been found with a special appliance that caused them to break open as soon as they touched the ground. An eye-witness identified this kind of bomb on the photos No. 8 and 9 (4) which is of the same type as the remains the Commission personally inspected. (5)

2. On 18th February 1952, in Bal Nam Ri. Anju Goon, Dai Ri Myen region, S. Pyengan Province, flies, spiders and bugs were found crowded into 1 yard square in 3 separate lots on open ground, each spot being about 1 metre from the next. One spot was covered with snow, others not. All the insects were alive. By the time the Investigation Group reached the spot, the insects had scattered over an area around. The flies were unusual, compared with the familiar Korean ones. The fly that was found had longer wings which were slightly spread; the body was bigger; the head was comparatively bigger in proportion to their body than those familiarly known. As to the spiders the familiar ones can be divided into 2 groups, large size and small size, and black in colour. Those found were of middle size with a little white on the body. As to the bugs, while the familiar ones have a rounded body and a little yellow colour, those found had flat bodies and were black. At this time of the year no flies or spiders have ever been found in this area before. The ground temperature was 20 degree below zero centigrade.

Towards midnight on the day before the discovery of the insects airplanes had been seen above this place, circling several times very low, without dropping any explosive or incendiary bomb, or machine-gunning. Expert examination showed that the insects were infected with plague bacteria. On February 25th, plague broke out in that village. 50 persons were taken ill of whom 36 died (in a population of about 600) up to March 11th, and the disease had not then run its course. Plague has never previously occurred in this region. (6) (7)

3. February 22nd, in Jong Dong, Hwang Hai Province, Pong San Goon, Cho Wa Myen region, flies were found in clusters, lying on ice and snow, over about an area of 200 meters in diameter with 5 to 10 flies to the square meter. They were lying in the open field, far from human habitation.

Also in Wol San, same Goon and region, flies were found 700

metres from the nearest house. In both cases, the flies had a smaller head, longer wings and hairier body than normally known. In the whole province 36 cases have been established up to March 12th, in which flies, mosquitoes, spiders and unfamiliar insects similar to fleas were found. (8)

4. Since 25th February in Kaichen Goon, S. Pyongan Province, flies and other insects were found in 9 cases. Some of them were discovered on snow. The insects found were of a type hitherto unknown. Flies do not usually appear before April in this county. No outbreak of diseases had occurred up to the time of the visit of the members of the Commission.

5. On February 26th, in Buk Myen, same Goon, a great quantity of flies and fleas were found on the snow, which later on spread from the village Nam Shin Il to Nam Shin I. 2 km. away, clusters of insects were found, wrapped in yellow paper, crowded on a patch of wet earth where the snow had smelted. (9)

6. On February 28th, near Song Ri, Kang Don Goon, Won Tan Myen region, S. Pyongan Province, on the ice of the bank of Puk Kang river (which serves the water supply of Pyongyang), ant-like insects were found in clusters of about 30 cm. diameter, with about 3 to 5 m. between each cluster. By the next day, the insects had already spread over an area of 800 m. The day before the insects were found, 5 American planes had been seen circling over the place for half an hour, without dropping explosive or incendiary bombs or machine-gunning. The witness stated that the expert examination disclosed that the insects were infected with bacteria which caused a disease of the intestines. (10)

7. On March 3rd, flies of unusual appearance, crowded in one spot about 1 yard square, were found at Ko Eup, Jan Shan Myen, Soonchen Goon, S. Pyongan Province. They were still alive, though lying on the snow at 10 degree below zero centigrade. The head of the fly was smaller than a Korean fly's, the wings closed, the body longer than that of the familiar fly. Flies are not normally to be seen alive in the open at this time of the year in the district. (11)

8. On March 4th, the same kind of flies was found under similar conditions in the same county in the village Ma Don, Sin Chen Myen. (11)

9. On the same day, several groups of mosquitoes were found near Anju City. A container similar to that described above, and which was

identified by photograph No. 8, was found. (4) (12)

10. On the same day, mosquitoes were found in the village Cha Jang, Anju District. The insects were found in groups in various spots of this area. They were of an unusual type; while the familiar ones are covered lightly with fair hair from head to body, these were much more hairy. (6) (7)

11. On March 5th in Pyongyang City, Choong Koo District Quarter Ham-moon Ri, large and small groups of flies were found in the street, spread over an area of about 1.5 to 5 m. The next day, cholera broke out in the neighbouring street. (13)

12. On March 11th, in Bek Dong Goon, a few kilometres from a POW Camp, some flies and other insects were found in clusters on the snow.

These groups of individual cases, proved by the Commission, represent only a small part of the real facts for it was not possible for the Commission to visit all the places affected. Where containers like leaflet bombs have been found it should be made clear that no leaflets have been found in the neighbourhood.

In North Korea there have been no previous epidemics for at least 4 years and no case has up to the time of the Commission's visit been reported except in the immediate area where clusters of insects have been found as described above. The fact that no widespread epidemic has occurred in consequence of the deposits of infected insects is, from our own observation, undoubtedly due to the careful and strict anti-epidemic measures that have been taken by the authorities with the fullest and closest co-operation of the people.

The first case of cholera was diagnosed on February 20th. This was 40-year-old Kim Hak Mun of the Puk Myen region, Chel Won Goon, Kang Won Province, who died on February 23rd. On February 25th, 35-year-old Kim Shul Sun fell ill in the same village. In S. Pyongan Province, Suk Chan Myen, two persons in the same village fell ill on March 5th, and both died on the following day. On March 8th, 3 more persons fell ill, one of whom died the same day and another on March 9th. In Pyongyang City (as mentioned above) 2 persons fell ill on March 6th, and another one on March 8th. Two of them died on March 8th. The quarter has been isolated. In Hwang Hai Province, where the local register (as mentioned above) showed 36 cases of discovery of insects, in Suan Goon, Su Gu Myen, Sok Dal Ri village, 2 persons fell

ill on March 8, one of whom died on March 9. No soldier fell ill of cholera. Total number of cholera cases is 13, 9 of whom died. (1)

The first case of plague was diagnosed on February 25th Hwang Li Shai, aged 29, of Bal Nam Ri, Anju Region. The case took a mortal turn. On February 29th, Pak Sun Ok, aged 26, of the same village, fell ill. In this case it was established that plague-infected fleas had been found on February 8th. The number of plague cases in the village amounted to 50, 36 of whom died, up to the time of the Commission's visit to Anju.

3 cases of plague have been proved in the army:—

In Kang Won Province, Tan Wan Goon, Dong Ha region, on March 4th, one soldier fell ill and died on March 6th. In S. Pyongan Province Jong Don Goon, Shoang I Dong village, one soldier fell ill on March 7th, and died the following day. In Han Kyon Nam Do Province, Ko Won Goon, Seng Nam Ri village, one soldier fell ill on March 11th, and died the following day.

The total number of plague-cases is 53, 39 of whom died. (1)

In a number of cases there is a local and temporal coincidence between the cases of cholera and plague and the discovery of infected insects.

In view of these facts the Commission states that it is beyond doubt that great quantities of insects, oftentimes of species unknown in Korea, were found under very low temperatures on the snow, on the open field or on the ice of rivers. The insects were proved to be infected in great number with plague, cholera and other contagious diseases. Close by the places where insects were discovered containers have been found whose construction permits the conclusion that they served for the carrying of great quantities of insects.

On a part of one of them a marking in English was discovered. In several cases a local and temporal coincidence between the objects found and the appearance of airplanes, which circled low above the place without firing or strafing was proved. Shortly after these discoveries cases of plague and cholera occurred. The cases investigated by the Commission which are only a few of the cases reported, have been set out above. These alone disclosed a serious and widespread deposit of such insects. In all the circumstances, the Commission must reach the conclusion that insects infected with epidemic diseases have been dropped over Korea by American airplanes.

CHAPTER 3

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

American planes have on various occasions used asphyxiating and other gases or chemical weapons at least since 6th May, 1951.

According to evidence given to the Commission by the Head of the Health Section of Nampo City People's Committee (1) on 6th May 1951, the city was bombarded four times, between 5.05 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. The bombardments took place in good weather and in a temperature of 23 degrees Centigrade 13 districts were attacked. In the course of the last attack when the inhabitants had taken shelter, 3 B29s attacked the districts of Sam Hwa Hoopo Ri, Yong Chong Ri, Chook Dong Ri and a part of Yong Soo Ri, over an area of 0.3 square k.m. with gas bombs. There were 1,379 casualties of whom 480 died of suffocation and 647 others were affected by gas. By other means during the raid, 76 people were killed and 176 injured.

The evidence of eye witnesses and of experts (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) taken by the Commission and the verification of materials and documents presented to the Commission establish the following facts: the gas spread immediately after the explosion of the bombs which produced first a black smoke, then green-yellow and yellow, and then colourless; the smoke had a disagreeable smell, resembling the smell of chlorine; its poisonous effect lasted until it evaporated, within about two hours; people in the shelters (including many children) were particularly affected. The symptoms of the victims were described as follows: Difficulty in breathing, hoarse voice, fainting, coughing, watering of the eyes, running nose, headache, feeling exhausted, the skin feeling hot, vomitting, spitting foam and blood, fever, cyanosis, feeble pulse, the symptoms of acute bronchitis and photophobia. Examination of blood showed an augmentation of white and red corpuscles and of haemoglobin from 100 to 115%. Post-mortem examination showed an augmentation of volume and weight of the lungs which carried on the periphery marks of the ribs, and a red-black liquid mixed with exudates flowed out of the parenchyma. The surface of the bronchial tubes became clear grey in colour and came away easily. The kidneys and the heart showed signs of loss of blood, and points caused by dilation of the capillary structure;

the meninges were smoothened and their structures dilated; the spinal marrow which was dissected showed ecchymoses in the white matter. When the Commission was in Nampo, it examined the results of the autopsy.

In the affected area of the city it was noted that grass became yellow brown, objects containing an alloy of copper became blue green and rings of silver became black. The Commission saw some of these articles identified by witnesses.

At 8 a.m. on 6th July, 1951, two American "Jets" flew over the village of Poong-Po Ri to the south of Wonsan from northeast to southwest. The temperature was about 27 degrees, a light wind blew from northwest, and the air was relatively wet. The sky was clear. Gas or some other unidentified chemical product spread over an area of about 100 to 200 m. at a point approximately 200 m. east of the village. (10) Two farmers, An Young Hwa and his wife Yang Choun Ok on their way to plough their land suffered burns on the skin, had difficulty in breathing, their eyes watered and could not remain open.

The scientific committee of the Ministry of Health sent a mission of inquiry (11) (12) (13) and witnesses and experts (14) (15) and case histories (16) (17) examined by the Commission established that the two victims were in good health up to 6th July 1951. Shortly after the planes had passed they (the victims) felt an itching on the exposed parts of the body (face, hands and feet); they observed red spots which grew to a size like haricot beans, which then swelled and were filled with pus. These injuries could not have come from any sickness whatsoever and resembled second degree burns but with a much more serious erosive action and taking a longer time to recover. The man had to remain in hospital from July 15th to August 15th, and the woman until August 21st. While they were in hospital, the blisters containing the pus or liquid broke and the dead skin fell off after the application of Pomatum, but leaving light scars.

Where the gas had spread 10% of agricultural plantations and more specially the leaves of beans showed round white spots which were about one cm. apart from one another, similar to the red spots found on the exposed parts of the victims' bodies.

The witnesses testified that there was no sound of any explosion of bombs, nor was there any machine-gunning.

On August 1st, 1951, about 3 p.m. two bombs were dropped on the villages of Yen Seug Ri and Won Chol Ri, (Province of Hwanghai) one in each village. They broke in the air with an unusually feeble sound and produced a black smoke, and a yellow green cloud spread on the ground. Four civilians were killed and 40 poisoned with similar symptoms and results to these found

during the bombardment of Nam-po on 6th May, 1951. The leaves of trees fell, cereals on the ground were damaged; brass objects became black. (18) (19) (20) (21)

On January 9th, 1952, at about 4 p.m. in clear sky and at temperature of at least 5 degrees, the small mountain village of Hak Seng north of Won-san was bombarded by two planes. After bombardment, 83 persons were poisoned and showed similar symptoms to those found after the Nam-po bombardment. They had, in addition, itching in the throat and felt a sweer taste in the mouth. These facts were established by witnesses including doctors examined by the Commission (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) and were corroborated by the information supplied by the Director of the Kang Won (32) Province Department of Health, and by a report made by many doctors of the Won San Central Hospital (33).

The facts set out above prove beyond question that the American Forces in Korea have in their possession chemical weapons of various kinds and that these have been used on many occasions against the civilian population, causing numerous casualties.

CHAPTER 4

MASS-MASSACRES, MURDERS AND OTHER ATROCITIES

The evidence of mass-murders, individual murders and bestialities committed by the military forces of the U.S.A. against Korean civilians including women and chidren is overwhelming both in the quantity of the crimes committed and in the variety of methods employed.

The Commission in this section of its report has dealt only with cases investigated in two of the provinces visited namely:

1. The Hwanghai Province where the members of the Commission visited three cities: Sinchon, Sariwon and Anak.

2. The South Pyongan Province where the members of the Commission visited 6 localities: Pyongyang city, Soonchown, Anju, Kaichen, Koon Woo Ri and Nampo.

PART I. MASS-MASSACRES

1. HWANGHAI PROVINCE

The cases investigated (but a few of the many put before the Commission) disclosed the following:

A. Sinchon

According to the evidence of Pyong Won Goon, the Chairman of the People's Committee, 35,383 civilians (19,149 men and 16,234 women) were murdered in the district of Sinchon during the American occupation, which lasted from October 17th till December 7th, 1950, i.e. for less than two months. The number includes a substantial number of refugees who were in the district.

(1) On the evidences examined, the following facts can be established beyond doubt:

On 18th October 1950 in the city of Sinchon behind the building of the People's Committee, a mass murder of about 900 men and women including about 300 children was committed. Some of the women were pregnant.

The murder was committed by order of the commander of the American occupying forces in the city—Harrison (described by one witness as Halison). Harrison was present when his order was fulfilled and took photographs of the execution.

The murder was committed as follows. All the people were pushed into an open deep grave. Harrison ordered them to take off their clothes, then ordered fuel-oil to be thrown over the victims who were set on fire. Those who tried to get out of the grave were shot.

A witness declared: "The cries and shrieks of these people were heart-breaking. Those who were not burnt to death were buried alive. Harrison came the next day and took photos."

On October 20th, 1950 about 500 men and women including about 100 children were murdered. Harrison was again present.

All the people were forced into an air raid cave shelter, which had 2 entrances. This shelter was cut in rock in the city of Sinchon behind the police headquarters. On Harrison's orders, American soldiers put explosives in the shelter with a fuse leading outside. Then both entrances were sealed with sacks of earth. Harrison ordered the fuse to be lit. All the people in the shelter were killed by the explosion.

In mid-November 1950 another mass murder took place. About 500 people, including women and children were killed. Here are the facts of this case: Harrison had sent an expedition to the Koo Wol mountains in Sinchon district, where he stated guerilla fighters were hiding. The expedition was fruitless. The American officer in charge thereupon ordered the seizure of all the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. On the way back to Sinchon, in the village of Min Chon-ri the commanding American officer gave orders that those people be killed. They were shot by American soldiers with machine-guns.

When the American forces were about to withdraw from the area on

7th December 1950, Harrison addressed the officers of the American units and of the Syngman Rhee auxiliary troops under his command. In a characteristic speech he is reported to have said the withdrawal was "temporary" and for "strategic reasons" and declared that the inhabitants who were still free should be told they should go south with the American troops. Whoever stays will be treated as an active enemy, and an atom-bomb will be dropped on them. He ordered that all the dependents of the "reds" must be annihilated; all the families of soldiers of the Korean People's Army and of all those working for the state should be considered as "red" for this purpose. His order was executed.

Further mass-murder of about 900 people, men and women took place on that day in two warehouses in the Won-An-Ri ward of the Sinchon city. There were over 200 children in one of these buildings. The American soldiers threw fuel-oil over the people's clothes and set fire to them. Hand grenades were thrown into the buildings through the windows. One of the Korean woman who was in the building with two children pushed the children out of the window. One child was shot. One fled. The mother was burned. Harrison and his officers were present. (2) (3) (4)

The members of the Commission have seen the grave in which the murder of October 20th was committed and the warehouses one was partly open, in the presence of the members of the Commission.

The members of the Commission also saw the shelter in which the murder of October 20th was committed and the warehouses one of which was subsequently destroyed by bombardment. On the walls of the shelter and the warehouse there are traces of burning.

Mass-murders were also committed in other parts of the Sinchon district. For instance:

On the day of their entry into Sam-Song-Ri, Yong-Chin-Myen region, Sinchon Goon, the American soldiers forced about 400 people into an open grave. Among them was a young girl, who gave evidence, who was there together with her family consisting of 15 people. All these people were buried alive. Afterwards the witness and another young girl managed to extricate themselves from the grave and fled to the mountains. (5)

On October 17th, 1950 in the locality of Boo-Jung-Ri the Americans forced 400 women and men into a cellar. According to the deposition of an eye witness the cellar was so crowded, that it was not possible to move in it. On October 18th, 1950 about 7 p.m. the Americans put fuel-oil on the people and burned them alive. The burned bodies remained in the cellar till the locality was liberated and were then discovered by their families.

The witness managed to get out through a ventilation opening and in spite of the wounds he sustained, he escaped and saved his life. (6)

In the locality Sol-Ma-Ri, Sinchon district, 2,000 people (men and women) were seized and murdered by various methods during the American occupation. These included children of 1 year old and old people over 70. An eye witness gave evidence of the horrible conditions in the jail. People were constantly beaten. A number were killed with knives or clubs. The witness was in a group of 80 which had to be murdered. He heard a shot and was hurt with a spear. He lost consciousness and after recovered he managed to escape. On many occasions he saw groups of people murdered and put into a grave. (7)

The Commission could not examine all the eye witnesses of mass murders who were available. But having regard to the facts proved, the Commission concluded that the number of over 35,000 murdered in the district of Sinchon declared by the Chairman of the People's Committee and based on the data of the Korean Commission for investigation into war crimes corresponds to reality.

B. Sariwon

An eye witness (8) told the Commission how about 950 people including many women, were shot on the mountains of Mi Ra (8 k.m. from Sariwon) on December 5th 1950 by order of an American officer commanding a military unit.

The shooting took place by machine-gunning just before the American troops were forced to leave the city. The members of the Commission have seen the pass in which the execution took place and the graves of the victims, which were opened for inspection by the Commission.

Immediately after the American troops entered the locality of Dai-Won-Ri district of Sariwon many inhabitants were seized including all the families of people serving in the Korean People's Army. An eye witness (9), a young girl who was also seized with a group of about 50 women and 30 men, including children of 1-2 years old told how horribly the American soldiers tortured the prisoners. The prisoners were beaten ceaselessly. The most frequently used method of torture was to put people on a table and to pour water through the nose. Every day people were killed in the prison. Some were hung by the hair and the American soldiers shot at them as at a target. Or they were beaten till they died. Or they were stoned to death. 29 people including 3 women were killed in this way. Other prisoners were forced to watch the murders.

Just before the Americans had to leave the city, the prisoners who were still alive were taken out of the prison, and shot. The father and brother of the witness were killed. She managed to escape when the people were being led out to execution.

Another witness (10) was for 20 days, with a group of about 700 people in the prison of Sariwon. All the prisoners were beaten. Water was poured into their throats. Among the prisoners there were many women with small children. One pregnant woman was beaten so much that she had an abortion. Every evening the American soldiers came to the prison and chose several women who returned after several hours crawling on all fours, their clothing torn to pieces, crying half-mad.

On December 5th, 1950 when the Americans retreated the prisoners were taken away in groups. A witness who was in the last group managed to escape. He found afterwards that all the other prisoners were killed.

C. Anak

The American occupation lasted in Anak from 18th October to 5th December 1950. During this time, according to the records made and produced by the Chairman of the People's Committee Mung Young Song, the American murdered 19,072 people. (11) The Commission heard the deposition of eye witnesses only as to a part of those murders.

On October 25th, 1950 a witness was seized, because her elder son was in the Korean People's Army. Her second son fled. On the same evening the Americans conducted the prisoners numbering several thousands and including the witness and her two younger sons to the river near Tolmuzi. The people were bound in twos. The execution took place by shooting or by bayonet. The witness was bound to a young girl who was bayoneted. She said, "I was shot and we both lost consciousness. When I recovered I felt my back heavily pressed, for corpses were heaped upon me, and I was wet with their blood." She and the girl, though wounded, managed to escape. Both of her younger sons were shot. (12)

In the beginning of November 1950 in the locality Sinchang-Ri in the region and District of Anak about 1,000 people were buried alive. This was stated by an eye witness whose son and grandson were among those buried. (13)

During their withdrawal the Americans ordered the population to go with them to the south. They threatened the people, saying that after their withdrawal an atom-bomb would be dropped on the locality. When thousands of people with their families were going southward they were machine-gunned. The witness who managed to escape told the Commission that the number of killed was about 1,500. (14)

D. Other localities

When the Commission was at Sinchon, witnesses from other localities arrived and asked to be given the opportunity of giving evidence. In only

a few cases was the Commission able to meet this request. Among these interrogated were witnesses from the localities Haiju, the Tong Gang coast and the Yeng-Pyeng island.

During the American occupation about 6,000 people, men, women and children were murdered in Haiju including the teachers and many students at the large College of Arts in the district. An eye witness (15) was in jail with a group of 500 people including women. All those people were taken out in groups to be shot. The witness managed to escape. One of his acquaintances who was in one of these groups was shot and received three wounds but did not die and later escaped. All the others were killed.

On the Tong Gang coast, at the end of December 1950, an eye witness (16) saw the American soldiers murder about 300 Korean people including many women and children. The people were shot or beheaded with Japanese sabres. The American soldiers had whole collections of such sabres.

During the last days of December 1950 mass murders took place on the Yeng Pyeng island. An eye witness gives the number of murdered people as approximately 2,000, mostly young boys and girls. The victims were shot or they were put on a ship and thrown into the sea. The witness saw the shooting himself and heard the Americans talking about the drowning.

2. SOUTH PYONGAN PROVINCE

In this province members of the Commission visited the following localities: Pyongyang, Soonchown, Anju, Kaichen, Kou-Woo-Ri, Nampo.

A. Pyongyang City

At the time of the American withdrawal, through leaflets and other means they threatened the people with the atom-bomb and compelled thousands of them to cross the river Dai Dong. During the crossing the American air force strafed and bombed the unarmed people. On 4th December 1950, some 1,000 and on 5th December 1950, some 3,000 Korean people including many women and children were killed in this way. (17) (18) (19) (20)

B. Soonchown

An eye witness told how 143 people including women and little children were killed on November 27th, 1950. (21)

Another witness described three murders committed by the Americans on October 20th, October 21st and December 2nd.

In the first case one woman was shot, in the second two women and in

the third 51 persons among them 5 pregnant women and some children 5-6 years old. The executions took place on the riverbank in the locality Kang Dong Ri. (22)

C. Anju

On November 11th 1950 American soldiers from the 24 Division shot 25 Korean people, believed to be members of the Worker's Party. Before the execution they were imprisoned and beaten and tortured systematically. Several were tortured by electric shocks. (23)

On November 19th 1950, the American soldiers seized and killed four Koreans. Three days later they took about 20 people and shot them in a nearby valley. (24)

On October 23rd 1950 in the locality of Rying Don Ri—of the Dong Myen Region Anju District American soldiers killed 9 workers by throwing them alive into a well and throwing stones on top of them. (25)

D. Kaichen

On November 29th 1950, the American soldiers murdered over 400 Koreans in the locality Eul Ryong Ri. Some 30 soldiers took part in this mass-murder. Before the execution the Koreans were imprisoned for 8 days, and many were beaten and tortured by means of electric power. (26)

E. Kou-Woo-Ri

23rd October 1950, a large number of people including 60 children under 5 years of age, 8 pregnant women and 5 old people over 60 years of age were shot by 3 American and one Syngman Rhee soldier. (27)

23rd or 24th October 1950, about 80 people including mothers carrying their babies on their backs and some children were murdered by American and Syngman Rhee troops. The adults were shot, the children buried alive. A witness saw her father killed in this massacre. (28)

A peasant Ku Son Chin was taken by American and Syngman Rhee soldiers together with 5 other peasants to a nearby hillside, forced into an open grave and shot. He was wounded and lost consciousness. Apparently he must have been taken as dead, for when he recovered consciousness the Americans had gone and he managed to escape. (29) Members of the Commission saw the grave, in company with Ku Son Chin. They saw the remains of bodies.

23rd November 1950, 50 people of Kwan Son Kwong were shot by American troops. Those killed included the witness' father and one of her brothers. She saw this murder. Her mother, grandmother, four sisters

(youngest 3 years old), two other brothers and about 6 of the neighbours' children aged between 5 and 14 were also killed. Some being shot, others buried alive. The witness saw the murder of the children. The other bodies were discovered after the American withdrawal from the area. (30)

F. Nampo

5th December 1950, on the day of their withdrawal, American troops took 64 workers at a factory to a nearby shelter and murdered them by shooting and throwing hand grenades. (31)

PART II. TORTURES, VIOLATIONS AND MURDERS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

Cases of murders and violations against Korean men, women and children given in this section are drawn from the same provinces as the facts described above. Only cases in respect of which direct evidence was investigated and accepted have been considered in this report.

1. HWANGHAI PROVINCE

A. Sinchon

On the very day American troops entered the locality Wuol San Ri of the Cho Ri Region, Sinchen Myen—they committed a particularly horrible murder against the Woo Mal Che family. (32) The Americans pierced a wire through the hands, ears and nose of the witness' husband. On his forehead they fastened with a nail, a diploma for work found in the room and tortured him until he died. 11 children of the family Woo Mal Che ranging from 5 till 25 years of age were shot on the spot. Woo Mal Che's daughter-in-law seeing the American soldiers torturing her father-in-law tried to defend him. The Americans attached her by her hair to a tree, cut off her breasts, put a wooden club in her vagina, poured fuel-oil on it and set fire to it. They then poured oil over her and burned her alive. About 20 American soldiers took part in this murder.

In the locality Mi Gok Ri of the Jong Chang Myen Region on the 5th December 1950, Bak Yong Nye, aged 23 was raped by 3 American soldiers. In the same locality and on the same date another woman 38 years old was raped by 4 American soldiers. (33) (34)

B. Anak

On October 18th 1950 in the locality Song San Ri, American soldiers forced all the inhabitants—adults and children into the school building.

One woman Kim Hwa Sil who defended herself against attempted rape was put naked in the courtyard. All the prisoners were compelled to watch her further torture. A club one meter long was put into her vagina. She died immediately. Her body was hung on a telegraph pole, where it remained till the end of the American occupation. All those scenes were photographed by the Americans.

10 other women were one after another raped by 2 or 3 soldiers. They were also beaten with clubs, kicked and clubs were put between their legs. The children were taken from their mothers' breasts. Beating, raping and murdering lasted for 8 days. On the 26th October 1950, the survivers were taken to the seashore and shot. The witness escaped from the convoy when there was a hold up on the road and the guards were temporarily distracted. She was the only one who lived. (35)

At Sam Seng Ri, Yong Jin Myen, Sunchen Goon, when the 12 year-old brother of witness Kim Hyen Choon tried to defend his peasant father from beating by American troops, they beat the boy and then dug out his eyes. (37)

C. Sariwon

On October 25th 1950 in the city of Sariwon—an American soldier with the letters M.P. on his arm committed a horrifying murder on a man named Kim Chan Du. Using a knife he cut off the victim's skin from the throat to the abdomen and started to skin him alive. As he had some difficulty in doing this, he threw stones at his victim until the victim died.

On November 11th 1950 a young girl was raped by 3 Americans. She was also cruelly beaten, kicked, and water was poured down her throat. Other soldiers raped a 56 years old woman.(36)

D. Haiju

In the city of Haiju, American soldiers tortured a young Korean girl named Jo Ok Hi who was chairman of the local women's organisation and was in prison in the same room as the witness. According to the testimony of the witness who was examined by members of the Commission, the American troops submitted her to slow torture, first putting out her eyes, after a lapse of time cutting off her nose, still later cutting off her breasts. (38)

2. SOUTH PYONGAN PROVINCE

A. Pyongyang City

American atrocities and crimes were numerous in the city of Pyongyang.

Typical individual crimes were raping, torturing and murders. Here are some cases:

24th October 1950, in Yin Heung Ri the whole family of An-Duk-Sil consisting of father, mother, 2 sons, 2 daughters and 11 other relatives including in all 8 children of whom two were babies were buried alive by 10 American soldiers. The bodies were discovered when the grave was opened after the withdrawal of American troops. (39)

Yin Heung Ri, 5th November to 3rd December 1950. Torture by electric shock and beating of civilian Choi Ki Ok aged 25 who was also stripped and dragged naked through the street. She was accused of being "a Red". (40)

Song Seuk Ri: 25th November 1950. Murder of mother of Kim Young Sook, aged 12, by shooting on the ground that she was "a Red". (41)

Cho Hak Reul, schoolteacher, was seized in Heung Ri, 2nd November to 3rd December 1950 on the ground that he was "a Red". He was tortured and murdered. Ge Kil Ryeu, his mother, was seized and imprisoned and beaten because she had "given birth to a Red". (42)

B. Kaichen

On October 25th 1950 the Americans took from their house a serving soldier and his mother. (see Chapter 6) They killed the mother and the son by shooting in the neck. The father who was in hiding in the hills nearby, saw the arrests and later recovered the bodies. (43)

In October 1950 American soldiers took a mother of 4 children from her home. Two of those children—a 7 years old girl and a 2 years old boy clung to her skirts—the American soldiers killed both children strangling the girl and beating the boy to death with the butt of a rifle in the presence of their mother. (44)

On November 17th 1950 Ree Sam Sil, a leading member of the local women organisation was put in jail where she remained till November 29th. She was tortured by means of electricity, raped by two soldiers, stripped and dragged naked through the streets. On the very day of the withdrawal of the Americans she managed to escape. (45)

From November 11th till November 29th 1950 the witness Kim Yong Son was in jail. He was beaten and tortured with electricity. On November 29th 1950 he was conducted with other prisoners to be killed and was shot. He was seriously wounded, lost consciousness awakened by night and managed to escape. (26)

C. Anju

Heung Hyep Ri: Imprisoned and tortured with electricity and beating

of Kim Tai Soon, age 25, schoolteacher, because "he was a Red". 20th to 30th November 1950.

Book Soong Ri: Seizure of Chai Ming Som as "a Red", beating in prison and subsequently murdered. Body recovered from nearby lake by his father. 19th November 1950. (45)

Book Song Ri: Seizure and subsequent murder of three peasants who refused confiscation of their grain without authority, receipt of compensation. 19th November 1950. (46)

Dong Maing Ri: Seizure of Pak Chang Rok, aged 38, peasant on 23rd October 1950 for refusing pigs and grain without production of authority, or receipt or compensation. Murdered on same day (with others), being bound and dropped alive in a well shaft, head first. Body recovered by mother a month later immediately after evacuation of area by U.S. troops. (47)

O Ri: November 1950, murder of Ri Seum Ok married woman aged 28, after she had resisted rape. (48)

Koo Teung Ri: 20th November 1950, taking of child Cha Deuk Keun, aged 12 with his peasant father and mother, and attempted murder by shooting (from which peasants died but child only injured and subsequently escaped). (49)

Song Seuk Ri: 25th November 1950. Murder of mother of Ri Yoon Sook, aged 12, by shooting on the ground that she was "a Red". (50)

Boug Rim Ri: 21st-29th November 1950. Beating and murder of Ri Wha Soon, peasant, for refusing grain without authority, receipt or compensation. (51)

Nong Rim Ri: 20th-30th November 1950. Seizure and imprisonment of whole family of a peasant including 3 children for resisting confiscation of grain. Murder of mother and one child and attempted murder of other 2 children including Ri Yoon Sook aged 16. The two surviving children were wounded by grenades but subsequently escaped. (50)

D. **Soonchen**

Sang Ri, November 1950, rape of Mrs. Ree, aged 64. (52)

E. **Koon-Woo-Ri**

23rd October 1950, O-Beng-Nyong a peasant was seized and imprisoned. Tortured with red hot iron by Syngman Rhee troops under the orders and in the presence of American soldiers.

This witness also deposed to the torture and subsequent murder of a woman named Joo Sung Byek in the same prison by American and Syngman Rhee troops. (27)

* * *

In this section of the report, the Commission has confined itself to a statement of those facts which were proved by direct evidence which in the opinion of the Commission was corroborated and established beyond doubt. A considerable volume of written statements was submitted to the Commission, which have been taken into account only by way of corroboration of facts proved by primary evidence. We were invited to investigate many similar cases to those stated above in various parts of the country, and it was time alone that prevented this from being done.

The members of the Commission were especially concerned to be satisfied in each case that the victims were indisputably civilians, and entitled to be treated as such; that they were given no trial, or even advised of any offence against the occupying power.

The circumstances surrounding the detention or mass murder of people reveal certain common features at all the major places which the Commission visited, and cannot, therefore, in the opinion of the Commission, be treated simply as cases of excesses committed by individual soldiers or units.

The wholesale killings fall substantially into two categories, the killing of the inhabitants of a locality, and the killing of refugees.

As to the former, it was established that on entering a locality the American troops either alone or using for their purpose Syngman Rhee auxiliaries or also using Japanese agents rounded up the families of all men serving in the Korean People's Army or of men who worked in state enterprises or government, or who were active in the Workers' Party or leading movement of women's league. In many cases this meant in practice the seizure of all families in which no young men were present. In nearly every case those seized included men, women and children of all ages. In some cases all the civilian inhabitants of a locality were seized. In addition, in many villages, peasants and their families were taken when they refused to hand over grain and livestock without any requisitioning authority being produced, and without any receipt being rendered or compensation offered.

While the group killings continued in each area throughout the period of occupation, it would appear that the greatest number of those killed were exterminated, either within the first few days of the occupation, or immediately before withdrawal from the area. In every town visited, it was clear that the occupation troops had on the day before, or on the day of retreat, taken the people in detention for whatever cause and deliberately exterminated them.

As to the killing of refugees, this falls into two periods:—

(a) When the American troops were advancing northwards in September and October 1950, large numbers of refugees fleeing northwards were cut off by the advancing troops particularly in the areas of Sinchon and Anak. These refugees were clearly distinguishable as refugees (whole families including women and children. The men wearing the traditional Korean white clothes, and the women long skirts in color) who were not at the time intermingled with troops of the Korean People's Army. It was these groups which were systematically exterminated as related above.

(b) When the American troops retreated in November—December 1950, it is established that large numbers of the inhabitants of the major cities were induced by leaflets and threats to believe that the atom bomb would be dropped and that they should move south with the American troops. These refugees were deliberately exterminated in their thousands by American forces.

The tortures and bestialities committed against individuals again reveal a common pattern of behaviour throughout the area visited, and cannot be passed over as the sadistic excesses of individuals.

The whole series of cases cited in this chapter of the report must not be taken as the whole evidence of cases committed but as typical of a vast number of similar cases brought to the attention of the Commission for examination. The torturing of people by beating, kicking, electric shocks, pouring water in the nose and throat to excess, cutting off various parts of the body, mutilation and the killing by shooting, bayoneting, suffocation, blowing up, burning alive and burying alive could be repeated again and again in sickening detail.

The Commission draws conclusions from these established facts which are set out later.

CHAPTER 5

AIR ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN POPULATION

I. DESTRUCTION OF CITIES AND VILLAGES

While travelling through many regions of Korea north of the 38th Parallel, the members of the Commission have seen for themselves that all the towns through which they passed, or in which they stayed, were completely destroyed or have only a small number of intact buildings left standing. They also saw heavy damage in many villages.

Enquiries into some characteritic cases established the circumstances in which this destruction was effected by air attacks by American planes:

(1). The City of Pyongyang

The capital of North Korea is a large city dominated by the Moran Hill. Before the war it had a population of 464,000 which had dropped to 181,000 by December 31, 1951.

Deputy Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee gave the Commission the following information:

Since June 27, 1950, the city of Pyongyang has been the target of many air attacks both by day and by night. In the course of these bombardments, more than 30,000 bombs (explosives, incendiaries and multiple explosives) have been dropped on the city. Up to December 31, 1951, out of 80,000 houses 64,000 were destroyed. In the year 1951 alone, 4,768 people were killed, and 2,438 seriously injured by these bombardments; 32 hospitals and dispensaries, 64 churches, 99 schools and university buildings, 1 museum and 29 theatres were completely destroyed. The hospitals which were under the control of the civil administration were marked with a red cross. On the 18th August 1950, the Military Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ordered that all buildings and vehicles used in the public health service should be marked with the Red Cross as soon as possible so that the sign should be clearly recognized from the air and from every side. (1)

Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army states that the city of Pyongyang did not possess a single arsenal or any factory that was used for military purposes. Nor had it any troops stationed there for the defence of the city. Further it has never had any A-A batteries in the city; they were placed outside and at some distance from the city. (2)

The members of the Commission have visited the city and seen the wholesale destruction of most of the dwelling houses. They have seen the ruins of several churches, still recognisable by their remainder of the steeples. They have also seen the ruin of the Kim Il Sung University. This grand building situated on a hill far from the centre of the city was bombarded several times before and after being set on fire by the American troops when they evacuated the city.

Witnesses described one of the bombardments of Pyongyang as follow:

On 16th September, 1950, when fighting was going on at a considerable distance away, the city was first attacked with incendiary bombs by more than 100 B-29s and then after a pause by 40 Gramans. These attacks took place in fine weather from about 10 a.m. in the morning till about 1 p.m. in the afternoon. Multiple explosive bombs exploding first in the air and again on contact with the earth were dropped for the first time on the town.

The burning of houses caused many victims. These victims included many people trying to find refuge on the Moran Hill, near the Monument of Liberation. In this place alone there were 70 deaths and the near the entrance to the shelter, 17 deaths. (3) (4) (5) Among the buildings destroyed in this bombardment, a church situated in Kwang Hu Ri quarter, could be identified by its steeple and its cross. (6)

Other air attacks were made, specially on December 3, 1950 (during the night) by a group of 6 B-29s; other attacks were during day-time and in fine weather on December 8th, 1950 by 7 B-29s, on December 24th, 1950 by 6 B-29s; on December 27th, 1950 by 11 B-29s; on January 3rd, 1951 by many B-29s with incendiary bombs; on July 30th, 1951 by 50 "Jets", flying very low; on August 15th, 1951 by a great number of fighters and bombers. Many of these attacks were after the departure of the American troops who occupied the city from October 19th to December 3rd, 1950. Many witnesses gave particulars to the Commission of the destruction of churches and schools. (7) (8) (9)

(2). The City of Soonchown, S. Pyongan Province

This city, when there were no troops, no A-A battery either at the time of attack or before, and had only a chemical factory, has been bombed a great many times and nearly completely destroyed.

Witnesses heard by the Commission gave full particulars of some of the destruction caused by the most intense attacks:—

On the 4th December, 1950 the day after the American troops withdrew from the city, a school clearly distinguishable by its playground, was bombed and destroyed.

On the 15th December 1950 in the morning an attack by "Jets" destroyed a large number of buildings and caused many casualties. 50 people were killed during raid, of whom 11 were machine-gunned.

On the 11th January 1951 about 30 B-29s bombed the town and

destroyed some churches which it was impossible to mistake for other buildings. (10) (11) (12) 13)

(3) The City of Kaichen, South Pyongan Province

This city was completely reduced to ruins.

One of the witnesses heard by the Commission said the most intense raids were on 20th July and 13th October 1950. In these two raids alone, out of a population of 7,500 nearly 1,000 were killed and 600 seriously injured. Planes dived and machine-gunned civilians in the streets. (14)

Another witness gave particulars of the destruction on 13th August of a school easily identifiable as such. (15)

The Commission visited the remains of this city. There did not appear to be a single dwelling above ground.

Every hospital, school, church, public building was destroyed.

The delegates of the International Democratic Federation of Women who visited Kaichen in May 1951 indicated in their report that they could see a big red cross still visible on the then remaining part of the roof of one of the town's hospitals; but when the members of the Commission were in Kaichen in March 1952, this mark was no more to be seen as the remainder of the building had been wholly destroyed in the interval.

Out of the prewar houses 1,342, only 15 remained standing.

The present population is 460, mainly living in holes dug in the neighbouring hills or in the rubble of the town itself.

There were no troops, no A-A battery, no military objectives in the town, apart from a railway line on the outskirts.

(4) The City of Anju

This town has suffered very heavy damage.

Two hospitals, a Catholic church, and many schools have been destroyed in the raids.

Out of 2,708 dwelling houses before the war, 2,172 have been destroyed.

In one of the bombardments the day after the Americans withdrew 63 people were killed. (16)

None of these buildings was situated in the neighbourhood of the railway; there was no military formation in or near the city; no A-A batteries, no military installations, no factory that was used for military purposes.

(5) The City of Nampo

The Vice-President of the People's Committee of Nampo informed the Commission of the following:

The city which had 100,000 inhabitants before the war was attacked on July 6th, 1950 for the first time by American planes including several B-29s.

In the course of this bombardment a granary was attacked and a very large quantity sacks of cereals destroyed.

New attacks took place on July 8th and July 12th, 1950. In the course of this last bombardment, 17 schools, 2 hospitals, 2 dispensaries and a theatre were destroyed. The bombardments lasted till the occupation of the city by the American troops, and after their evacuation of the city, bombardments by planes and battleships were renewed.

Particularly violent and murderous bombardments by B-20s, took place on 6th May, 1951. (17) (18) (See Chapter 3)

There were no troops, no military installations, no factory manufacturing arms in this city. The harbour was only used for fishing boats.

A glass-works and a foundry situated outside the city have been destroyed since the commencement of hostilities. The railwayline has been repeatedly bombed.

During their visit to the city, members of the Commission saw the total destruction of the city and the ruins of a big secondary school. This school was situated alone on a hill and surrounded by sport grounds. Ruins of several churches and of one hospital, also surrounded by open ground, were to be seen. They saw traces of a painted red cross on the roof of the hospital. Many marks of machine-gunning were seen.

(6) The City of Sariwon

This city was completely destroyed.

Deputy Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee indicated to the Commission that it has been frequently bombarded. The most violent attacks were made in fine weather on September 14th, September 21st, 1950; October 12th, 1950; February 5th, April 3rd, and 23rd, May 15th, August 1st, October 12th and December 25th, 1951 by B-29s, 2 engine planes and Gramans. The number of bombs dropped in the city is estimated at 3,000.

In the city there were no factory used for military purposes, no troops stationed, no military installations, and the railwayline has not been used since the beginning of the hostilities. A-A batteries were only installed in the second half of 1951.

Among the buildings destroyed in the course of the bombardments were 11 schools, 1 public library, 4 clubs, 4 churches, 16 dispensaries and hospitals. These hospitals were under civil administration, and marked with a red cross according to the instructions of the People's Committee. 1,391 people were killed by bombing and machine-gunning and over 3,000 wounded. (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)

(7) The City of Sinchon

Many bombardments were made by B-29s, 2 engined planes and Gramans, particularly on August 13, 1950 and on December 23, 1951.

The attacks took place generally in day-time and in fine weather; they lasted half an hour to an hour. There was never any fighting near the city.

The city of Sinchon had no factory that was used for military purposes; no military installations and no A-A batteries. No troops were stationed there.

The railwayline had been destroyed early in the war and was not used.

The hospitals were under civil administration and were marked with a red cross. (24)

(8) The City of Anak

Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee of the city pointed out that the city has been very frequently bombarded since the beginning of the hostilities. The principal attacks were made on about 20th September, 1950 and during the months of April and May 1951 by B-29s and Jets. There were no soldiers stationed in the city. There were no military installation, no factory used for military purposes, no A-A batteries and no railwayline. 2 churches, 8 schools, and 1 hospital were destroyed. The hospital was under civil administration and was marked with a red cross.

911 persons were killed by machine-gunning.

At the time of bombardments, the front was 120-200 km. away from the city. (25)

(9) The Village of Yongkang

The members of the Commission thought it useful to investigate one case, taken as an example, of a village destroyed by bombardment and visited the village of Yongkang.

This village is situated to the southwest of Pyongyang. It was attacked on January 12th, 1951, at 11 a.m. for three hours by six 2 engined planes which dropped about 150 incendiary bombs and machine-gunned the inhabitants. 36 among 115 houses were completely burned. There were 8 persons killed including 6 children from 2 to 15 years of age and 2 persons badly burned. (26) (27)

The preceding examples show that the American planes flew over cities and villages behind the front which had in general no military objectives. The planes bombarded them without discrimination, and caused many casualties among civil population. Hospitals, indicated by a red cross, and churches and school easily recognizable were destroyed.

2. DESTRUCTION OF ISOLATED BUILDINGS

(1) Destruction of a School at Koo Ryen Ri

On March 11, 1952, at 9:30 a.m. when the Commission proceeded to this locality to make enquiries, 4 Graman planes attacked a school with explosive bombs. This school was situated about 1 km. from the houses of the inhabitants. This school was easily recognizable from the form of its construction. It could not even be confused with a factory.

The members of the Commission could see on their arrival that the building was intact. Thereafter the roof was damaged by the bombardment. The planes then dived and machine-gunned, but caused no victim.

The village Koo Ryen Ri is situated 40 km. from any railway-line. It had no military installation, no factory used for military purposes and no troops stationed there.

Immediately after the bombardment, the members of the Commission heard the evidence of a witness who had seen bombardment. The members of the Commission also examined the damage themselves. (28)

(2) Destruction of Buildings of Culture

President of the Commissariat for Research and Conservation of Cultural Objects has furnished the Commission with a report about the destruction of buildings and cultural object. He also furnished the Commission with a list of 29

buildings (temples, palaces, pavilions) of great archaeological, artistic or historical value destroyed. These buildings were generally bombarded shortly after the retreat of the American troops. The American command could not ignore the cultural value of the objects bombarded. The President pointed out that most of the buildings were constructed with the customary architectural features according to religious traditions. He gave many photos to the Commission, which showed that the destroyed temples were built in groups of buildings in the characteristic style, and many were situated in isolated places. (29)

The Commission proceeded to Pyongyang to make enquiry about the destruction of Temple Yang Myong which was one of the most ancient buildings built on the 11th century It was situated in a park on the slope of Moran Hill overlooking on the Daidong River. There was no other building in the immediate vicinity of the temple.

The bombardment of Yang Myong Temple took place on January 3, 1951 shortly after the retreat of the American troops. It attacked by B-29s with incendiary bombs in fine weather between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. In the course of the same attack incendiary bombs were also dropped on the city 800 metres away from the temple. No other part of the Moran Hill was bombarded on that day. (30)

On visiting the place, the members of the Commission could testify that the temple was completely destroyed.

The Commission in its lengthy journeys through Korea has seen for itself the terrible destruction of towns and villages, of hospitals, churches, schools, factories, mills and means of communication. It has seen for itself on innumerable occasions the destruction wrought by indiscriminate bombing on places that could not conceivably have been military targets as understood in international law. Differentiation between defended and undefended cities apparently did not exist. Whether a building was protected under the Rules of War or not appears to have made no difference.

It has also seen how the Korean people despite the destruction of their homes and villages is living today. In holes dug in the rubble of cities, in holes dug in the sides of hills, the Korean people are continuing their daily occupations, tending the fields, work-

ing in underground factories, sending the children to underground or cavelike schools, and in their leisure moments going to an underground cinema or theatre.

The devastation caused by American planes is contrary to all concepts of international law, and must be understood in this light.

CHAPTER 6

OTHER WAR CRIMES

A. WILFUL DESTRUCTION OF CIVIL PROPERTY

In almost every town or village occupied at some time by American troops and visited by members of the Commission cases of the deliberate destruction of civilian properties were brought forward for examination and reports made by the Investigating Commissions appointed by local People's Committees after the evacuation of American troops were produced.

The Commission investigated typical cases in some towns and examined eye-witnesses.

Kaichen District. The Kaichen Higher Middle School and Primary Middle School, a modern building standing in its own grounds was used during the occupation of the town by American troops for military purposes. On 30th November 1950, the day when they evacuated the town gasoline was thrown onto the buildings, which were then fired and destroyed. Other public buildings in this district were similarly destroyed. (1) (2)

Soonchown, S. Pyongan Province. On 4th December 1950, the day of evacuation by American troops, Soon Tang People's School (Primary), Kwang San Il Ri, which had been used as an American military hospital, was fired with gasoline by the retreating forces and destroyed. (3)

The following buildings in this district were similarly destroyed by fire on 3rd and 4th December 1950:

Soonchown Girls' Middle School
Soonchown People's School (Primary)
Eunshan Middle School for Girls
Eunshan Middle School for Boys
Soonchown Boys' Middle School
Two People's Schools in Milcheun
Soonchown "Father in Heaven" Church (Roman Catholic) (4) (5)

B. PILLAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF OBJECTS OF CULTURAL INTEREST

Pyongyang Museum. This most important of the Museums of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was pillaged by American troops occupying Pyongyang, on the 29th October and 3rd November 1950. Evidence was given by the Director of the Museum who saw the pillage of the Museum. (6)

A concrete cavern had been constructed in the grounds of the Museum, which stands on a hill surrounded by parkland. The treasures of the Museum were placed in this cavern which was sealed up so far as necessary ventilation permitted, and concealed by earth before the American occupation. American troops operating under orders of a Superior searched for and found this cavern, which was broken open and what seemed from their appearance to be the most valuable objects were taken away in American army trucks.

A safe in the Museum was blown open and statuary wantonly damaged. (6)

. . . . . .

President of the Commissariat for Research and Conservation of Cultural Objects states that during the period of American occupation, they entered, in addition to the Pyongyang Museum referred to above, the Historical Museum of Kim Il Sung University, the Historical Museum of Chung-jin, the Historical Museum of Hamheung, the Special Museum of Mt. Myohyang, N. Pyongan Province and the Historical Museum of Haijoo, Hwanghai Province. 6,709 objects of artistic or historical interest were pillaged or destroyed while materials and books were burned. Among other places of historic interest wantonly damaged or destroyed were an ancient grave of Kokuryo period (circa 400 A.D.) with frescoes at Kang Seu, S. Pyongan Province which was destroyed and used as a warehouse; an ancient grave decorated with brilliant frescoes in Pyong-Gang, S. Pyongan Province, utilised as a gaol for the imprisonment of Korean civilians; and ancient grave of the Kokuryo period with frescoes in Anak, Hwanghai Province, which was damaged by hand grenades, and later bombed. (7)

C. DESTRUCTION AND CONFISCATION OF GRAINS

In a number of cases referred to above (in Chapter 4) the initial seizure of persons subsequently ill-treated or murdered was on their refusing to give up grain or livestock without production of proper authority to requisition; and without being offered a receipt or compensation. In addition,

statistics prepared by Investigating Commissions of Goon People's Commitees after evacuation of their respective areas by American troops were produced to the Commission which disclosed substantial seizures and wanton destruction of foodstuffs and livestock by the occupying forces, not needed to supply the occupying forces, and without regard to the requirements of the civilian population. (2) (5) Typical cases investigated by the Commission are:—

Chang I Ri, Soonchown Goon. 15th December 1950. Shortly after evacuation of the area by American troops, grain stacked in sacks in an open field was destroyed by incendiary bombs dropped by low flying American planes in daylight. (8)

Nong Rim Ri, Anju Goon. 19th October 1950, family of peasants, together with 30 other villagers seized and imprisoned, for refusing to hand over grain and livestock to U.S. troops without requisitioning authority, and without receipt or compensation. (9)

Kaichen. 2nd of October 1950, 500 sacks of unhusked rice and corn taken by U.S. troops by truck from Warehouse of Taxes in Kind and used as a bridge. (10)

Sam Po Ri, Kaichen Goon. 5th November 1950, 500 mals of rice in the yards of 2 peasant farmers set on fire by U.S. troops with gasoline and destroyed. (10)

Book Song Ri, Anju Goon. 9th November 1950, Grain and livestock demanded by American troops without producing any authority to requisition, or rendering receipt or compensation. (11)

D. OFFENCES AGAINST P.O.W.'S

Kaichen. A soldier of the Korean People's Army in uniform, with military identification card was taken prisoner by American soldiers at the home of his father Cha Yu Suk, together with his mother (see above Chapter 4). He and his mother were shot by the Americans two days later, and the bodies recovered by the father. (12)

Bek Dong. N. Pyongan Province No. 5 P.O.W. Camp was bombed three times by U.S. planes:

2 p.m. 9th November 1950
9:30 a.m. 14th November 1950
1:30 p.m. 19th November 1950

The Commission was informed by the Korean Authorities that after the first attack a protest was made to U.N.O., which gave particulars of the situation of this camp, but has not itself seen the relevant document.

The camp is now marked with a large sign visible from the air. On all these occasions the weather was clear, and the camp, standing at the tip of a small peninsula at the confluence of the Yalu River and a tributary cannot possibly be mistaken for any other objective. The P.O.W.s having taken shelter there were no casualties, but buildings were destroyed.

Chosan. N. Pyongan Province No. 1. P.O.W. camp has been bombed twice by American planes. 10 p.m. 13th October 1951, bombed with anti-personnel bombs and high explosive. 2 British officers, 1 British and 5 U.S. P.O.W.s were injured, 3 U.S. casualties later dying from wounds. Among the camp staff, two men killed and I wounded. Fragments of bombs and tail fins bearing U.S. markings were found.

16th March 1952. Bombed again with damage to 3 British P.O.W. huts and injury to 1 British P.O.W.

The camp is situated in mountainous country in N. Korea. There is no railway, military camp, depot or installation or any possible military objective in the vicinity of the camp.

The evidence concerning these two raids was given to the Commission by a number of British P.O.W.s in the Camp. (13) (14)

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The Commission has given very careful consideration to the facts disclosed in this Report, to which it has applied the principles of international law universally accepted by civilised states.

It is not the function of this Commission to pass a final judgment. It is not a Tribunal that is competent to do so. Its duty is limited to an investigation of the facts, and to indicate the offences against international law which, in its opinion, these facts disclose. If there be a defence to the crimes this Report discloses, that defence must be heard by an appropriate international Tribunal before final judgment can be passed.

On this footing the Commission reaches the following conclusions: —

I. By the deliberate dispersion of flies and other insects artificially infected with bacteria against the Korean People's Army and among the civilian population of North Korea, with the intention of spreading death and disease, a most grave and horrible crime has been perpetrated by U.S. forces

in Korea, contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land of 1907, and to the universally accepted law prohibiting bacteriological warfare which was re-stated in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

2. By the use of poison gas bombs, and other chemical substances among the civilian population of North Korea, the U.S. forces are guilty of a planned and deliberate breach of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Article 23 (a) and (e) and of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

3. By the murder en masse of civilians or of individuals without charge, without trial, including many women and children throughout the areas occupied by them the United States forces and Syngman Rhee soldiers under their command have acted in defiance of the express provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 (Art. 46) imposing a duty on the occupying power to protect the lives of inhabitants.

4. By the wrongful seizure and imprisonment, ill-treatment and tortures of the civilian inhabitants in the areas occupied, the U.S. forces and Syng man Rhee soldiers under their command have again broken the express provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907.

5. By the bombardment of undefended towns and villages far from the front and the indiscriminate destruction from the air of non-military objectives, the American forces have again acted in defiance of the accepted laws and customs of war, and in particular in breach of the Hague Regulations.

6. By the destruction of protected buildings, such as buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, historic monuments and hospitals, in some cases in the indiscriminate bombardment of undefended towns and villages, and in others by deliberate attack on these protected buildings, when they were being used solely for the purpose for which they were intended, and where necessary, marked with appropriate signs. The American forces have again broken the Hague Regulations of 1907 and in particular Article 27.

7. By the deliberate destruction by fire and explosive of public buildings of a civil or non-military character when such destruction was not imperatively demanded by the exigencies of war, the American forces are in breach of the Hague Regulations and in particular of Articles 55 and 56.

8. By the confiscation without requisitioning authority, and without compensation or receipt, or by the deliberate destruction of foodstuffs and the private property of civilians, not necessary for the maintenance of the

occupying forces, the American troops have again broken the Hague Regulations and in particular Articles 46 and 52.

9. By the murder of prisoners of war, American troops have been guilty of a breach of the Conventions of 1929 and 1949 concerning the treatment of Prisoners of War.

10. By the pillage of historic works of arts, and of private property, the American forces have been guilty of offences against Hague Regulations (Art. 47).

In the opinion of the Commission all the above constitute war crimes as defined by Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.

Having regard to the extent and character of the crimes revealed, the Commission is of the opinion that the American forces in Korea have been guilty of crimes against humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Charter, as follows: —

1. By the wholesale destruction or extermination of sections of the civilian inhabitants, and in particular of refugees without any attempt to bring any to trial for any offence, and by the terroristic methods adopted against whole sections of the Korean people, and since 28th January 1952 by the use on a large scale of the bacteriological weapons against civilians;

2. By the destruction or attempted destruction of the way of life of the people of North Korea, by the destruction of its schools, university, museums, its historic monuments and cultural objects, by the destruction of the organs of government and the murder of its officials.

Taking the view that the extensive murders are not the result of individual excesses, but indicate a pattern of behaviour by the U.S. forces throughout the areas occupied by them, and taking into account that the employment of bacteriological and chemical weapons over extensive areas of the country must constitute an attempt to destroy a whole people or part of a people, the Commission is of the opinion that the American forces are guilty of the crime of Genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948.

In the light of these conclusions, the Commission must name those who should be brought to the bar of world justice to answer for these crimes. The Commission has no hesitation in saying that many of these crimes could not have been committed without the fullest knowledge of and planning by the leaders of the government of the U.S.A. and of the High Command of the U.S. Forces. It therefore indicts these people and all officers commanding in the field who are responsible for these crimes together with all individual soldiers who accepted and carried out orders contrary to international law.

With these conclusions we have completed the task that was imposed upon us by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers.

We feel bound to say that our experiences in Korea, in the conduct of our investigation have filled us with horror and dismay at the savagery revealed. We know that there are many, who, like some of ourselves before our journey, will find it difficult to accept the terrible facts established in this Report. We therefore solemnly pledge our honour as lawyers and as ordinary men and women to the truth of the facts disclosed. We have come from different countries, we do not share a common religion, a common political outlook, or even a common tongue. We have endeavoured to perform our task conscientiously and with full regard to our responsibilities as lawyers.

This Report, the result of our labours, is unanimous.

We believe that those who read it will share our horror and detestation of the crimes and criminals.

We ourselves are determined that the rule of law shall be upheld in the world, that no state, individual, however mighty, shall escape the consequences of their crimes.

Justice will prevail, and to secure justice, the world must secure peace.

This Report, we hope, will be a contribution to the struggle for world peace, and especially for Korea whose sufferings must never be forgotten, and whose peace must be rapidly secured.

We must conclude by expressing our conviction that the events in Korea cannot be treated as an isolated incident, but as a phase in the development of active war that may endanger and engulf the whole world. The use of such inhuman weapons as bacteriological warfare must be taken to indicate a new degree of savagery in the conduct of so-called civilised states which must threaten every man, woman and child. All who cherish a desire for a life of peace and security for themselves and their children, must understand the lesson. Peace is the property of the people and must be preserved by the active struggle of the people.

This report is written in English and signed by all the members of the Commission, in Peking on 31st March 1952.

Dr. Brandweiner
L. Cavalieri
Jack Gaster
Marc Jacquier
Ko Po-nien (in Chinese)
M.L. Moerens
Letelba Rodrigues De Britto
Z. Wasilkowska.

APPENDIX

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND OF PRINCIPAL WITNESSES REFERRED TO IN REPORT

CHAPTER 2

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. Report
2. Act No. 1
3. Act No. 2
4. Photos Nos. 8 and 9
5. Kim Tu Wan
6. Ri Yang Rin
7. An Kyo Tai
8. Kim Il Sun
9. Ra Dong Sook
10. O Ching Keun
11. Kim Yong Chan
12. Kim Jin Soon
13. Choi Du Sop

CHAPTER 3

CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. Report of the Head of the Health Section of Nampo City People's Committee
2. Doctor Kim Chu Hwa
3. Doctor Kim Chu Hwa
4. Doctor Kim Chu Hwa
5. Doctor Kim Chu Hwa and 9 others
6. Doctor Kim-Won-Son
7. Doctors Ryu Cha Jin and O Choong Hyen
8. Choi Dong Kyu and 5 others
9. Choi-Chung-Mun and 2 others
10. Map of bombed area of Poong-po si
11. Report of the mission sent by the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Health
12. Photo of An Yung Ha
13. Photo of Yang Choon Ok
14. Han Sang Ok, Doctor

15. Doctor Jo Hi Dong
16. Case history of An Yung Ha
17. Case history of Yang Choon-Ok
18. Doctor Ri Kuk Bom
19. Doctor Huang He Nam
20. Doctor Jo Yeb Boon
21. Doctor Kim Yun Kuan
22. Doctor Li Kang Chel
23. Doctor Choi Suk Bok
24. You Ok Nyo
25. Kim Jung Ja
26. Kang Kyeng Ok
27. You Kouk Lyol
28. Li Rong Choung
29. Han Myong Dong
30. Bak Kyong Soun
31. Li Ok Nyo
32. Information supplied by Ly Chang Tai, President of the Doctors' Association of Kang Won Province
33. Report made by many doctors of the Won-San Central Hospital

CHAPTER 4

MASSACRES, MURDERS AND OTHER ATROCITIES

1. Byen Yoon Kyoo
2. Kim Man Suk
3. O Tai Sin
4. Heu Pil Soon
5. Kim Hyen Choon
6. Choi Kye Hyen
7. Kim Sun Soo
8. Pak Chung Hi
9. Choi Soon Sil
10. O Choong Dong
11. Moon
12. Choi In Wha
13. O Yeb Poon
14. Kim Yang Sun
15. Yoo Joon Soo
16. Choi Myeng
17. Ri Sung Bong
18. Chung Chi Eun
19. Kim Sung Choon
20. Chun Deuk Woo
21. Seu Ki Ho
22. Han Bo Boo
23. Kim Tai Soon
24. Choi Yoon Yeng
25. Kim Ke Wol
26. Kim Yong Sun
27. O Bong Nyung
28. Choi Sun Ok
29. Koo Sung Jin
30. Choi Ki Suk
31. Kim Dol Suk
32. Woo Mal Che
33. Pak Yong Nyo
34. Li Kab Bye
35. Kim Sang Hyen
36. Choi Soon Sil
37. Kim Hyen Choor
38. Yoo Joon Soo
39. An Deuk Sil
40. Choi Ki Ok
41. Kim Young Sook
42. Ge Kil Ryeu

43. Cha Yoo Suk
44. Kang Jin Hyen
45. Ri Sun Sil
46. Choi Yeum Jeung
47. Kim Ke Wol
48. Pai Jin Kyem
49. Cha Deuk Keun
50. Ri Yoon Sook
51. Pak Myeng Deuk
52. Mrs. Ree

CHAPTER 5

AIR ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

1. Instruction 5 of the Military Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 18th August 1950
2. Statement of Vice Chief of Staff of the Korean People's Army
3. Choi Seng Hwan
4. Choi Tai Jin
5. Ri Sam Hwa
6. Byen Rin Se
7. Ri Hak
8. Kim Ok Kyun
9. Ri Woon Ryong
10. Jo Do Won
11. Kim So Jo
12. Kim Ok Soon
13. Chung Sin Kyun
14. Kim Kwan Bong
15. Ri Dong Seb
16. Kim Hyen Young
17. Choi Dong Kyu
18. Kim Chu Hwa
19. Ok Yeng Ja
20. Yang Tai Il
21. Rim Boong Jin
22. Ri Bong Pal
23. Eak Doo Hieng
24. Bien Un Gu
25. Mun Jung Seung
26. Hong Chun Cha
27. Li Chang Chun
28. Lim Byng Lhik
29. Report of President of the Commissariat for Research and Conservation of Cultural Objects
30. Choi Serg Hwan

CHAPTER 6

OTHER WAR CRIMES

1. Ri Sung Sub
2. Statistical Summary of Damage at Kaichen
3. Chun Woon Hak
4. Teun Tai Seung
5. Statistical Summary of Damage at Soonchown
6. Hwang Wook

7. President of the Commissariat for Research and Conservation of Cultural Objects
8. Kim So Jo
9. Ri Yoon Sook
10. Kim Eung Ryel
11. Choi Yoon Yeng
12. Cha Yoo Suk
13. Statement of British P.O.W.s (Photostat)
14. Statement of British P.O.W.s (Photostat)

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